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Abstract 
 
The thesis I try to develop here hopes to contribute to some recent discussions on the evolution 
of human creative cognition. In particular, it is a response to the view that pretend play was a 
primary driver of the evolution of human creativity, a position defended in Carruthers (2002), 
Picciuto and Carruthers (2014) and elsewhere. This thesis doesn’t directly address what we 
might think of as a traditional philosophical puzzle. Instead, my concern here is with a puzzle 
that has its origins in palaeoanthropology. While it might not be ‘our’ puzzle, it nonetheless 
touches upon areas which have long been the concern of philosophers: the nature of thought 
and its relationship to language, the nature of representation in art, and more recent concerns 
with our understanding of concepts like the imagination and creativity and what their 
relationship might be. It appears as though the emergence of our species saw a rapid (in 
evolutionary terms) development of material culture, from new hunting techniques to the 
production of representational art. Because of its dramatic contrast with the relatively stagnant 
material culture of pre-cursor hominids this has sometimes been described as a ‘creative 
explosion’. One of the central questions this dramatic change prompts is what drove this 
explosion? Many answers have been posited, including the emergence of language, the 
appearance of pretend play in childhood, and the accumulation of material wealth in the form 
of skills and improved tools that allowed our ancestors the time to be creative. I develop an 
alternative thesis which sees a co-evolution of language, a tendency to engage in fantasy, and the 
externalisation of this tendency in storytelling as the explanation.  
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INTRODUCTION 
An Overview 
 
Introduction 
 
The thesis I try to develop here aims to contribute to some recent discussions on the 
evolution of human creative cognition. In particular, it is a response to the view that pretend 
play was a primary driver of the evolution of human creativity, a position defended in 
Carruthers (2002), Picciuto and Carruthers (2014) and elsewhere.  This thesis doesn’t directly 
address what we might think of as a traditional philosophical puzzle. Instead, my concern here 
is with a puzzle that has its origins in palaeoanthropology. While it might not be ‘our’ puzzle, it 
nonetheless touches upon areas which have long been the concern of philosophers: the nature of 
thought and its relationship to language, the nature of representation in art, and more recent 
concerns with our understanding of concepts like the imagination and creativity and what their 
relationship might be. It appears as though the emergence of our species saw a rapid (in 
evolutionary terms) development of material culture, from new hunting techniques to the 
production of representational art. Because of its dramatic contrast with the relatively stagnant 
material culture of pre-cursor hominids this has sometimes been described as a ‘creative 
explosion’. One of the central questions this dramatic change prompts is what drove this 
explosion? Many answers have been posited, including the emergence of language, the 
appearance of pretend play in childhood, and the accumulation of material wealth in the form 
of skills and improved tools that allowed our ancestors the time to be creative. I develop an 
alternative thesis which sees a co-evolution of language, a tendency to engage in fantasy, and the 
externalisation of this tendency in storytelling as the explanation. 
 
The first two chapters of this thesis function as a survey of a wide range of relevant 
literature on the topics of creativity, the imagination, language, and their evolution. This 
includes both philosophical literature and empirical research from palaeoanthropology, 
comparative psychology and linguistics. The subsequent three chapters develop the key claims 
of this thesis: that the evolution of creativity was driven forward when a capacity for language 
evolved in a species with a predisposition to engage in fantasy and to share interesting things. 
When language ‘got into place’ in our species, we began to externalise our fantasies, sharing 
them with our conspecifics for mutual enjoyment. In turn, the most useful (evolutionarily 
speaking) and most entertaining fantasies were developed into stories that became deeply 
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embedded in the culture of the groups telling them, even shaping the lexicon available to these 
groups. As these cultures became more sophisticated as their members bonded ever closer 
through their esoteric shared lexicon and mythology, and their stories took on increased 
significance, these stories began to manifest themselves in other mediums, specifically as cave 
art. 
 
Chapter 1: Imagination & Creativity 
 
The first chapter deals specifically with literature analysing creativity and the 
imagination, as well as their connection. It begins by re-examining the traditional analyses of 
creativity: the Inspiration View and the Derangement View. The Inspiration View sees the creator 
(specifically, an artist or poet) as divinely inspired, or a mouthpiece of the gods. I argue in the 
first chapter that such a view is the result of the ‘flash phenomenology’ of creativity – it often 
appears as though our creative insights come out of nowhere, creating a sense that we must 
have taken inspiration from some outside source, such as a muse or a god (perhaps, I suggest, as 
helpful an explanation as any in the absence of an adequate naturalistic explanation). This 
feeling has some similarities to cases of thought insertion in schizophrenia, but a key difference 
is the accompanying sense of authorship in creative inspiration which is absent in cases of 
thought insertion.  
 
Creativity is drawn even closer to cases of mental illness via the Derangement View, 
though, which elucidates a view that still has traction in popular ideas of genius: that there is a 
fine line between genius and insanity. Although Schopenhauer’s version of the Derangement 
View sees madness as a result of genius (caused by the artist’s insight into a world beyond our 
own), I suggest that the opposite causal relationship holds: mental illness allows the artist to 
flout social, moral and cultural conventions (perhaps because they are simply unable to 
comprehend them), unleashing creativity. That mental illnesses like schizophrenia have not 
been weeded out through evolutionary processes is something of a puzzle, and I come to 
examine this puzzle in Chapter 6. 
 
The chapter moves on to modern analyses of creativity, which attempt to unpack the 
concept of creativity into necessary and sufficient conditions. A range of views from the last few 
centuries (from Kant to Boden) are analysed to reveal their common ground: each advocates 
for a version of two necessary conditions: originality and value. A process or product is creative 
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only if it is novel, i.e. the invention or innovation is new either to all agents or to some 
particular agent. However, originality alone is not sufficient for creativity – the invention or 
innovation must also have value to all or some agent(s). Original nonsense would not be 
considered to be creative on such an account. A third criterion, highlighted by Berys Gaut, is 
also included in our understanding of creativity: agency. Gaut recognises that some new product 
or process cannot be considered creative, even if it is novel and valuable, if it was created 
entirely accidentally or by simply following some mechanical procedure of discovery. 
 
With an understanding of creativity in place, Chapter 1 moves on to consider the 
nature of the imagination and its connection to the accounts of creativity just outlined. What 
emerges is the difficulty of providing any comprehensive taxonomy of the imagination. I outline 
here only a small amount of its purported variants and uses. We see that imagination can be 
propositional in form (‘imagining that’) or objectual (‘imagining X’), that it can be spontaneous or 
deliberate (the latter being consciously controlled and the former casting the imaginer as a 
spectator), and that it can be solitary or social (one imaginer vs. imaginings involving two or 
more collaborators). I argue that the significance of social imaginings, in particular, have been 
neglected in the literature, and develop the argument here and in Chapter 5 that storytelling 
(especially in the oral tradition) is a particularly important form of social imagining in that it has 
a great explanatory role to play with regard to the evolution of human creativity. The practice 
of storytelling necessarily depends upon propositional imagining too, which I argue in Chapter 
3 either emerges, or takes on distinctive features, with the evolution of language. 
 
 The link between imagination and creativity is fairly clear in cases where our 
imaginings become manifest as creative products, such as the stories mentioned above, or 
technological innovations where we use objectual imagining to mentally rotate a stone as we 
craft a hand axe (See Chapter 2). Imaginings themselves can also be creative where they have 
originality and value. However, given that something’s originality and value can be relative to 
cultures, groups, and even individual agents, we must be cautious not to conflate being 
imaginative with being creative. One kind of imagining has been repeatedly singled out by 
authors as lacking in creativity (perhaps entirely, on some accounts): fantasy. Yet it is my 
contention in this thesis that fantasy is actually an important driver of the evolution of 
creativity. My first chapter therefore begins to build the case for the defence of fantasy. 
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 Examining the thoughts of Freud, Currie and Ravenscroft, Gaut, Walton, and Scruton 
on fantasising, I suggest that many philosophers have been led to underestimate its significance 
to the evolution of creativity because of the ease with which it can be done, and the pleasure so 
closely associated with it. I argue (beginning in Chapter 1 and continuing in Chapter 4) it is, in 
fact, because of this that it marks itself out as an ideal candidate for everyday creativity in the 
form of stories, jokes, and many other ways. As such, fantasy needs to be given closer 
examination in the literature on imagination. 
 
Chapter 2: The Evolution of Human Creative Cognition 
 
 Chapter 2 gives us further reasons to focus on the role of fantasy, but it arrives at these 
reasons via an analysis of the evolution of human creative cognition. The chapter begins with a 
puzzle: given that the cognitive basis for human creativity, including fully-syntactic language, 
got into place around 100,000 years ago, why did human beings apparently not begin engaging 
in widespread creative behaviour until some 60,000 years later? This is the supposed ‘puzzle of 
the Creative Explosion’.  
 
I detail in this chapter evidence and argumentation from palaeoanthropology and 
linguistics that tracks both the evolution of our species and of our capacity for language. A 
number of scholars have attempted to solve the puzzle of the creative explosion by saying that 
this explosion takes place only after language appears, but evidence about human migration 
patterns suggest that such a basis must have been in place before human beings began leaving 
Africa, ultimately inhabiting the rest of the world, around 100,000 years ago. Moreover, if 
there is a strong connection between the imagination and creativity, as I suggest there is in 
Chapter 1, then an analysis of our evolutionary ancestors suggests that even before the basis for 
language got into place we already had relatively rich imaginative resources available to us. This 
is what makes the puzzle so, well, puzzling! Why didn’t language immediately trigger an 
expansion in creative output in our species? 
 
To address this issue, I detail the imaginative basis available to us prior to language by 
examining the imaginative capacities of non-human animals and pre-cursor hominids. It is 
possible that non-human animals have some (limited) capacity to imagine the future, and they 
also appear to be able to demonstrate some ability to imagine alternative solutions to a 
problem. These capacities suggest some underlying capacity for episodic memory (the ability to 
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mentally relive past events) and some capacity for objectual imagination, perhaps using percept-
based mental representations to hold in mind possible sequences of actions to be tried out to 
solve a problem. More controversially, there is some evidence of apes engaging in episodes of 
pretend play, which would seem to require a capacity for secondary representation: being able 
to represent some object in thought both as the object itself, but also simultaneously as 
something else e.g. mentally representing a banana as both a banana and a phone. 
 
Whatever the imaginative capacities of non-human animals, it seems safe to suggest that 
those capacities would be outstripped by those of the earliest hominids. Evidence from the 
archaeological record, such as their ability to rapidly adapt to new ecological niches and their 
stone-knapping techniques suggest advanced objectual imagination capacities and analogical 
reasoning skills. It is also possible that precursor hominids were also engaging in creative 
activities such as dancing and singing (an idea I return to in Chapter 5). Language, it is generally 
thought, would provide an additional capacity for generating new ideas which would enhance 
any pre-existing capacities we can identify. Yet the puzzling 60,000 year gap remains. Clearly, 
then, something in addition to language is required to kick-start human creativity. But what? 
 
I outline in Chapter 2 a recent attempt to address this question, that of Picciuto and 
Carruthers, 2014. According to their account, the missing ingredient was pretend play. Clearly, 
if the non-human animal evidence for pretend play is taken at face value, then this explanation 
might seem initially unlikely, but it is worth keeping in mind that evolution is rarely linear. 
Traits sometimes emerge at (effectively) the wrong time, and thus are not selected for, but 
emerge again later in the lineage and demonstrate their adaptive advantageousness; sometimes 
they emerge as spandrels (by-products of some other adaptation that later turn out to have 
adaptive benefits of their own when environmental circumstances change). Moreover, we 
might conclude that the evidence for pretend play in non-human animals is simply inconclusive 
or implausible. It is something like this position that Picciuto and Carruthers take, asserting that 
the kind of play observed in non-human animals does not involve pretence. 
 
Pretend play, then, according to Picciuto and Carruthers is a uniquely human 
phenomenon that utilises experiential and propositional imagining. It utilises the capacity for 
secondary representation to generate suppositions for imagined scenarios, and children act as 
though these suppositions were true. Imagined events and scenarios actually carry with them 
some of the rewards of their real-life counterparts: a child imagining calling up their favourite 
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grandparent on the telephone (by ‘dialling’ a banana) will actually get some of the enjoyment 
that the real thing would have brought them. Our imaginations are hardwired to our reward 
systems, meaning that we’re naturally motivated to engage in episodes of fantasy and 
imagination. But there are adaptive advantages to pretend play too: the cognitive basis for 
pretend play in childhood is essentially the same basis for creativity in adulthood, so exercising 
these particular cognitive muscles in infancy should make us more creative in later years. As 
such, pretend play in childhood should predict creativity in adulthood. 
 
 However, examination of the empirical evidence fails to bear out Picciuto and 
Carruthers’ hypothesis. In a review of the relevant literature, Lillard et al., 2012 arrive at the 
view that there is no conclusive or persuasive evidence to support the suggestion that pretend 
play in childhood enhances creativity in adulthood. If the evidence draws any picture at all for 
us, it is that pretend play is the result of some other selected-for capability involved with 
creative cognition. As such, whatever explains the evolution of creativity would best fit the 
evidence if it could also account for the emergence of pretend play in childhood. I argue that 
my own solution to the puzzle of the Creative Explosion does just that. 
 
 Picciuto and Carruthers do give us some valuable insights on how to approach the task 
of solving the puzzle at hand. We need to explain the emergence of some trait that utilises the 
biological basis that was in place prior to human beings leaving Africa 100,000 years ago, and 
their observation that imagination is hardwired to our reward circuits is an incredibly useful 
starting point. I suggest that Picciuto and Carruthers are too quick to dismiss fantasy as a useful 
driver of creative cognition, and return to this suggestion in Chapter 4. However, an important 
task remains to be done at this point, which is to set out precisely what language is in the sense 
relevant to this thesis, and what it might contribute to the imaginative capacities we inherited 
from our evolutionary ancestors. It is this task that I turn to in Chapter 3. 
 
Chapter 3: Language and Human Creative Cognition 
 
My third chapter attempts to show how the evolution of language in our species 
changed creative cognition. It begins by outlining a distinction between language as a cultural 
object and language as a natural object. Natural languages, such as English, German, Mandarin 
etc. are cultural objects consisting of arbitrary conventions developed over a number of 
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generations. However, underlying these conventional systems are a series of biological 
adaptations that make up the faculty of language. These adaptations might be thought of as a 
natural object. Study of the evolution of language could focus on language as either a cultural or 
a natural object, in the former case tracking the changes to the conventions of a natural 
language over time and in the latter case tracking the emergence of the various biological traits 
that language depends upon (those for vocalisation, grammar etc.) 
 
Though both language as a cultural object and as a natural object are relevant here, the 
primary focus of this thesis is the emergence of our capacity for language and its impact on 
human creative cognition, and thus the main focus in this chapter is on its underlying biological 
basis. The human language faculty appears to be a universal trait across our species, and 
Generative Grammarians like Noam Chomsky have sought to investigate the computational 
constraints that appear to operate on all human languages. A theory of these constraints is called 
Universal Grammar. Universal Grammar accounts for every possible combination of rules 
governing language, and thus every possible (permissible) utterance. Each natural language 
selects from Universal Grammar the rules governing its syntax, semantics and phonology, and 
Universal Grammar itself functions as a ‘language acquisition device’, allowing us to identify 
which rules are in play in the languages we acquire as children. Studying Universal Grammar, 
therefore, allows generative grammarians to establish the basic computational processes 
involved in generating linguistic utterances in every language. 
 
Chapter 3 presents a particular view on the computational process underpinning 
language, that of Wolfram Hinzen. Hinzen rejects the long tradition in the philosophy of 
language that assumes that thought is logically and explanatorily prior to language (a view 
termed Nominalism). Instead, Hinzen suggests that ‘narrow syntax’ – the computational path 
which generates a meaningful sentence by categorising a lexical root as nominal, verbal or 
clausal – gives rise to propositional thought. On Hinzen’s view then, when the biological 
adaptations for full language get into place (specifically those for grammar), a new kind of 
thought emerges – one which has subject-predicate structure, that is truth-bearing, and can 
refer to objects, events and propositions. 
 
Narrow syntax is explained as a three phase computational cycle, which at its fullest 
generates a proposition which refers and can be evaluated as true or false. Moreover, the 
computational cycle operates ‘blindly’ over the symbols the system utilises (words) as these 
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symbols are decoupled from their semantic and conative content. As such, the output of the 
system – a referential, truth-bearing proposition – is arrived at without any commitments to 
truth or falsity, or to its desirability. This gives us a capacity to ‘imagine that’ something is the 
case without having to believe that it is the case, or that it is desirable for it to be the case. 
Propositional imagining, as described in Chapter 1, depends upon thoughts with these 
distinctive features, thus the emergence of language coincides with the emergence of a new, 
powerful kind of imagination.  
 
I argue that the computationally minimal process that Hinzen describes offers us a 
‘cheaper’ alternative to the imaginative capacities we share with animals and precursor 
hominids (though we still possess those capacities as well), and that this new capacity for 
propositional imagination would be favoured by evolution for a number of reasons. Chiefly is 
its unbounded and creative nature: there is no (theoretical) limit to the number of propositions 
we can generate, and because the proposition is generated independently of concerns about its 
truth or desirability, we can generate freely and assess usefulness later. This is crucial in 
building thoughts about possible worlds, in theory-making and so on. Because of the advantages 
this would confer in terms of planning, I argue that we would come to prefer a linguistic 
cognitive style, leaning ever-more on propositional imagination over its evolutionary ancestors. 
And given that imagining certain kinds of things brings with it the rewards of actually attaining 
their real-life counterparts (as discussed in Chapter 2), I ultimately suggest that we would be 
predisposed to use our new capacity for propositional imagination to engage in fantasy. With 
that, I turn to the issue of fantasy in Chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 4: Fantasy & Language 
 
Fantasy, I argue, has been overlooked in terms of its significance for our understanding 
of the imagination and for its role in the evolution of human creativity. I therefore begin the 
fourth chapter by re-examining some of the claims made about it in the literature identified in 
Chapter 1. Specifically I look at the connection between fantasy and desire, and fantasy and 
escape. 
 
In most discussions of fantasy, the focus is on fantasy as connected to our personal 
desires (for sex, for work, etc.) The suggestion is that fantasy concerns itself with imagining 
getting what we want in order to receive some of the feelings of happiness, satisfaction, joy, 
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and so on, that we would ordinarily receive if we attained the real thing. I suggest that this 
connection to desire has often led us to think of fantasy as mere wish-fulfilment, and therefore 
of less intellectual value than imagination proper. However, even if this is true of personal 
fantasy, I suggest that it has been overlooked that there might be such a thing as impersonal 
fantasy: fantasies in which we don’t play a direct role in what is imagined i.e. fantasies which 
are from a third-person perspective, or involve someone else’s desires rather than our own. 
Fantasies of this nature, I suggest, might be useful for promoting social bonds as they give us a 
better understanding of what motivates our conspecifics (whether they are friends or rivals). 
 
Other discussions of fantasy focus on the idea that it involves escaping reality. 
However, whilst I agree that much fantasy does involve severing the bonds with reality in terms 
of what we imagine, it isn’t always the case that what we imagine is more desirable than what 
we have. Moreover, I reject the suggestion that fantasies differ from imaginings on the grounds 
that imaginings are intended to give us a better understanding of reality than escapist fantasies 
(Scruton’s view). I present evidence in Chapter 4 that creating fantasy worlds unlike our own is 
actually part of a process of gaining a better understanding of our own world by drawing 
conclusions about other possible worlds. Fantasies are rarely lawless; they, in fact, tend to 
follow much the same set of rules as our own. As such, we are able to join the dots from our 
fantasy world to our own in order to discover new understandings about the real world. 
 
Whilst the social and practical benefits of fantasy are suggested above, neither connect 
directly to what we have said about language in the preceding chapter. I therefore turn my 
attention to this connection in the remainder of Chapter 4. I begin by looking at the way in 
which we use language: to request, to inform and to share. Our communicative intentions 
differ from non-human animals that we teach sign-language to, who tend to use what they have 
learned only to request. Instead, even as pre-linguistic infants, we display a tendency to inform 
our conspecifics about the presence of interesting things and to share emotions and attitudes. 
And given that our imaginative acts are closely linked to the brain’s reward circuits (as 
discussed in Chapter 2), and that ‘spontaneous’ imaginings like fantasies are more ‘fun’ 
(Chapter 1) and connected closely to desires, then fantasies seem like just the kind of thing that 
a co-operative, informative species would want to share at the earliest available opportunity. So 
what is required to do this? 
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The major restriction to sharing fantasies is the lack of an established ‘fantasy lexicon’. 
The cognitive basis for language (narrow syntax) might be in place at the onset of our species 
but, as the cultural aspect of language, the lexicon of natural languages must build over time. It 
is harder to express the (precise) idea of a half-woman-half-fish without the label ‘mermaid’. 
Yet once that label is introduced into common parlance we can construct sentences expressing 
all kinds of things about mermaids. So developing a fantasy lexicon both makes the process of 
externalising fantasies easier, and it makes richer and more varied fantasies possible. As 
different lexicons develop across different groups, so those ideas become shared and take on 
cultural significance. And the time taken to get this lexicon into place, I argue, partly explains 
the puzzle of the Creative Explosion. The rest of this explanation comes in the cultural 
significance of externalised fantasies, particularly fantasies presented in the form of stories. I 
address this portion of the explanation in Chapter 5. 
 
Chapter 5: Storytelling & Creativity 
 
 Storytelling, it turns out, is a much older practice than most people realise. Recent 
research from Julien d’Huy suggests that many of the ancient stories we’re familiar with – for 
instance, the ancient Greek myths of Callisto and the story of Odysseus and the Cyclops – are 
actually much older than the versions we’re familiar with from the works of Hesiod and 
Homer. Using a mix of methodology and data from evolutionary biology, mathematics, 
sociology and palaeoanthropology, d’Huy has attempted to trace back the origins of these 
stories. To do so, he identifies key ‘mythemes’ (the core themes and story elements within the 
myths) and tracks their journey with human population groups as they make their way around 
the world. His suggestion, ultimately, is that these stories are as ancient as much of the cave art 
we have found (older, in fact). If this is the case, then it is very probable, I argue, that these 
stories are part of one of the earliest examples of a common creative practice: storytelling. 
 
 We have seen in previous chapters that we are naturally predisposed toward 
storytelling because of the enjoyment that fantasy brings us and our tendency to share 
interesting information. Precursor hominids may even have engaged in storytelling-like activity 
before language was in place, through dance and music. Presenting narratives (of all kinds) are 
useful for both social bonding and for transmitting information. Presenting a narrative in a 
certain way can allow us to manipulate conspecifics by prompting in them an emotional 
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response. We can also present to them information that we want them to have. Clearly, once 
language is in place, any capacity we have for doing this is infinitely enriched given that 
language computationally operates blindly on its constituent symbols, thus allowing us to 
construct narratives without prompting ourselves to have any particular emotional response. 
So, for example, we can create a story about a bear attacking and killing a loved one without 
necessarily feeling the anxiety that the actual event would bring. However, telling the story can 
prompt those emotions in others (even in ourselves), and so storytelling can be used to 
strengthen (or weaken) social bonds by utilising this capacity to stir up emotional responses. 
 
 The idea that narratives exist as a social bonding tool is suggested in Robin Dunbar’s 
account of the evolution of language. For Dunbar, language evolved as a kind of ‘vocal 
grooming’ – a cheap way for us to maintain social relationships in large social groups. Our 
evolutionary ancestors used physical grooming for this purpose, but with large social groups it 
becomes impossible to maintain all of the relationships by physically grooming conspecifics. As 
such, vocal sounds could come to replace physical grooming because they allow us to service 
multiple members of our group simultaneously (as well as freeing up our hands for other 
purposes) – as a form of ‘gossip’. However, Dunbar’s account suggests that grammar falls out 
of this practice, whereas I argue that it predates and shapes gossip. Instead, I suggest that our 
lexicon might emerge from an established and ritualistic set of expressions – sounds we may 
have been making for quite some time in order to signal to conspecifics (similar to the complex 
signalling system we see in non-human primates). Once the biological adaptations for grammar 
get into place, they allow us to parse this set of expressions into what we would now recognise 
as words, and then combine and recombine those words as propositions. 
 
 This new capacity for propositional thought and communication functions as an 
imagination-instructing system, particularly once it reaches the level of externalisation. If I say 
‘The large yellow dog bit the small orange-faced man’, the linguistic utterance directs your 
imagination toward a certain set of ideas and images. Given that the computational system used 
to generate this expression operates blindly on the symbols within it, such a system can pair 
symbols with unlikely partners i.e. ones with which the ‘typical’ emotional or semantic 
associations have been decoupled. For instance, we might attach a predicate like ‘is evil’ to an 
inanimate object incapable of actually instantiating that predicate in reality, such as a hammer, 
creating the notion of an ‘evil hammer’. This sentential element can be fully embedded into a 
proposition and spoken of in exactly the same ways as real entities. As such, it is possible to 
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generate an infinite number of ideas without regard to their truth (or their usefulness). This 
makes our linguistic system the perfect tool for expressing our natural tendency toward 
engaging in fantasy and sharing the interesting bits with our conspecifics. 
 
 So how does this connect with the kind of creativity we see at the point of the Creative 
Explosion? I argue that we can draw a line between the practice of storytelling and the practice 
of cave painting. Given that stories can (with some convincingness) be traced back to the same 
time period as some of the cave art we have found, we can begin to reanalyse the images we 
find at the Creative Explosion in the light of the myths being told at that time. What we find 
when we do this are representations of stories that are still with us today. This, I argue, tells us 
that these stories pre-date these artworks and provide inspiration for them. And while stories 
don’t fossilise, making it hard to evidence this suggestion, a Storytelling Hypothesis for the 
evolution of human creativity does better explain the evidence connecting pretend play and 
creativity (the same evidence that undermines Picciuto and Carruthers’ Pretend Play Hypothesis). 
It seems that play emerges as an epiphenomenon of some other trait. Storytelling appears to be 
a strong candidate for explaining a tendency to play – play often involves acting out some 
existing story (e.g. pretending to be a heroic figure), and in a sense is similar to representing a 
story through the visual medium of cave art. This, I suggest, lends credibility to my own 
solution to the puzzle of the Creative Explosion. However, with such an explanation seemingly 
necessarily sitting out of the reach of direct empirical evidence, I turn in Chapter 6 to a range of 
evidence that I suggest lends itself to the claims made in this thesis. 
 
Chapter 6: Testing the Thesis 
 
Chapter 6 begins by considering a potential challenge noted earlier in the thesis: the 
narrowing gap between evidence for the emergence of our species and the emergence of our 
species’ creative behaviour. I suggest that, rather than being a problem for my thesis, recent 
evidence found to suggest that creative behaviours might have begun much earlier than we 
initially though could actually be evidence in favour of some of the claims of my Storytelling 
Hypothesis. For instance, the fact that we see symbolic tally markings on, and use of, red ochre 
around 70,000 years ago might actually just be considered further evidence in favour of the Out 
of Africa Hypothesis which my thesis adopts. The fact that tally marking and use of red ochre 
persists for some 30,000 years more where it appears in Europe is just another case, I say, of 
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cultural traits migrating with human populations. This, I have argued, is also the case with the 
stories we told. With that in mind, I turn again to the idea that human beings are biologically 
geared toward storytelling. 
 
We see further evidence of the claim that we’re storytellers by nature in the way we 
perceive the world, not only in the way in which we describe it. Our perceptual system is a 
hypersensitive agency detection device, honed by evolution to seek out the presence of agents 
in our environment. An interesting side-effect of this is our tendency to over-identify agents; that 
is to say, we see agency where none is present. This can be seen in a range of phenomenon, 
including Pareidolia (seeing patterns, such as faces, in things) and other kinds of apophenia. For 
instance, we see the movement of non-agents like geometric shapes in terms of agency – as 
chasing and running away from one another, as demonstrated in the Heider-Simmel effect. As 
such, we’re naturally inclined toward telling explanatory stories which sometimes cast non-
agents as agents, providing a fertile ground for the imagination. We even see this reflected in 
cave art, through animal-human hybrid figures. 
 
But what if such hybrid figures could be produced in the absence of language? I address 
in Chapter 6 just such a challenge, posed by Nicholas Humphrey. Humphrey cites the case of 
Nadia, an autistic savant, who appears to be able to produce an original photo-realistic hybrid 
image, not dissimilar to those we see in the caves at Chauvet. However, I suggest there is 
reason to doubt this claim of Humphrey’s based upon more detailed examination of Nadia’s 
case. The evidence collected by Lorna Selfe, the psychologist who studied Nadia in detail at 
various points in her life, suggests that Nadia’s supposed hybrid figure is actually nothing more 
than a replica of an image she has seen in a Ladybird book (much like her replica of Toulouse-
Lautrec’s jockey). However, Nadia’s case does give us pause to consider the connections 
between language deficits and imaginative deficits, which I take up in the next sections of 
Chapter 6. 
 
Looking as cases of acquired aphasia presents, I suggest, further evidence that language 
was co-opted by the imagination for some specific purposes. One of those appears to be music. 
Trained musicians who acquire aphasia find that their musical abilities are impaired where they 
depend upon the imagination, yet their graphic or visual abilities are not. This, I suggest, is to 
be expected given what I have suggested about the evolution of the imagination in Chapter 2. 
Williams syndrome cases should present one of the strongest challenges to this thesis, since 
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they suggest that imagination can be impaired even when someone has prodigious linguistic 
talent. However, closer analysis of these cases reveals that there are, in fact, notable linguistic 
impairments associated with Williams syndrome, specifically relating to grammar. These same 
impairments might also explain why Williams syndrome patients underperform on false belief 
tasks, given that narrow syntax is responsible precisely for generating thoughts with a 
propositional structure – beliefs are, after all, typically held in philosophical circles as the 
archetype of propositional attitudes.  
 
As a final consideration of pathological cases, I turn to the issue of psychosis. In this 
instance, I suggest that we find evidence relating to the evolution of language that again 
supports the claims I make in this thesis. Psychosis is typified by its linguistic nuclear symptoms 
– hearing voices, thought insertion and so on. One suggestion, from Crow, is that psychosis is 
actually the price we paid for language, and this is why psychosis isn’t removed by evolutionary 
forces. Language is so useful that it permits the negative side-effect of psychosis (in a small 
number of individuals). However, I suggest that our analysis of creativity in Chapter 1 might 
offer another reason as to why psychosis persists – because of its connection to creativity. Both 
the Inspiration View and the Derangement View can be tied to the nuclear symptoms of 
psychosis, and in Chapter 1 we saw that there is an overrepresentation of psychosis in creative 
populations. I argue in Chapter 6, then, that a common cause of both psychosis and enhanced 
creativity could be the linguistic cognitive feature of hearing voices – our inner monologue. 
Clearly, in cases of psychosis, this process has gone awry, but I suggest we depend heavily upon 
our inner narrator in the generation of fantasies and, ultimately, stories. 
 
And, once again, we have reason to think that stories are useful to us. Further evidence 
is called upon in this chapter showing that creating and interacting with paracosms (fantasy 
worlds) has a strong correlation with the ability to tell and comprehend stories. This, I suggest, 
might be because even hearing stories requires extensive use of the imagination to ‘fill in’ 
missing information when we attempt to recall what we are told. This is perhaps why, we see, 
encouraging children to play based upon structured stories correlates with enhanced creativity. 
The common theme which emerges from this evidence is that the more we engage with 
fantastic narratives, the more likely it is that we will be creative adults. 
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Summary 
 
 The position I advocate for – that of the co-evolution of fantasy, language and 
storytelling – is, I suggest, a better solution to the puzzle of the Creative Explosion than that of 
Picciuto and Carruthers. My Storytelling Hypothesis coheres with the evidence relating to pretend 
play more than their Pretend Play Hypothesis. Moreover, there are independent reasons to 
favour the story I tell in this thesis. 
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Chapter 1: 
IMAGINATION & CREATIVITY 
What is the imagination and what is its connection to creativity? 
 
Introduction 
 
 As stated in the Introduction, the aim of this thesis is to outline the view that a co-
development of the complex relationship between language, fantasy and culture was (and 
perhaps remains) the evolutionary driver of human creative cognition. I have indicated that 
fantasy is an often underestimated variety of imagination, and I begin to build this argument in 
the current chapter by outlining the relevant notions of imagination in the current literature 
and their connection to creativity. I develop the argument in favour of fantasy further in 
Chapter 4. This chapter, more immediately, will seek to establish an account of the imagination 
which specifically includes fantasy in order to later demonstrate the explanatory benefits of such 
an account when it is applied to the problem of the evolution of human creative cognition. 
Specifically, I argue that a broad account of the human imagination (which includes not only 
fantasy, but various forms of mental imagery and propositional thought) will allow us to better 
understand its evolutionary ancestors, both in pre-cursor hominids and non-human animals (see 
Chapter 2). Moreover, it helps makes sense of the lofty ambitions that many philosophers and 
linguists once held for language as the explanans for uniquely human creative capacities. 
 
 Before outlining this account of the imagination, however, we must first say something 
about the thing to which it is said to significantly contribute – creativity. §1 and §2 are 
dedicated to this purpose, firstly outlining the traditional analyses of creativity – the 
Inspirationalist and Derangement views found in Plato – and recasting them through the lens of 
the imagination. Doing so, I argue, preserves some useful phenomenological and explanatory 
features of these accounts of creativity. I then turn to modern attempts to set out the necessary 
conditions for creativity, adopting the common suggestions with little opposition so that we 
might have some specific criteria by which we can assess imagination’s contribution to 
creativity. I turn to this issue in §3, identifying and describing several varieties of imagination 
(though I do not attempt to offer an exhaustive taxonomy) and examining their relationship to 
creativity. What emerges from examining the philosophical literature on imagination here is the 
frequent attempts to distinguish it from fantasy. In §4, I introduce an alternate way to view 
fantasy, found in Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, which sees it as another variety of imagination. I 
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begin to make a case in this section that this particular variety has been unfairly denigrated 
when considering its role in human creativity, an idea that I will revisit and continue to defend 
in subsequent chapters. 
 
§1 Traditional Analyses of Creativity 
 
 Although they have fallen out of favour in recent years, there are two particular 
analyses of creativity that historically recur in the philosophical literature and, to some extent, 
remain in the popular imagination today (Gaut, 2003). Although these were initially intended 
to describe poetry, they might be easily extended to cover creativity in other domains of human 
activity. The analyses are (i) the Inspiration View, which takes the poet as the mouthpiece of the 
Gods, and (ii) the Derangement View, which suggests the poet is (in some way) a ‘madman’. 
Despite the fact that they have fallen out of favour, I argue below that re-examining these views 
through the prism of imagination (with its myriad construals in the philosophical literature) 
reveals important aspects of creativity that we ought to retain in contemporary analysis. 
 
§1.1 The Inspiration View 	
Inspirationalism is expressed by Plato as follows: 
 
[Homer’s gift] is not an art, but… an inspiration; there is a divinity moving you, like 
that contained in the stone which Euripides calls a magnet, but which is commonly 
known as the stone of Hereclea. This stone not only attracts rings, but also imparts to 
them a similar power of attracting other rings..; in like manner the Muse first of all 
inspires men herself; and from these inspired persons the chain of other persons is 
suspended, who take the inspiration. For all good poets… compose their beautiful 
poems not by art, but because they are inspired and possessed (Plato, Ion: 533). 
 
 Gaut’s interpretation of Plato’s view here is that the originator of the creative act is a 
supernatural agent and human creators are merely ‘mouthpieces of the gods’ (Gaut, 2003). 
Whilst it may seem that the quote might be suggesting that it is Creativity itself that is imparted 
to us by the Muse, it is important to keep in mind the particular case Plato has in mind. Many 
scholars assert that Homer was not a single individual, but in fact a ‘movement’ (Graziosi, 
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2002). The suggestion here is that the oral tradition of Homeric poetry is a matter of a story 
being passed on from one generation of reciters to the next, with natural variations developing 
the story (thus not involving any substantive act of creativity at any point beyond the story’s 
inception by the Gods). It has been suggested that the repetitive use of rhythmically formulaic 
epithets is indicative of the process of memorising and reciting an existing body of work, 
though clearly each performance will have demonstrate some variation (Parry, 1930). On this 
view, then, the other ‘rings’ attracted to the divinely inspired poet, therefore, are indirect 
mouthpieces of the gods.1 
 
Stories about the involvement of supernatural agency in creativity (especially artistic 
creativity) persist across various cultural groups. For example: 
 
[I]n many Native American cultures human creation of the art is consistently denied… 
[T]he paintings and engravings are spirit objects. These by definition are believed to 
have an origin in the supernatural, not natural, world. (Whitley, 2009: 178)  
 
 Although a metaphysically unattractive picture (for a naturalist, at least), a link to the 
supernatural may have explanatory value for understanding creative products for which we lack 
any alternative substantial social or historical context. Given the limited archaeological evidence 
to help explain some of the images painted on cave walls during the Upper Palaeolithic, 
approaching these images from the perspective of Inspirationalism might allow us to better 
explain the connection between these images and, say, the collections of objects seemingly 
placed in the same caves i.e. given the apparent presence of deliberately placed objects on alter-
like stones, and their co-occurrence with visual depictions of animals and human-animal hybrid 
figures, we might view these as part of a wider religious practice in which a shamanic figure acts 
in the belief that he or she ‘channels the Gods’ to create these paintings (the view favoured by 
Whitley). Or, more simply, stories about the Gods and the supernatural might have become 
prevalent and influential within Upper Palaeolithic culture by this point such that artists took to 
the caves to create a permanent record (the view I defend in Chapters 4 and 5). So, 
Inspirationalism shouldn’t be dismissed out of hand because of any concerns about implied 
																																																								
1 We can’t be certain whether or not Plato shared this modern understanding of the authorship of Homeric poetry, 
and this question is not of great relevance here. Gaut’s interpretation, which I happen to share, seems at least open 
to us, and not unreasonable. 
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ontological commitments, especially given the potential explanatory benefits of understanding 
human practices as at least motivated by a belief in divine beings. 
 
 Kant also defends a version of Inspirationalism in The Critique of Judgement, but one 
which moves away from the potentially worrying ontological commitments of the Platonic 
view. Specifically focusing on genius, Kant suggests that the genius  
 
…cannot indicate scientifically how [he/she] brings about [the creative] product… 
Hence, where an author owes a product to his genius, he does not himself know how 
the ideas for it have entered into his head, nor has he it in his power to invent the like at 
pleasure, or methodically, and communicate the same to others in such precepts as 
would put them in a position to produce similar products. (Hence, presumably, our 
word Genie is derived from genius, as the peculiar guardian and guiding spirit given to a 
man at his birth, by the inspiration of which those original ideas were obtained) (Kant, 
1952: Ak. 308). 
 
We can, if we so desire, read the suggestion of a ‘guiding spirit’ here as simply some 
innate and biologically-grounded set of talents predisposing a genius toward the creation of 
original products that stand apart from the rest in the domain (see §2 for further clarification of 
Kant on genius and creativity). Kant, then, points the way toward a naturalistic framework 
within which we can retain one of the intuitively appealing aspects of the Inspirationalist 
account: that great ideas appear to come out of nowhere. A more recent version of 
Inspirationalism along these lines i.e. minus the Platonic ontological concerns, has been 
defended by Kivy (2001). Kivy suggests that something like Plato’s model of creativity is 
required to account for genius: 
 
Bright ideas are not generated by acts of will through application of some “method”. 
Bright ideas just “happen” to people. People who get them are patients, not agents. 
That was Plato’s (or Socrates’) discovery. Insight is a kind of “infectious disease” that 
one succumbs to. One might well call it the “passive” notion of genius (Kivy 2001:11). 
 
 Kivy’s suggestion includes the notion that there is a kind of phenomenological 
abruptness to some kinds of creativity: the idea seems to ‘pop into your head’ apropos of 
nothing. One (frequently cited) example to illustrate this notion is that of Friedrich von 
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Kekulé’s account of his discovery of the ring structure of the benzene molecule (cited, for 
example, in Boden, 2004: 26). Von Kekulé describes a day-dream or reverie involving a snake 
swallowing its own tail (the ancient Greek symbol of introspection, cyclicality or self-
reflexivity, ouroboros) as revealing to him the structure of the molecule (Read, 2011). Stokes 
(2011) describes this as bearing the flash phenomenology of inspiration. Perhaps this flash 
phenomenology isn’t unique to creative thought – for instance, suddenly remembering 
something might feel similar to suddenly having a (creative) idea. However, the difference 
between the two cases is that inspiration reveals something new. Kivy’s own view is qualified in 
two ways: firstly, the flash phenomenology is necessary but not sufficient for inspired creation; 
certain innate creative abilities and dispositions are also required. Secondly, geniuses require us 
to treat them ‘as if’ they have been divinely inspired because we (currently) have no naturalistic 
explanation for this phenomenon.2 This is particularly the case for artists who produce a ‘one 
off’ – something for which there is no precedent. Stokes terms this ‘as-if Inspirationalism’. 
 
 It is important to note that the Inspirationalist isn’t simply hand-waving when she turns 
to the divine to explain works of genius. In fact, the Inspirationalist method mirrors that of the 
phenomenological arguments for free will. Campbell (1951), Lehrer (1960) and Searle (1984) 
all argue for free will from the basis that it feels as though we have a choice about what actions 
we pursue, and we can all be certain that we feel that way. In much the same way it is the 
phenomenological content that leads the Inspirationalist to the idea that (at least some) 
creativity is divinely inspired – it certainly doesn’t feel as though it comes entirely from within, 
so we must work outwards to the best explanation available at the time, namely the divine. We 
might, however, wish to be cautious with how we characterise such experiences of divine 
inspiration. Whilst it does seem like some Inspirationalist accounts want to advocate for a 
rather extreme view of the role of the divine, others certainly do not. For instance, the 
description of Native American views of inspiration given by Whitley above seems to view the 
artist as an entirely passive conduit; Kant’s view, by contrast, isn’t committed to this notion for 
the genius at all. The Native American view of inspiration sounds almost like a case of thought 
insertion, as with schizophrenic patients. In cases of thought insertion, it feels as if the thoughts 
are not one’s own, but instead belong to someone else and have been inserted into one’s mind 																																																								
2 This problem is re-stated by Harold Osborne (1977). In Osborne’s view, aesthetic properties are dependent 
upon non-aesthetic properties but not deducible from them in any rule-governed way. As such, artists cannot 
reason consciously about how to produce aesthetic properties, meaning that the source of the artistic works must 
ultimately be unconscious, thus explaining why the inspired person might feel as though he is guided by forces 
beyond his or her (conscious) self. 
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(Mullins, 2003). However, we might be reticent to say this of Kant’s genius: she might not 
know how she came by the thought, but does not feel as though she is not its author. 
 
For both Kivy and Gaut, then, in the absence of a naturalistic explanation it is 
important to treat geniuses as though they have been divinely inspired. However, this 
(supposed) lack of a naturalistic explanation doesn’t mean as-if Inspirationalism is resistant to all 
further analysis. Recent philosophical literature on creativity emphasises value and originality (or 
novelty) as necessary conditions for creativity (see §2 below). Not just any idea that pops into 
our head is creative; in the very least, the value criterion means that the idea must serve some 
purpose, solve some problem, or some such thing. Von Kekulé’s daydream seems to illustrate a 
process, conscious or otherwise, of working through knowledge, memories, images etc. and 
eventually discovering how these illuminate one another to solve a scientific problem of sorts. 
This seems to be at least one way in which we deploy the imagination (Wilson, 1971). The 
imagination can thus provide insight (the ‘infectious disease’ Kivy mentions above), which is 
surely typified by the kind of flash phenomenology described above in terms of divine inspiration. 
But this does not mean that we must regard the creative individual as a ‘patient’ under such 
circumstances: in von Kekulé’s case we might think the imagination is operating ‘behind the 
scenes’, or unconsciously, on a problem he had otherwise been consciously wrestling with over 
an extended period of time.3 Walton describes this as a kind of spontaneous imagining (see 
§3.3). That an unconscious kind of imagining is possible is, I believe, important to providing an 
evolutionary account of other varieties of imagination (see Chapter 2). 
 
 A more recent philosophical distinction may be useful to consider here. Gaut (2003) 
draws a distinction between passive and active creativity. Gaut cites the von Kekulé anecdote as 
an illustration of passive creativity, that is, creativity that: 
 
…occurs when the subject is unaware of the creative process, if any, which has 
occurred to produce the creative outcome. The outcome simply ‘pops into the head’ of 
the subject (Gaut, 2003: 156). 
 																																																								
3 There are good general reasons to be sceptical about the accuracy of the description of the creative process in 
such widely cited cases as this. The von Kekulé story in particular is now well-known in philosophical circles, with 
his first telling occurring in 1890 to describe a process which took place at some point between 1865 and 1872 
(when he published two separate papers on the structure of benzeme). It’s possible that von Kekulé’s story is 
simply a re-telling of a similar analogy present in the parody journal ‘The Journal of the Thirsty Chemical Society’, 
which used the analogy of a circle of monkeys grabbing one another by the tail (Greenbaum & Wilcox, 1965). 
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Inspirationalism, then, is a passive form of creativity, to be contrasted with its active 
alternative, in which “the subject actively searches out various solutions, consciously trying out 
different approaches, and in the course of this activity comes upon a solution” (Gaut, 2003: 
156-7). In Gaut’s view, active creativity lacks the flash phenomenology associated with its 
passive counterpart. 
 
 One reason why ancient philosophers may have been quick to attribute the products of 
inspired creation to the gods rather than human imagination is because of their tendency to 
focus on works of genius rather than everyday creativity. Such works, especially, may seem 
‘otherworldly’ because of the perceived ‘impossibility’ i.e. the great difficulty, of a ‘mere’ 
human being to be their author. But more recently, Kant, Kivy and Gaut also make genius their 
focus in varying degrees. However, I’m fairly confident that the flash phenomenology of the 
acts of creativity associated with genius by these authors will, in fact, be familiar to (almost) 
everyone: suddenly realising that we can fix the leaky tap by using the rubber stopper from a 
discarded beer bottle may have this ‘feel’ to it. This doesn’t constitute an act of genius, nor is it 
a discovery of huge value (or, more precisely, ‘agent-neutral’ value – value which reaches 
beyond the agent and into an objective or communally-agreed value; see Picciuto and 
Carruthers, 2014), yet it shares many of the base features described for von Kekulé’s case 
above. If someone were to tell us that they were a completely passive conduit for divine 
inspiration, contributing little of their own knowledge or understanding to the creative 
product, that they’d been spoken to by the Gods and were merely enacting their will, we 
would probably be more likely to think that they were mentally ill than we would be to regard 
them as a genius.4 And this is perhaps why the Inspiration View shares its origins with the 
Derangement View, to which I turn in the next section. 
 
 In sum, then, there are particular aspects of the Inspiration view that are worth 
retaining: 
 
(i) The explanatory value of leaving open the option of viewing creative acts for which 
we lack contextual knowledge as-if they were divinely inspired (though there may be 
reasons to prefer other explanations) because this leaves open the possibility that some 
cultural story can be told to link together the scant contextual information we have;  																																																								
4 Such a view would also perhaps invalidate an ‘agency criterion’ for creativity i.e. that the act was deliberate, or 
originated with the person being described as ‘a genius’ in these cases – see §2 for a discussion of this.	
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(ii) The identification by the Inspiration view of the flash phenomenology of some 
creative acts and recognition of its importance to understanding creativity (though, I 
have suggested, this phenomenology has historically been too closely associated with 
acts of genius when, instead, it has a much broader application). 
 
§1.2 The Derangement View 
 
The origins of the Derangement View might also be traced back to Plato’s comments in 
the Ion. As we saw above, not only does Plato speak of being inspired, but also of being 
‘possessed’. This kind of description also seems apt for the experiences of Shamanic artists, who 
also demonstrate numerous symptoms of mental illness (Whitley, 2009). Plato claims that a 
poet is ‘never able to compose until he… is beside himself, and reason is no longer in him’ 
(523b3-5), and the connection between genius and madness remains in the popular imagination 
to this day. 
 
One of the more sustained treatments of this idea in the philosophical literature can be 
found in Schopenhauer’s The World As Will and Representation (Schopenhauer, 1958). 
Schopenhauer sees the artistic genius as having some kind of imaginative access to a world 
beyond our own (essentially that of Platonic Ideas).5 This powerful imagination elevates the 
artist beyond that which is given to him in sense perception, enabling him (for Schopenhauer 
thinks women to be incapable of this feat) to create works of art which represent pure Ideas to 
his audience in ways that make them accessible (Lewis, 2012). This has similarities to the 
Kantian view above, in that acts of exemplary creativity are somehow instructive to their 
audience. The audience’s aesthetic experience also involves a disconnection from immediate 
experience: Schopenhauer takes seriously the idea that one can be lost in contemplation of a rose, 
for example, becoming aware of the ‘essence of roseness’ in the process. However, for 
Schopenhauer, the audience do not have the same imaginative powers as the artist: the non-
artist tends to use the imagination to engage in ‘mere’ fantasy – imaginative acts that are 
designed to service the will i.e. selfish desire – whereas the genius uses his imagination to 
achieve objective understanding of reality. This denigration of fantasy is common throughout 
																																																								
5 There are very close parallels with Schopenhauer’s view of creativity in the Hindu tradition too. Chuadhuri 
(quoted in Chu, 1970) describes the Eastern view of the creative process as “a flash of aesthetic insight into the 
heart of the object… [T]he artist experiences intimate oneness, the spirit of the object.” Note, again, the presence 
of flash phenomenology here. 
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the philosophical literature and, I will argue both in §4 and elsewhere in this thesis, that this 
contributes to its being overlooked as an important driver in the evolution of human creative 
cognition. Setting this aside for now, let us return to discussing the Derangement View. 
 
The connection to derangement in Schopenhauer’s account comes from the effect that 
access to pure Ideas has on the genius: artists are peculiarly prone to madness because their 
contemplative experiences put them in an increasing state of discord with the ordinary world. 
The more they access the world of pure Ideas, the harder it becomes for them to seamlessly 
reintegrate back into the world inhabited by the rest of us. Interestingly, there is an empirical 
correlation for this claim of the Derangement View. Studies by Kyaga et al. (2011, 2013, 2014) 
suggest that there is an overrepresentation of people with symptoms of schizophrenia or bipolar 
disorder working in creative occupations. This latter condition seems to be particularly strongly 
linked with creativity in literature: Jamison (1993) presents an extensive study of the link 
between bipolar disorder and the “artistic temperament”. Although there is some dispute in the 
scientific community about the extent and the nature of the link between creativity and mental 
illness, there are a variety of studies that can be called upon as tentative support for some 
version of the Derangement View. As a result, I (tentatively) propose below an alternative to 
Schopenhauer’s version of this view. 
 
§1.2.1 Creativity and Constraint 
 
On Schopenhauer’s view then, derangement is eventually caused by the exercise of the 
imagination as it places the artist into a kind of experiential limbo between the world of pure 
Ideas and the ordinary world. However, I wish to suggest that the direction of causation could 
easily be reversed: a pre-existing mental illness may be the cause of enhanced creative 
capacities. Let us explore this suggestion before moving away from the Derangement View. 
 
Because of the value criterion for creativity, it may be argued that creative acts must 
operate within an established framework for evaluation. One proponent of this view is Fred 
D’Agostino (1984, 1986). His account agrees with Gaut’s that originality is also a necessary 
condition for creativity, and D’Agostino also endorses, though in slightly different terms, the 
value criterion: D’Agostino suggests that the created product should be exemplary, in that it can 
serve as a model for future productions in the same domain, by revealing some new standard 
for future productions or establishing some new set of constraints within which future 
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productions must operate (not dissimilar to Kant’s description of works of genius). However, 
D’Agostino also suggests that ‘the created product [should be] an appropriate, but non-random, 
response to the circumstances of its production’ (D'Agostino, 1984: 91). Here, D’Agostino is 
reflecting the same sort of intuition as Briskman, who suggests that ‘a scientific or artistic 
product is [creatively] valuable insofar as it constitutes or incorporates a solution to a problem’ 
(Briskman, 1980: 95). Both accounts require some benchmark against which the value of the 
created product can be judged: the product must be responding to some circumstances or 
problem, and the value of the product is determined (at least in part) by how appropriately the 
product responds. 
 
The implicit suggestion in these accounts is that creative activity can only be valuable if 
it takes place within an existing framework of constraints (expanded upon below) or set of rules 
that provide the context for its evaluation. D’Agostino makes this point explicit by saying that 
the degree of creativity: 	
…depends on, and varies inversely proportionally with, the strength of the constraints 
on the problem [and] depends on, and varies directly with, the degree to which the 
production of the product reveals the existence and relevance of constraints on the 
problem for which it is a solution which were hitherto unknown (D'Agostino, 1984: 
97). 
 
There is much subtlety and detail in D’Agostino’s account that is interesting but 
unnecessary for my purposes here. However, the broad picture of his view is one of a ‘global’, 
species-specific set of constraints on the kind of creative thinking that humans are capable of. 
For D’Agostino, this general set of limits is put in place by language (specifically by what 
Hinzen, 2013, terms ‘narrow syntax’; see Chapter 3).6 In addition to these global constraints 
are the ‘local’ constraints specific to the kind of creative activity in which one is engaged. To 
take one of D’Agostino’s examples – that of jazz improvisation – the local limits or constraints 
are the key, tempo and mood of the piece against which the musician is improvising. In 
D’Agostino’s view, the stricter the constraints upon creative practices, the less creative the practice – 
in the strictest cases the rules will provide a mechanical search procedure for finding a solution 																																																								
6 There is another point of connection worth noting here, but one which can’t be explored within this chapter. If 
language provides some kind of global constraint on creative thought, then we might expect there to be a 
correlation between language deficits such as acquired aphasia and creative thought. I explore this correlation in 
Chapter 6. 
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to the problem at hand, ensuring that they are not creative at all (see §2). Something like jazz 
improvisation, he suggests, has very few rules and therefore is a highly creative practice.7  
 
So how does this relate to imagination and the Derangement View? This is the question 
to which I now turn. 
 
§1.2.2 Breaking Convention 
 
One way in which mental illness could be the cause of enhanced creativity (thus 
reversing Schopenhauer’s view) is if it somehow liberates the creator from constraints in place in 
mentally healthy individuals. We don’t need to identify specifics for my purposes here, but 
certainly freedom from social inhibitions might permit more experimental creative acts. So it 
might not be that the mentally ill creator has some special insight or access in the way that 
Schopenhauer suggests, but instead has an increased willingness to push the boundaries when 
they create, or perhaps simply unawareness of where the boundaries are. The role of the 
imagination here is, perhaps, that where boundaries are absent, the agent may demonstrate 
willingness to engage imaginatively with a subject in ways other people might not. And if 
mentally ill creators do have special insight, it may be because they acquire a greater 
understanding of universal human emotions because their own experience lies at the extreme 
end of the spectrum. Consider, for example, Sylvia Plath’s exploration of sadness and despair as 
someone who suffered from depression (for discussion of this, see Claridge et al., 1998). We 
might, not unreasonably, believe that it is precisely the extent and duration of the emotional 
distress caused by her mental illness that granted her the insights her works demonstrate. Her 
mental illness would provide for her both more opportunity and more reason to engage 
imaginatively with the emotional states it engenders. In this version of the Derangement View, 
mental illness is the cause of creativity rather than the effect – mental illness increases the 
creator’s freedom from the rules or constraints of the creative domain in which they are 
operating.  
 																																																								
7 There are reasons to doubt that jazz improvisation really is as unconstrained as D’Agostino suggests. Hamilton 
points out that: “familiar patterns of notes are embedded in the performer’s muscular memory as a result of 
countless hours spent with the instrument, and regurgitated when there is no restraining score. Improvisers 
express themselves less than they think because so much of what they play is what they are remembering, including 
things they do not even know they are remembering.” (Hamilton 2000: 180) For Hamilton, we tend to over-value 
jazz improvisation because we aesthetically value spontaneity, even if that spontaneity is, in fact, illusory or 
pretend. 
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Precisely what the relationship is between constraint and creativity isn’t entirely clear. 
There’s some intuitive plausibility to D’Agostino’s suggestion that highly constrained creative 
acts are less creative, and others such as Kant (1952, see §2) and Osborne (1979) also suggest 
that works of genius are such precisely because they go beyond current principles of excellence; 
yet there are also compelling accounts which claim the opposite. Boden, for example, argues 
that the presence of narrower constraints can actually lead us to judge something to be more 
creative: 
 
[S]ome musicians regard Mozart as a greater composer than Haydn even though they 
allow that Haydn was more adventurous, more ready to transform musical styles. 
Mozart’s superiority, on this view, lay in his fuller exploration (and tweaking) of 
musical space, his ability to amaze us by showing us what unsuspected glories lie within 
this familiar space (Boden 1994: 114). 
 
It also seems plausible to suggest that things like the domain of creativity, or the nature 
of the problem the creator intends to solve, might impact upon our judgement on this issue.8   
For instance, it seems that there are clearer and stricter constraints on computer programmers 
than there are on visual artists broadly construed, operating as they are with a defined and 
relatively narrow set of possible operations in their programming language. Yet, we may wish 
to praise the creativity of the computer programmer precisely for their ability to solve a highly-
specified real-world problem while working within such constraints, whilst at the same time 
praising an artist for flouting the relatively fluid and few conventions governing their creative 
domain when they, for instance, tip a urinal on its side and sign it ‘R.Mutt’. The precise 
relation need not be specified here for my version of the Derangement View to pass: it does not 
specify that derangement is necessary or sufficient for creativity, only that there are some 
instances where it contributes to achieving some other necessary condition for creativity, such as 
originality or value.9 
 
This version of the Derangement View, then, is instructive in explaining how creativity 
develops or occurs. This is precisely the aim of this thesis, and it identifies a particular group of 																																																								
8 A similar view is offered by Csikszentmihalyi (1996) via his ‘systems model’ of creativity. Csikszentmihalyi sees 
degrees of creativity as dependent upon an interplay of the domain of creativity, the field of creativity (the people 
who are the ‘gatekeepers’ to the domain) and the creative agent. 
9 This, of course, might not be (and, in fact, is not) always the case – intense psychotic episodes, for example, 
might make creativity impossible. 
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persons as a potentially interesting focus. That things like psychosis and depression have not 
been phased out by evolution has puzzled evolutionary biologists, linguists, psychologists and 
philosophers alike (see, for example, Brune, 2004). A common suggestion is that these 
conditions must somehow co-occur with some evolutionarily desirable trait and, as mentioned 
above, the empirical evidence offers up creativity as a candidate. More interestingly, one 
proposed explanation for this co-occurrence is that both share a common cause in the form of 
the evolution of language in our species (Crow, 2000). Given the central argument of this 
thesis, this is a view of great interest here. However, I will return to this idea – and to other 
pertinent discussions about the connection between language disorders and creativity – at the 
very end of this thesis only after the prerequisite discussion of language in Chapter 3. I will, 
instead, now move away from traditional to contemporary analyses of creativity, before finally 
taking a more in-depth look at the imagination itself. 
 
§2 Modern Analyses of Creativity 
 
Whereas the traditional analyses of creativity discussed in §1 focused on the source of 
creative ideas i.e. whether they came from the Gods or a deranged mind, modern analyses of 
creativity have attempted to unpack the concept itself to provide a definition. Outlining 
necessary and sufficient conditions for creativity is useful to the discussion of imagination here, 
as well as its relationship to Inspiration and Derangement, by identifying particular criteria to 
which the imagination can be said to contribute during the creative process. As mentioned 
above, discussions of creativity have historically often focused upon genius, and this tendency 
has carried over into the definitional project, with many authors focusing on the concept of 
GENIUS rather than that of CREATIVITY. However, it has also often been the case that what is said 
of genius is easily transferable to what is generally termed ‘everyday creativity’. Kant, for 
example, suggests that: 
 
Genius (i) is a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given: and not 
an aptitude in the way of cleverness for what can be learned according to some rule; 
and that consequently originality must be its primary property. (2) Since there may also 
be original nonsense, its products must at the same time be models, i.e. be exemplary; 
and, consequently, though not themselves derived from imitation, they must serve that 
purpose for others, i.e. as a standard or rule of estimating. (Kant, 1952: Ak. 308) 
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 Kant therefore identifies two conditions that must be met for something to count as a 
work of genius: originality and exemplariness (setting a standard against which other similar 
works can be measured). Kant’s remarks on genius here are actually very close to many more 
recent discussions of creativity more broadly. For instance, Simonton (1999) offers the 
following analysis of creativity: 
 
Creativity must entail the following two separate components[:] First, a creative idea 
or product must be original… However, to provide a meaningful criterion, originality 
must be defined with respect to a particular sociocultural group. What may be original 
with respect to one culture may be old news to the members of some other culture. 
Thus, Galileo’s discovery of sunspots counts as an original contribution to European 
civilisation even though the Chinese had noted their existence for well over a thousand 
years. Second, the original idea or product must prove adaptive in some sense… An 
invention must not only be new, but it must also work… A scientific theory… must be 
logically coherent and factually correct… In the arts, finally, adaptiveness often entails 
the capacity to maintain interest through novel expression as well as through powerful 
emotional appeal (Simonton, 1999: 5-6, emphasis added). 
 
Both Simonton and Kant use the term ‘originality’ here to label their first criterion, 
and many recent discussions of creativity adopt this same term. However, it isn’t clear that 
Kant is using ‘originality’ in exactly the sense in which Simonton does, though there is, I 
suggest, a clear kinship. Kant’s focus seems to be on the process, whereas Simonton’s is on the 
product. For Kant, the genius creates in a way that isn’t (at least obviously) rule-governed. Their 
process, therefore, is original in the sense that it defies (simple) replication. For Simonton, the 
important issue is that the output of the creative act is somehow new, even if it is only new in a 
culturally relative (or perhaps even agent-relative) sense. These two positions seem perfectly 
compatible with our intuitions about creativity. An unoriginal product can be produced in a 
creative way. For example, using solar parabolic concave mirror dishes to create fire seems, to 
me at least, highly creative, despite the fact that one could have created the same result by 
striking a match. However, repetition of this process (e.g. on the countless YouTube videos 
posted online and on TV magazine shows) does seem to warrant the assessment that not every 
instantiation of this process is creative. So what is being assessed in this case is the method of 
production, rather than the product. A lot of innovation is in finding more efficient ways of 
doing something we’re already doing, and presumably the product is no more creative for 
	 37 
being the result of an original process. However, it is less clear whether an entirely unoriginal 
method could produce a creative product: presumably some variation on an old process must 
occur to produce a different result, and highly original products (we might assume, anyway) 
may require greater variation. Whether these products are creative or not would depend also 
on their value.10 
 
There’s another important point to draw out of Simonton’s version of the originality 
criterion here: that originality is relative. Boden (2004) makes much the same point when she 
suggests that originality (or ‘novelty’, to use her term) can be relative even to a given person. 
Boden’s distinction therefore isn’t merely along sociocultural lines as with Simonton, but 
instead between that at the person-level (‘P-novelty’) and the historical level (‘H-novelty’). ‘P-
novelty’ involves originality “with respect to the individual mind which has the idea”, whereas 
‘H-novelty’ is original “with respect to the whole of human history” (Boden, 2004: 32). In 
terms of process and product, both could be P-novel, H-novel, or both P-novel and H-novel (if 
something is H-novel, it is necessarily also P-novel). Because we can distinguish between P-
novelty and H-novelty, we can also make better sense of the notion of convergent thought i.e. 
where there are two independent discoveries of the same thing, such as a new method for safely 
storing meat (such as salting and burying it) or producing representational drawings of animals 
on cave walls. If these were geographically and temporally disparate discoveries, we wouldn’t 
want to say that the chronologically later discovery wasn’t creative simply because it lacks H-
novelty. Nor are we forced to say, even, that it is less creative: we might decide that the 
temporal disparity was a result of the absence of pre-requisite cultural accretions that explain 
the delay, but still be separately impressed by the rate of cultural development that enabled the 
chronologically earlier case. For instance, if it is a prerequisite of cave painting that there be a 
rich culture of storytelling, and that a prerequisite of a culture of storytelling is a particular 
group population density, then the absence of these preconditions would explain the absence of 
cave painting. If the first cave paintings were produced by a group who achieved the 
prerequisite population density 10,000 years earlier than another group, and thus beat them to 
the production of cave paintings by up to 10,000 years, we wouldn’t say the second group’s 
cave paintings were any less creative an innovation than the first group’s. 
 																																																								10	We might think of the many artworks produced using much the same method by drip painting artists like 
Jackson Pollock as a possible counterexample, but presumably what is important about this process is the selection 
of which canvasses to keep and which to discard.
	 38 
This first criterion, originality, is therefore applicable to both process and product and 
is relative to agents, culture, and all of history. It is taken also to be a necessary but not 
sufficient condition. Mere originality, it is suggested, is not constitutive of creativity. As Kant 
points out in the passage above, much ‘nonsense’ is original but not creative. Although Gaut 
points out that we might be sympathetic toward the view that original nonsense appears to have 
some merit over received nonsense, it is generally accepted that creativity depends further 
upon the second criterion identified above. For Kant, the criterion is exemplariness, and for 
Simonton it is adaptiveness. Considering the disparate focus of each author, I suggest that both 
have in mind some version of the value criterion adopted by most contemporary accounts of 
creativity. 
 
Kant’s concern, as I have said, was with genius. For Kant, then, the creative products 
he is concerned with are those at the upper-most level of creativity. The products of genius, 
and their mode of production, must be models for all other would-be creators to follow. There 
seems to be little wrong with this assertion: it is precisely that their work astounds us that we 
tend to proclaim particular individuals as geniuses. Simonton’s focus, meanwhile, is on giving a 
Darwinian explanation of creativity. ‘Adaptiveness’ is therefore a term borrowed directly from 
Darwin’s evolutionary theory. A creative product is ‘adaptive’ inasmuch as it is well suited to 
the purpose for which it was created. Carter (2004) suggests a non-Darwinian alternative when 
he stresses the importance of ‘appropriacy’: 
 
By ‘appropriate’ is meant something that is normally fitted or adapted to the resolution 
of problems or difficulties existing within defined constraints. It should also have 
outcomes which are clearly valued as specific within a particular work or activity 
domain and which are approved and valued within the cultural community associated 
with that domain (Carter, 2004: 29).11 
 
In each of these accounts, what is essentially at stake is whether or not the thing is 
valuable: as a model for others to aspire toward, as a solution to a problem, as somehow 																																																								
11 Greg Currie has pointed out that approval of the relevant community does not seem to be a necessary condition 
for creativity. In his example, the invention of a contraceptive device might be creative even if disapproved of in 
the relevant community. However, it seems to me that approval and value are going to differ depending upon how 
we draw the lines around a given ‘community’. To take his example, the ‘moral community’ might disapprove of 
an invention the ‘scientific community’ approve of. The issue then is one of domains of evaluation: are we evaluating 
something as a moral innovation, a scientific innovation, etc ? This is part of the problem with the value criterion – 
it is an incredibly vague stipulation.  
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culturally significant etc. That we value creative products seems obvious – as Dutton points 
out,  “the persistent pursuit of creativity shows itself, for example, in the reluctance of careful 
writers to use the same word a second time in a sentence where synonyms are available; the 
thesaurus exists less for greater precision in writing than for the sake of pleasurable creative 
variety” (Dutton, 2009: 54). So, mere originality is insufficient for creativity: it requires 
originality with a purpose. 
 
Gaut adds a third criterion to those outlined above. He points out that something could 
be original and valuable, but still not be considered creative. Such cases would include 
accidental creativity, where the agent has not deliberately created the product, but perhaps 
done so as a by-product of some other action. Gaut therefore recognises the need for an 
‘agency condition’. The problem is familiar to discussions about agency in ethics: moral praise 
and blame can only be assigned to agents; surely, the thought goes, the same should be true of 
assigning value to acts of creativity. Consider the example of a man daubed in paint and locked 
in a dark room containing a canvas who, in his attempt to escape the room, unwittingly creates 
a stunningly good abstract painting (Gaut, 2003). The concern here is that the outcome is 
achieved purely by chance, and intuitively we lean toward the judgement that this was not a 
creative act. Similarly, if the outcome is achieved by mechanically and systematically working 
through the full range of relevant possibilities, such as the case (cited in Novitz, 1999) of 
Charles Goodyear’s discovery of vulcanisation, then we share similar intuitions. Whether or 
not something is a creative act therefore seems to depend upon how the (original and valuable) 
product is made. 
 
Gaut expresses this in terms of involving ‘flair’ on the part of the maker (Gaut, 2003: 
151), and though this expression seems to imply something beyond the agency criterion 
described above, Gaut doesn’t add anything to this description to suggest that this is anything 
more than an implicature effect – we might assume from the term ‘flair’ that, for Gaut, the act 
of creativity must be done in a particularly skilful way, but if this is what he means then it is not 
made explicit. The additional criterion is meant to rule out cases where an original and valuable 
product has been made either by a purely accidental process (presumably some luck is 
permissible e.g. when an artist makes a fortunate error), or by a purely mechanical process 
(though perhaps some creative acts involve mechanical ones, e.g. changing social policy by using 
a mechanical hacking process to steal sensitive government documents). Gaut expresses this by 
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suggesting that “creativity… is the kind of making that involves flair in producing something 
which is original (saliently new) and which has considerable value” (Gaut, 2003: 151). 
 
 So, creativity is generally thought to involve three criteria: 
 
1. An ‘originality criterion’: for something to count as creative, it must be original, 
though originality is itself relative e.g. to individuals, to cultures, and to history. 
2. A ‘value criterion’: for something to count as creative, it must have value. Again, 
value is relative e.g. to agents, to societies, etc. 
3. An ‘agency criterion’: for something to count as creative, it must not be produced 
by a purely accidental process, nor by a purely mechanical one, though luck and 
mechanised processes may be permissible to an extent. 
 
The final tasks of this chapter, then, are to outline the most relevant of the myriad 
available varieties of the Imagination from philosophy and psychology, and to show the 
connection between imagination and the understanding of creativity outlined above. This is the 
focus of §3. This will set up the groundwork for a discussion of how the imagination played a 
role in driving the evolution of human creativity and, in turn, how language fits into this 
picture. It is one specific variety of imagination that I will argue played a crucial role: fantasy. 
For some philosophers, there is a distinction in kind to be drawn between imagination and 
fantasy, but in §4 I attempt to demonstrate that there are reasons to avoid distinguishing 
between fantasy and imagination in this way. 
 
§3 Imagination and its connection to Creativity 
 
 It is generally accepted within relevant philosophical circles, at this point, that the term 
‘imagination’ covers such a broad range of notions that it is neither possible to conjure up a 
simple taxonomy, nor even a simple taxonomy of attempted taxonomies! Possession of great 
imagination has been credited with driving the evolution of human creativity (Carruthers, 
2002) and lack of imagination has been blamed for its failure to prevent the 2001 attacks on the 
World Trade Centre (Morris, 2013), such are the varieties of its supposed uses in the world. 
Strawson neatly describes the difficulties of providing a plenary covering all understandings of 
the imagination: 
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The uses, and applications, of the terms ‘image’, ‘imagine’, ‘imagination’, and so forth 
make up a very diverse and scattered family. Even this image of a family seems too 
definite. It would be a matter of more than difficulty to identify and list the family’s 
members, let alone their relations of parenthood and cousinhood (Strawson, 1970: 
31). 
 
It is my contention here that this should not really worry us. And it is certainly not my 
intention to offer any kind of comprehensive taxonomy. Instead, what this section attempts to 
do is identify and describe accounts of the imagination that have specific relevance for the 
discussion in the chapters which follow. This should lay the groundwork for contrasting human 
and non-human animal imagination (Chapter 2), as well as establishing accounts for which I will 
later argue that language necessarily plays a central role (Chapters 3 and 4). I will also spend 
some time here examining the notion of ‘fantasy’ and its connection to the imagination, so that 
I might go on to argue that fantasy has been somewhat mischaracterised, and its role in driving 
creativity underplayed (§4 & Chapter 4). What should emerge by the end of the next two 
chapters is a picture of a diverse faculty employed by a range of species to assist them with a 
range of social and environmental challenges. However, what should also emerge by the end of 
this thesis is a uniquely human variety of imagining, one which employs the cognitive 
architecture put in place by the evolution of language, and that manifests itself in the distinctive 
and universal creative behaviours of our species - storytelling, music, dance and art. 
 
§3.1 Creative, Propositional and Objectual Imagination 
 
 Most empirical work on the imagination has focused on what Currie and Ravenscroft 
(2002) term the ‘creative imagination’. This variety of imagination involves putting together 
“ideas in a way that defies expectation or convention: the kind of imaginative ‘leap’ that leads to 
the creation of something valuable in art, science, or practical life” (Currie and Ravenscroft, 
2002: 9). Currie and Ravenscroft speculate that non-human animals, as well as humans, may be 
capable of creative imagination to some degree, though they don’t fully explore this suggestion 
(since it is not their intended focus). I pick up this suggestion in Chapter 2, drawing upon some 
of the empirical work just mentioned. 
 
 So what form does the creative imagination take? In other words, how might we put 
ideas together in the imagination so as to create something new and valuable? Other varieties of 
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the imagination that have been identified shed some light on this. For instance, Yablo (1993) 
draws a distinction between propositional and objectual forms of imagining. Propositional 
imagining is imagining that P. Yablo gives as an example imagining that there is a tiger behind 
the curtain. The distinctive feature of propositional imagining, according to Yablo, is its alethic 
content i.e. that it is truth-evaluable. Only propositional imagining is truth-evaluable. This is an 
important claim, and one I will return to after my discussion of language in Chapter 3. For 
now, I will say only that it has been consistently argued by Hinzen (2006, 2007, 2011, 2013, 
Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013) that this feature of propositionality emerges with grammar, so 
propositional imagining is the paradigmatic case of a linguistic form of imagination. 
 
 Objectual imagining, according to Yablo, is (perhaps obviously) imagining some object, 
such as the tiger from the previous example. Yablo’s elaborations on this notion are interesting, 
though perhaps a little confused in places. He explains objectual imagining as imagining an 
object “endowed with certain properties” (Yablo, 1993: 27), so we might, for instance, imagine 
the tiger as being striped. This seems a fairly uncontroversial way of thinking about objectual 
imagining, and multiple similar accounts are given elsewhere (for instance, see Currie and 
Ravenscroft, 2002 on 'sensory imagination'). However, Yablo blurs the lines between 
propositional and objectual imagining when he suggests that we might imagine the tiger as being 
endowed with the property of ‘being behind the curtain’ and yet “also imagine that it has those 
properties” (ibid.); this seems problematic. For one, we might question whether ‘being behind 
the curtain’ is a property of the tiger or of the imaginary world the tiger inhabits i.e. it is an 
imagined world in which there is a tiger behind the curtain.12 In other words, it sounds less like 
imagining an object than it does imagining a state of affairs.13 If it is the latter, then this would 
seem to involve the alethic content Yablo states is unique to propositional imagining, and 
entirely absent from objectual imagining. Conversely, on Yablo’s view only objectual imagining 
(that which purports to depict an object) has referential content. This seems similarly 
problematic, depending upon what Yablo means by referential content. Clearly, propositions 
																																																								
12 I have in mind here the same sort of objection that Kant raises against the Ontological Argument by saying that 
existence is not a predicate. Being extended in space is a predicate, but having a fixed location in space might not 
be – it seems like this might always be relative to some other object, and thus not a property of any object but 
instead a property of the universe containing the objects. 
13 Nagel (1974) describes a kind of imagining that may be helpful here – perceptual imagining. The former includes 
what Yablo terms ‘objectual imagining’, but more explicitly also includes imagining states of affairs too. On 
Nagel’s account, we take the position of an imaginary perceiver for either objects or states of affairs. Perceptual 
imagining is, therefore, broader than objectual imagining, and Yablo’s account might be strengthened by drawing 
this distinction so as to avoid the concerns about alethic content creeping into examples he thinks illustrate 
objectual imagining, which is meant to eschew alethic content altogether. 
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refer. If we imagine that ‘The tiger has eight black stripes’ then we are clearly imagining 
relationships obtaining between representational tokens and objects (here, for instance, there is 
a relationship between a definite description ‘the tiger’ and an object, an imaginary tiger). 
Alethic content emerges here at least inasmuch as it is true or false whether the imaginary tiger 
being depicted has eight black stripes, and presumably this kind of concern is what motivates 
parallel discussions about truth in fiction. 
 
 Setting these concerns to one side, it is clear that we possess the capacity for objectual 
imagining, and Yablo’s view that it is different to, and independent of, propositional imagining, 
seems fine. And it is also clear that we deploy objectual imagining often. Currie and 
Ravenscroft (2002: 11) describe this as a kind of ‘imaginative projection’ in which we have a 
perception-like experience in the absence of a corresponding real object. We might add to non-
propositional varieties of imagining, cases of imagining doing or experiencing something - what 
Walton (1990) terms ‘active imagining’ or ‘imagining de se’. In these kinds of case, for instance, 
imagining seeing a bear, the imaginings are first-personal, but do not include identifying 
ourselves in that imagining: 
 
When I imagine (myself) seeing a rhinoceros, there may be a sense in which I do not 
imagine that Kendall Walton sees a rhinoceros, or imagine Walton’s seeing one, or imagin 
of Walton that he sees one. No verbal representation of myself (neither my name nor a 
description of myself nor a first-person pronoun) need figure in my thoughts as I 
imagine (Walton, 1990: 31) 
 
§3.2 Are all imaginings creative? 
 
 So how do the propositional and objectual varieties of imagination relate to the creative 
imagination? It seems that we can combine propositional imaginings and objectual imaginings 
(both ‘ideas’) in ways that satisfy the description given for creative imagination above. For 
instance, we may string together propositional imaginings in the form of a story, or we might 
imagine previously unthought-of of objects (a tiger with three white stripes, one yellow stripe, 
and one fuchsia stripe). Given what we have said above about the relativity of the originality 
and value criteria for creativity, it’s tempting to say that any imagining might count as creative. 
Gaut, however, specifically warns against the use of ‘imaginative’ as a synonym for ‘creative’, 
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claiming that this would entail a “true but analytic and trivial connection between imagination 
and creativity” (Gaut, 2003: 151-2).  
 
For Gaut, the issue is that not every instance of imagining yields something that is both 
‘saliently new’, his version of the originality criterion above (but seemingly operating with 
stricter standards), and valuable. He instead cautions against calling something creative simply 
because it goes beyond what is given to belief and perception (a view he attributes to Scruton). 
Gaut gives two examples of what he regards as uncreative imaginings: imagining a golden 
mountain and imagining falling off the edge of a cliff. He suggests that these are ‘not in any even 
minimal sense’ creative imaginings. Whether both (or either) of these examples pass will 
depend upon how broadly we construe the originality and value conditions. Most actual cases of 
imagining a golden mountain seem unlikely to meet a strict rendering of the originality 
criterion – most of us will imagine a golden mountain only when instructed to do so by Hume 
(or some other philosopher borrowing his example). As such, the idea itself doesn’t originate 
with the reader’s imagining. But if the reader is combining the distinct ideas of ‘golden’ and 
‘mountain’ for the first time without instruction, there would be an agent-relative sense in which 
the imaginative product is original (though perhaps still not valuable) even if it uses a process 
that agent may have used many times before (mentally combining two images). It is important 
to remember that we can describe processes as well as products as ‘creative’ (see §2), and this 
must also be true of imagination: how we imagine can be creative, even if what we imagine is 
not, and vice versa. Consider, then, Gaut’s second example. In Gaut’s words: 
 
When I peer over a cliff’s edge I may, with boring and predictable regularity, just like 
countless other people, imagine being hurled down to the rocks below (Gaut, 2003: 
155). 
 
What is Gaut’s point here exactly? Is it that my imaginative act is not creative because 
many others have done the same under similar circumstances (thus failing to meet the 
originality criterion)? If so, this position would surely entail that, for instance, portrait painting 
is not creative because, when sat at an easel with oil paints and a subject before me, I do what 
countless other people do and paint the person I see. Moreover, our actual imaginings under 
these circumstances are rarely so dull as to simply imagine that P i.e. imagine the proposition that 
‘I am falling off a cliff’ is true. Propositional imagining was introduced as a variety of 
imagination to describe the form that imagination takes, not the content. Nagel describes a kind 
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of imagining that seems to naturally come into play here, sympathetic imagining. This is 
imagining oneself as undergoing a certain experience. When stood at the cliff edge, our imagining is 
less likely to be a bland imagining that the proposition ‘I am falling off a cliff’ is true then it is to 
be an exploration of the emotional and perceptual experience one might have under 
circumstances in which that proposition is true. And such imaginings might perhaps be 
expected to vary drastically between individuals who are on that cliff edge with a view to 
making that fall a reality and those who are merely there to watch the sun set. These imaginings 
might even vary within a single subject imagining the fall in different moods. As such, the 
analogy with portrait painting extends beyond the fact that multitudes have undertaken the 
same process and into the fact that, when they do, they produce a variety of products too. It 
seems to me that a much more permissive rendering of the originality criterion wouldn’t rule 
out these imaginings as original.  
 
Whether these examples fail to meet the value criterion or not also surely depends 
upon the circumstances: both cases are potentially instructive to the agent (for example, either 
in learning about Hume’s distinction between simple and complex ideas, or learning that, after 
doing some sympathetic imagining, we don’t really wish to throw ourselves off a cliff). Rather 
mundane or routine imaginings like that in Gaut’s second example might be most valuable as a 
prompt for further, more creative, imagining. As Walton (1990) points out, our imaginings are 
tethered to the world in some way – they either are about the world we live in, or involve 
(elements of) things from our world. But more creative imaginings might flout conventions or 
rules that govern our daily lives. If someone imagines falling from a cliff but, immediately 
before hitting the floor, sprouting eagle wings and beginning to soar upwards and over the 
ocean, their imagining might well be original (if they’ve imagined or heard no such story 
before) and possibly valuable too (at least inasmuch as it might be pleasurable, and serve as a 
form of psychological relief from the thoughts that drove them to imagine falling in the first 
place). Routine imaginings, therefore, might have value as prompts for fantasies.  
 
 Gaut’s caution about conflating imagining and creativity should still be heeded though. 
It seems fair to suggest that some imaginings would fail to meet the criteria for creativity that we 
set out above. The originality criterion would not be met when, for the nth time, a weary 
philosophy postgrad is instructed by yet another philosopher to imagine a golden mountain and 
acquiesces in their request. By this point, even the value criterion might not be met under such 
circumstances. Another concern is whether the agency criterion is met when an agent imagines 
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under written instruction. This looks like a pretty mechanical way to produce creative output 
(with clear parallels with computer programming). I think, therefore, Gaut is correct to worry 
that we might reduce imagination and creativity to a trivial and analytic relation if we make the 
criteria for creativity too permissive, but given the arguments for their relativity of each 
criterion above I’m inclined to say that most imagining will turn out to be minimally creative. I 
don’t think that this should concern us too much. As I will argue immediately below, 
discussions of creativity have been subverted by philosophers since Kant to focus specifically on 
genius or exceptional creativity (whether intentionally or accidentally), and only recently have 
philosophical discussions tried to re-orient themselves toward an understanding of the everyday 
creativity that is evident across the human population. Both phenomena are important here, 
since human creativity involves a wide range of behaviours. 
 
§3.3 Other varieties of Imagination 
 
 Philosophers have usefully identified several other varieties of imagination that help us 
with our focus here. These include Walton’s distinction between spontaneous and deliberate 
imaginings (Walton, 1990). The distinction Walton makes here is between acts of imagination 
that occur ‘with or without the subject’s conscious direction’ (ibid.) This distinction is 
particularly useful when we turn to non-human animal cognition to look for evolutionary 
predecessors for the kinds of imagining we typically associate with human creativity (which I 
explore in Chapter 2). In Walton’s view, the line between spontaneous and deliberate 
imaginings is not sharp, but spontaneous imaginings are characterised as rendering the imaginer 
as a ‘spectator’ rather than a perpetrator:  
 
Rather than constructing her imaginary world, she “watches” as it unfolds. It seems less 
her own contrivance than something created and existing independently of her. She 
may be surprised at how it turns out… Spontaneously created imaginary worlds are 
like the real world in their capacity to surprise us. Imagining spontaneously can be 
more fun, more exciting than doing so deliberately (Walton, 1990: 14). 
 
 Walton’s observations about spontaneous imagining here are interesting in a number of 
ways. Firstly, Walton goes on to claim that dreaming is a kind of ‘spontaneous, undeliberate 
imagining’ (ibid: 16). Imagining, on this account, doesn’t require conscious control. This opens 
up the possibility of at least one kind of imagining that can be done (or, probably more 
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accurately, experienced) by non-human animals (see Chapter 2). Conscious control need not 
be an all-or-nothing thing either: for Walton, daydreaming sits somewhere on the hazy line 
between spontaneous and deliberate imagining, because there are certainly elements of 
daydreaming which are consciously directed and elements which simply occur to us. The 
second interesting observation Walton makes above is that spontaneous imaginings might be 
more fun. Walton ties this to the suggestion that the more conscious we are of the falsity of a 
proposition, the harder it is to believe. If the facts are conspicuous, they might intrude into our 
imaginative experience and make a daydream or other kind of imagining less enjoyable. There 
is (arguably) an implicit suggestion here that imaginings which successfully take us further from 
the facts are more enjoyable, as is the case with fantasy (which Walton, perhaps in a throwaway 
remark, seems to suggest is also a kind of spontaneous imagining; Walton, 1990: 14), since the 
suggestion is that it is truth’s intrusion on our imagination that makes it less enjoyable. This 
suggestion is important here because I will go on to argue that engaging in fantasy led us to 
begin sharing those fantasies once language was in place; and this is the very process that I argue 
accounts for the evolution of human creativity. 
 
 A further distinction from Walton is also helpful with respect to this thesis: between 
social and solitary imagining. Social imagining involves the joint participation of several subjects, 
with solitary imagining (self-explanatorily) involving a single agent. Walton’s observation that 
such a thing as social imagining takes places actually marks a stark contrast to the parallel 
philosophical discussion of creativity. In his semantic and cultural history Keywords, Williams 
(1983: 82) argues that the shift away from the Inspirationalist view of creativity did not begin 
until the Renaissance period. Up until then, the word ‘creation’ was not used to describe 
human actions but, instead, only the divine. However, from the Renaissance onwards, 
‘creation’ starts being used to describe acts of the human imagination – the creation of 
alternative worlds. Caution over the transition from divine to human creation is reflected in the 
use of the word ‘creation’ in Elizabethan literature, where it closely reflects a sense of the 
counterfeit, such as Shakespeare’s description of Banquo’s ghost as ‘a false creation’ (Carter, 
2004: 25). The modern sense of creation as a human act only becomes established in the 
eighteenth century as the Enlightenment shifted us toward a Humanist conception of the 
universe and away from traditional religious teachings. It is within this context that the idea of 
the genius as an isolated individual emerges (Williams 1983: 143), and in turn becomes the 
focus of philosophical work from Kant. It is worth noting that the idea of the genius as an 
isolated individual is contrary to many contemporary practices (collaborative scientific work, or 
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the very new phenomena of ‘hackathons’ and ‘game jams’, for example). I wish to suggest that 
focusing on practices involving social imaginings might help us to explain the evolution of 
human creativity. In particular, storytelling involves social imagining in that it minimally 
requires an author and an audience, but (especially in the oral tradition) it typically also involves 
contributions from multiple agents. 
 
 However, most discussions of the imagination, Walton-excepted, follow the path 
toward the isolated individual. This is both understandable and forgivable, but in neglecting 
social imaginings, I argue, we have missed something fundamental in our attempts to explain 
the evolution of human creativity and its connection to language. As we will see in Chapter 2, 
many critics of the view that uniquely human creative thought somehow comes for free with 
language note that there is an apparent gap between the emergence of language in our species 
and the emergence of distinctively human creative behaviour (such as cave paintings). The 
thought, therefore, is that something in addition to language is needed. A promising route to 
solving the puzzle that this gap presents is to suggest that some cultural accretions must get in 
place in the meantime. However, there is (as yet) no discussion of social imaginings in the 
literature addressing this. This thesis takes the position that a very specific form of social 
imagining, storytelling, driven by fantasy, provides the precise kind of cultural scaffolding 
required to satisfactorily explain the uniquely human creative behaviour that emerged. I turn 
now to the kind of imagining that I claim drives this process of cultural accretion, fantasy.14 
 
§4 Fantasy (and its Detractors) 
 
 When Sigmund Freud turned his focus to how works of literature come into being, the 
answer he came up with was fantasy (a term he uses interchangeably with ‘day-dreaming’). 
Freud argues that authors, or at least the authors of the ‘pop culture’ of his day (‘dime’ novels, 
romances and short stories), are ostensibly adult mirror-images of their childhood self at play.15 
Whereas, according to Freud, children’s fantasies are about being grown-ups, manifesting 																																																								
14 Creativity at the individual level would still be possible in the absence of such cultural scaffolding, but without an 
effective means to disseminate skills and information then those innovations simply wouldn’t take hold. I argue 
(Chapter 5) that storytelling is a particularly effective way of disseminating skills and information. The 
archaeological record shows evidence of ‘failed’ innovations cropping up from time to time ahead of the ‘Creative 
Explosion’ (see Crow, 2002 for a review of such evidence; see Chapter 2 for details on the Creative Explosion). 
15 To some extent, the genre of fantasy literature is still seen as somewhat childish, and not as ‘serious’ artwork. Its 
purpose is seen as ‘mere’ entertainment, or as escapism. I discuss the connection between fantasy and escape 
below and in Chapter 4. 
	 49 
themselves as pretend play to that effect, grown-ups’ fantasies centre on other ambitions and 
erotic desires (perhaps unsurprisingly for those familiar with his work, Freud claims that female 
fantasies are almost exclusively erotic in nature). Authors might take as their subject any set of 
ambitions and turn them into literature. Freud gives two examples to illustrate: (i) the 
invulnerability of the hero, who survives any number of dangerous situations against the odds, 
and (ii) being irresistible to ‘all’ of the women in the novel. In Freud’s view, these works of 
literature are externalisations of the process of quasi-wish-fulfilment that is engaging in fantasy. 
Authors differ from everyone else only in their willingness to share their fantasies (the rest of us 
are too ashamed). 
 
 Gaut draws a sharp distinction between ‘imagination’ and ‘fantasy’. In his view, 
imagination lacks any ‘intrinsic ends’ i.e. any end that makes it the state that it is. While belief 
has as its intrinsic ends truth, and intention has as its intrinsic ends action, imagination has no 
such ends. It would be paradoxical to say ‘I believe that it is raining, but it isn’t’, or to say ‘I 
intend to go trampolining, but I won’t go when I can’, but we can substitute ‘imagine’ for 
‘believe’ and ‘intend’ in these sentences without any such paradox arising. It is this lack of an 
intrinsic ends that Gaut claims makes imagination ‘peculiarly suited’ to be the vehicle of active 
creativity, allowing us to try out different approaches without any entailed commitments to 
truth or action. Fantasy, by contrast, is goal-oriented in much the way Freud asserts. The goal 
in fantasising, in Gaut’s words: 
 
… is to enhance one’s own enjoyment, and the aim of this project determines what 
counts as a successful piece of fantasising. So, if despite my efforts, I keep imagining 
myself being embarrassingly humiliated, the fantasy has gone wrong (Gaut, 2003: 161) 
 
 Like Freud, then, Gaut sees fantasy as focused on enjoyment. Walton too, as 
mentioned above, seems to see fantasising as a kind of spontaneous imagining, which he sees as 
more fun than its deliberate counterpart. However, Gaut seems to stop short of Freud in that he 
doesn’t see the project of fantasising as going beyond the mere enjoyment of an isolated 
imaginer; Freud, by contrast, suggests that we externalise fantasy as creative writing, and this 
is, I argue, an important realisation. Fantasy may begin as wish-fulfilment, but it doesn’t always 
end there. If Freud is correct, then fantasies that begin in the imagination may manifest 
themselves as novels, in jokes, and (nowadays) television shows, movies and countless other 
media. What makes it peculiarly suited for externalisation is the fact that it is so enjoyable – 
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both for us to engage in, and to share with others as we direct their imagination toward our 
fantastic ideas. 
 
 Scruton too attempts to draw a distinction between fantasy and imagination, though 
along different lines (Scruton, 1983). For Scruton, the artist employs imagination in order to 
get a better grasp of reality, whereas fantasy aims at escapism. However, Currie and 
Ravenscroft (2002: 38) suggest that, rather than being two distinct things, this is really a matter 
of one thing, imagination, being put to two different uses. It is Currie and Ravenscroft’s view 
that, I believe, is more appealing. This requires a perhaps broader and more permissive account 
of the imagination than Gaut, Scruton and others are willing to grant, but I will argue in 
Chapter 4 that permitting us to see fantasy as part of the faculty of imagination gives the 
imagination a more prominent and specific explanatory role in the development of human 
creativity. 
 
 Currie and Ravenscroft’s own account of fantasy is to see it as a kind of ‘indulgent 
imagining’ (ibid.) Indulgence, they note, can both admit of degrees and be exhibited in different 
ways, offering a non-exhaustive list of examples. The first way concerns effortlessness: “Our 
imaginings count as fantasy if they exhibit one’s preference for comparatively effortless 
imagining over effortful imagining” (ibid.) Currie and Ravenscroft allude to Gombrich’s (1963) 
comparison of Bouguereau and Botticelli’s depiction of the birth of Venus to illustrate this 
notion. Gombrich suggests that the history of art can be seen as one of the interplay of artist and 
audience, a “balance between what one might call aesthetic activity and regressive pleasure” 
(Gombrich, 1963: 37). For Gombrich, because Botticelli lacked the technical skill of 
Bouguereau, evidenced amongst other things by the pentimenti in his depiction of Venus, and 
because later audiences were more visually literate, reading Bouguereau’s painting is easy, 
perhaps effortless. However, because of this, the eroticism of the painting is entirely on the 
surface – it requires no real effort on the part of the audience to trace the artist’s own 
imaginative effort; as such, Gombrich derides Bouguereau’s Venus as a mere ‘pin up girl’ (ibid.) 
 
 For Gombrich, the artist does his audience a disservice when his work is too easy to 
read. The audience are taken for ‘simpletons’ when, in fact, the ‘sophisticated’ look for ‘more 
difficult gratifications’ (ibid.). Such sentiments characterise today’s ‘hipsters’ quite well! 
However, Currie and Ravenscroft don’t choose Gombrich as an example in order to side with 
Gaut in suggesting that fantasy is somehow creatively bankrupt because it is so easy that anyone 
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can do it, with little variation for content. Effortless imagining is just one way in which we can 
characterise fantasy. A second way is by agreeing with Scruton that escapism is a kind of fantasy 
(but not one somehow distinct from imagination). Escapist literature, they suggest, can often 
require imaginative effort, and constitutes “a preference for imaginings that protect us from 
uncomfortable truths” (Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002: 39-40). This is a second kind of fantasy, 
indulging us as it does in escaping a reality we want to avoid. 
 
 The third way in which imagining can be indulgent is more obvious: “by being an 
imaginative project the aim of which is to satisfy all, or as many as possible, or the strongest, of 
one’s desire-like imaginings” (Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002: 40). They cite as an example the 
formulaic romances of Mills & Boon, which are renowned for their repetition of plots and plot 
devices and predictability. Feminist critique of these novels suggest that Freud’s early 
description of fantasy manifested in pop culture’s creative writing was perhaps accurate: 
helpless damsels invariably find themselves (willingly or unwillingly) paired with the male 
protagonist (Cummins and Bindel, 2007). 
 
 The common thread throughout all of these accounts is that fantasy involves the 
(imagined) fulfilment of desires. Employing the same arguments we saw above to suggest that 
not all imaginings are creative, Gaut is particularly scathing about Freud’s account of fantasy: 
 
Fantasising is a kind of imagining, but is rarely creative. Indeed, perhaps the simplest 
but most telling objection to Freud… is that daydreaming, a kind of fantasy, is almost 
never creative, and thus is not a promising model for creative writing (Gaut, 2003: 
155).16 
 
Yet it is hard to see why commonplace fantasies would fail to provide a promising 
model for creative writing – and certainly not the pop culture that Freud was primarily 
concerned with. If we take the Freudian account seriously (more seriously than I think we 
really should), then externalisation of a commonplace fantasy would create the kind of positive 																																																								
16 In his rush to denigrate fantasy as uncreative, Gaut makes a puzzling assertion. Whereas fantasy aims at our own 
enjoyment, “creative uses of imagining, in contrast, need not aim at personal pleasure or at learning something. 
Nor need they aim at being creative: for one can be creative even though one does not aim to be so” (Gaut, 2003: 
161). This is puzzling because it is Gaut, in this same paper, who suggests that we need to introduce ‘flair’ i.e. the 
agency condition, into our definition of creativity to rule out unintentional creativity. I’m far more convinced by 
the examples Gaut provides to illustrate the need for an agency condition than I am by his assertion that imagining 
aimed at pleasure is somehow not creative. Again, the arguments are that it lacks originality and/or value, but 
since these are relative, I fail to see how this can be the case. 
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feedback loop that would actively encourage creative writing. We are, remember, ashamed to let 
people know our fantasies, but in finding an audience affirming that such fantasies are 
acceptable, or even enjoyable, to them, the author can reduce the tension wrought by the 
shame felt at having those fantasies (tension-reduction being the purpose of the Freudian Ego). I 
worry that Gaut’s concern about the lack of originality of our fantasies confuses process and 
product here. Just because the process of fantasising may be describable in those terms, that 
doesn’t mean the fantasies themselves aren’t highly original and valuable. Revenge fantasies 
might be very enjoyable and easy to engage in, but they might also be highly creative. Spanish 
and Elizabethan revenge tragedies are amongst some of the most highly regarded and discussed 
works of literature and, if the Freudian theory is correct, are the product of the fantastic 
imagination. Even our own revenge fantasies might involve incredibly creative ideas about how 
to get even with someone. 
 
 Despite agreeing with much of what they suggest, I still find much of Currie and 
Ravenscroft’s discussion of fantasy unsatisfying because of its selection of examples (such as 
Mills and Boon novels). What is interesting about Freud’s piece on fantasy is that he feels, at 
one point, the need to apologise for not focusing on literary creation, since it is his intended 
focus. Instead, he rightly points out, he has spoken more about fantasy in general; that is, 
fantasy in the experience of the normally-developing child and the average adult. The 
assumption from Gaut, and perhaps Walton, is that everyday fantasy lacks originality and value, 
despite these criterion being reducible to a subjective level. It would, I think, be more accurate 
for Gaut to say that everyday fantasy is less creative, rather than rarely creative. Rather than 
attempting to dismiss the everyday as uncreative, a more interesting approach would be to look 
at fantasy as it is externalised on a daily basis – in jokes, in improvised bedtime stories, and in so 
many other ways – rather than by comparison to imagination manifest as works of literature 
and art. Currie and Ravenscroft too might find greater value for fantasy by looking beyond the 
trashy novels that Freud thinks fantasy leads to, and instead to works of literature involving the 
creation of detailed imaginary worlds (e.g. fantasy novels; I return to this idea in Chapter 4). 
Doing so, I will argue, would make us less inclined to downplay the importance of fantasy, that 
is, fantasy as the indulgence of our desires in imagination, differing in degree, in nature, and 
whose externalisations differ radically depending upon the cognitive and cultural resources of 
the agent. 
 
 
	 53 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 We have seen, then, that fantasy (as a species of imagination) has been given less 
detailed consideration than it perhaps deserves. Connecting fantasy to creativity, via language, 
will be one of the central tasks of this thesis. We have made some important observations about 
the nature of fantasy here: that it is particularly enjoyable, and that it is can be externalised in 
the form of stories. I have suggested, also, that these fantasies might themselves be creative 
even before they become externalised – to do so they would need to meet the criteria for 
creativity i.e. they must be non-accidentally, non-mechanically produced imaginings that are 
original and valuable. The rest of this thesis will attempt to demonstrate just how valuable our 
tendency to engage in fantasy has been in the story of the evolution of human creativity. The 
starting point for doing so will be, in the next chapter, to track the evolution of creativity in 
our species, beginning with our non-human animal ancestors, through pre-cursor hominids, and 
eventually to modern homo sapiens. Examining creative behaviour makes good suggestions about 
the cognitive architecture that underpins that behaviour, and now that we have set out a variety 
of kinds of imagination, and elucidated imagination’s connection to creativity, we can try to 
determine the imaginative capacities of our evolutionary ancestors. This, in turn, should allow 
us to pose questions about what, if anything, the evolution of language in our species did to 
transform the cognitive architecture utilised in human creativity. 
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Chapter 2: 
THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN 
CREATIVE COGNITION 
How and when did human creative cognition evolve? 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we examined traditional and contemporary analyses of 
creativity. We saw that the traditional accounts of creativity focused on the origin of creative 
ideas – did they originate with the gods (Inspirationalism), or did they originate with some kind 
of deranged mental state that takes the creator beyond the boundaries that normally developing 
human beings operate within (The Derangement View)? To some extent, this chapter continues 
the discussion of the origins of creative ideas, but switches the focus to finding an evolutionary 
explanation by examining the emergence of the cognitive basis of human creativity. Doing so 
provides the remaining groundwork required to start building my own story of the evolution of 
human creative cognition by indicating precisely what capacities were in place in our 
evolutionary lineage prior to the emergence of our species. 
 
 This chapter also has a further focus. One of the central aims of this thesis is to explore 
the role that language has played in the emergence of the distinctively human kind of creativity 
that we see across all human populations today. This chapter, therefore, also outlines relevant 
details of the evolution of the biological basis of the language faculty. In Chapter 6, once more 
detail has been given on the precise notion of language which is of interest to this thesis in 
Chapter 3, we will return to this discussion of the evolution of language and its impact on 
human creativity by examining some interesting evidence about the impact of acquired aphasia 
on human imagination and creativity. I will contend that this evidence supports my thesis that 
fantasy and storytelling are the crucial drivers of the evolution of human creative cognition, a 
position I outline over the course of the next three chapters. 
 
 The chapter begins in §1 by outlining a puzzle about the emergence of our species and 
the emergence of the creative behaviour that typifies it. I then turn in §2 to the story of the 
evolution of language, suggesting that while many aspects of the faculty of language are shared 
with our evolutionary ancestors, syntax is not, making fully-syntactic language unique to Homo 
sapiens. §3 makes some suggestions about what kind of imaginative capacities were in place 
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prior to the emergence of fully-syntactic language, clearing some space to identify the precise 
contribution that language makes. This section offers a broad overview of non-human animal 
imagination and precursor hominid imagination, before returning us to the puzzle set up in §1. 
§4 outlines an attempt to solve this puzzle by Picciuto and Carruthers (2014), an attempt that I 
argue in §5 is ultimately unsuccessful. This sets up the key issues to address in the remaining 
chapters of this thesis: the roles of language, fantasy and storytelling in the evolution of human 
creativity. 
 
1. The Supposed Puzzle of the ‘Creative Explosion’ 
 
§1.1 The Speciation of Modern Homo Sapiens  
 
Our species came into existence during the Middle Pleistocene period. Fossil and 
mitochondrial DNA evidence suggests that ‘anatomically modern humans’ existed in Africa 
from perhaps as early as 200,000 years ago (Renfrew, 2007), but certainly by between 150,000 
and 70,000 years ago (Stringer, 2002). Contemporary Homo sapiens are generally thought to be 
directly descended from these first Homo sapiens, perhaps from a single population of as few as 
600 breeding individuals (Marean, 2010) who began to leave Africa and populate (ultimately) 
the rest of the world between 130,000 and 100,000 years ago. This has come to be known as 
the ‘out of Africa’ hypothesis (defended in Stringer, 2002), and this hypothesis holds the 
current consensus in the palaeoanthropological community. Other pre-sapient Hominids such 
as Homo erectus had first appeared in Africa much earlier, and their lineage saw the emergence of 
multiple hominid species such as Homo heidelbergensis, Homo floresiensis, with Homo sapiens and 
Homo neanderthalensis descending from the former. As these different Hominid species also 
began to inhabit other parts of the world, a rival to the Out Of Africa hypothesis posits that our 
species may have evolved independently in multiple locations from these different groups of 
Hominid explorers. However, given that species-specific traits such as language are universal 
across human populations and require a complex combination of biological traits that is unique 
to our particular hominid line, it is reasonable to assume that the biological basis for language 
originated with a specific group of hominids before they left Africa to populate the rest of the 
world, rather than coincidentally and separately evolving from multiple lineages all over the 
globe. 
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 While it is possible to give an account of the emergence of anatomically modern humans 
without too much controversy by appealing to the fossil record, it is far more difficult to tell a 
story about the emergence of behaviourally modern humans i.e. ones that share our phenotypic 
behavioural traits, including fully-syntactic language and a wide range of creative behaviours 
across many domains of human life. Language doesn’t fossilise, nor do certain kinds of creative 
behaviour such as oral poetry, song or dance. As a result, many of those attempting to track 
either the evolution of human creativity or the evolution of language have pointed to preserved 
examples of cultural sophistication such as cave art and technological innovation in human 
populations as evidence. This kind of activity most clearly occurs in various places in Europe 
somewhere between 35,000 and 43,000 years ago (Mellars 2002), and this occurs alongside a 
host of other changes (see Fig. 1 below) that suggest an increase not only in artistic creativity, 
but in scientific creativity too. This period has been referred to as the ‘Upper Palaeolithic 
Revolution’ (Gilman, 1984) and also described in terms of a ‘Creative Explosion’ (Pfeiffer, 
1982). 
 
 The reasons to point to cultural evidence such as that in Figure 1 below as evidence of 
the presence of language in our species are fairly obvious. Language seems like a particularly 
efficient way of disseminating information between both between groups and generations, 
allowing for a ‘ramping up’ of cultural sophistication (Pinker, 1994, Mellars, 2002). Moreover, 
cultural practices such as cave paintings and the repetition of decorative motifs seem to indicate 
the kind of symbolic thought associated with language. As such, most academics discussing 
these issues are confident that fully-syntactic language was in place by this time.17  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
17 One notable challenge to this comes in Humphrey 1998, who offers some reasons to think that cave art, 
specifically, should not be taken as indicative of linguistic thought. I will address this challenge in Chapter 6. 
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Fig. 1 Archaeological evidence for the Creative Explosion 
 
1 Changes in tool manufacturing techniques, including an increased element of ‘imposed form’, with clear regional variation in style; 
2 Introduction of new technologies (and at an increased tempo), e.g. for skin-working, projectiles for hunting; a shift from ‘all-purpose’ handaxes to specialised individual tools; 
3 
An enhanced diet (to include small game and fish) and new methods of cooking and storage e.g. pits 
dug into the permafrost acting as natural refrigerators; suggests improved understanding of the natural 
environment, including lunar/tidal patterns. 
4 Increased population density, evidenced through an increase in the number of occupied sites; 
5 Production of baskets, textiles, rope, fish nets and snares from plant fibres; 
6 Tentative evidence for the first ‘ceremonial’ burials, evidenced by the presence of grave goods, some of which would have taken several man-years to manufacture; 
7 The appearance of extensively and regularly notched bone artefacts, possibly representing systematic numerical notation; 
8 The appearance of the first unambiguous musical instruments, such as the bird-bone flutes found at Geissenklösterle, Germany; 
9 
The creation of personal decorative adornments made from materials procured from sites up to several 
hundred kilometres away, reflecting changes in economic and social organisation (including, possibly, 
long-distance, inter-tribal trade); 
10 
The first appearances of representational or ‘naturalistic’ art, including small carvings made from bone, 
antler or ivory (reflecting the changes in hunting techniques in procuring these materials) and cave 
paintings at Lascaux, Altamira and the Grotte Chauvet. 
Sources: Mellars (2002), Renfrew (2007: ch. 5) and Cochran and Harpending (2009: ch. 2). 
 
 
§1.2 A Puzzle? 
 
However, taken together this information was, up until very recently, taken to present 
something of a puzzle: given that all of the relevant biological changes for fully-modern human 
cognition are thought to be in place and evolutionarily stable by around 100,000 years ago, 
before human beings first left Africa to populate the rest of the world, why didn’t the kind of 
human creativity that abounds today show up until some 60,000 years later?18 Or to put it 
another way, what else was needed besides language to provide the stimulus for the emergence 
of creative behaviour during the Creative Explosion? This is a question that this thesis seeks to 
answer, but the answer I will posit will actually contend that distinctive creative behaviours that 
simply would not fossilise emerged not too long after the development of fully-syntactic 
language, and thus the chronological ‘gap’ between the emergence of language and the 
emergence of sophisticated and uniquely human creative behaviour is shorter than the puzzle of 
the Creative Explosion suggests. 
 
 In fact, in recent years more and more evidence has been discovered that suggests 
much earlier beginnings of symbolic and creative behaviour in human populations. For instance, 																																																								
18 Colin Renfrew is concerned with a closely related puzzle – what he terms the ‘sapient paradox’. Renfrew points 
out that we only begin to see significant and rapid cultural change as recently as 10,000 years ago, noting the 
glacial pace of cultural innovation in the preceding 90,000 years of our species’ existence. 
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Henshilwood et al. (2009) discovered blocks of ochre at the Blombos Cave in South Africa that 
appear to contain symbolic notation. These are dated perhaps as far back as 80,000 years ago, 
and associated with anatomically modern human remains. Similarly, evidence from the Qafzeh 
Cave in Israel associates anatomically modern human remains with the possible use of ochre in a 
symbolic way at 92,000 years ago (Hovers et al., 2003). It might be the case, then, that the 
puzzle isn’t really a puzzle at all – there was no significant ‘gap’ between the emergence of our 
species and the development of creative behaviour.19 However, I think this response is too 
simplistic. The recent evidence is of a very different nature to the evidence associated with the 
Creative Explosion. Apparent symbolic (perhaps numerical) notation associated with these 
earliest discoveries is not of the same kind as the representational art that appears at Lascaux 
tens of thousands of years later, even if both draw upon similar cognitive capacities. The rate of 
technological change in our species still appears to speed up dramatically at the time of the 
Creative Explosion (and perhaps gains pace exponentially when we extend the time period to 
our own). These facts still leave us with some interesting questions to address: what cognitive 
or cultural developments are required for these changes to occur, and what prompted these 
developments? I will discuss a specific attempt at answering these questions from Peter 
Carruthers in §4, but highlight some difficulties with the answer he provides in §5. The 
remaining chapters of the thesis will develop an argument for alternative answers to these 
questions. First, however, I will briefly outline some key issues in the evolution of language. 
 
2. The Evolution of Language 
 
 Human language today consists of a large and varied lexicon and a system of 
grammatical rules that allow us to combine lexical items in a (theoretically) infinite number of 
ways. These combinations are most commonly externalised as speech, though we have also 
developed fully-expressive gestural languages i.e. sign language, for cases where speech isn’t 
appropriate. Writing is a relatively recent method of externalising language, having been 
around in a system which also encodes the grammatical aspects of language for around 4,000 
years (though proto-writing systems and numerical notation systems have existed for longer; 
see Ifrah, 2000, Woods, 2015). 																																																								
19 Clearly, there isn’t a one-to-one relationship between observed behaviour and cognitive capacities. While we 
can be fairly certain that in order to perform some particular (observed) behaviour, the underlying cognitive 
capacity for performing that behaviour must be present, we cannot infer from the absence of evidence for some 
behaviour that the underlying cognitive capacity for such behaviour was not present. 
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Working on the basis that speech was the earliest way of expressing linguistic thought, 
many biological developments needed to be in place before language could become a stable trait 
within our species. Some of these biological developments are shared with non-human animals, 
and obviously with pre-cursor hominids, yet there is a distinct absence of evidence that any 
species other than our own possesses fully-syntactic language. Precisely how it is the case that 
our Hominid line alone developed language in this sense is the subject of much debate, and I 
don’t intend to lay out the merits of every theory here. What this debate aims to settle, though, 
is what mechanisms are involved in language, whether these are specific adaptations for 
language, and at what point in our lineage we acquired them. Some academics, such as 
psychologist Michael Tomasello, claim that human language emerges not from any language-
specific adaptations, but instead from adaptations for cooperative behaviour that are unique to 
our species (Tomasello, 2010). Speech scientist Philip Lieberman, however, thinks that the 
core biological adaptations for language are those involving motor control of speech 
(Lieberman, 1968). Linguist Noam Chomsky, by contrast, believes that neurological 
adaptations specific to the highly abstract core of syntax are the final biological piece of the 
puzzle required to bring about our species’ linguistic capacities (see Hauser et al., 2002 for 
discussion of Chomsky's view, and an outline of rival theses). Whichever theory is correct, it is 
clear that adaptations for speech, syntax and intention-reading (i.e. Tomasello) are all involved 
in the human ‘language faculty’. 
 
 Fitch (2010: 142) identifies what he sees as an incomplete list of sixteen components 
that make up the human language faculty, with each component potentially having its own 
adaptive story. Aspects of the language faculty, as mentioned above, are shared with many 
other species. For instance, ‘signal learning’ – having an extensive vocabulary of learned signals 
– is shared with many non-human animals, from mynah birds to vervet monkeys. We therefore 
know that this mechanism appears in our own evolutionary lineage possibly tens of millions of 
years ago.20 In our more recent evolutionary history we see the emergence of the FOXP2 gene, 
which is involved in the complex motor control required for speech (as well as other aspects of 
normal language development). Despite rather hopeful claims upon its discovery that we had 
found the ‘language gene’ (Pinker, 1994), it turns out that this is just one of many genetic traits 
making up the story of the evolution of language. The same variant of this gene was shared by 																																																								
20 The lines that led to humans and chimpanzees split 5.1 million years ago (mya), those that led to gorillas 6.3mya, 
and to orang-utans 13.8mya. The split between old-world monkeys (e.g. macaques, langurs) and these great apes 
was around 25.3mya. 
	 60 
Neanderthals, and therefore most likely mutually inherited from our common ancestor Homo 
heidelbergensis around 300,000 years ago. A variant of the gene has also evolved in some 
songbirds, and affects vocal learning in those species too (Scharff and Haesler, 2005).  
 
In addition to the numerous biological adaptations required for language, child 
development studies make it clear that a certain amount of environmental stimulus is required 
in order to allow for the normal development of a child’s linguistic abilities (Fitch, 2010). In 
this sense, cultural transmission of language also plays an important role in the evolution of 
language, and it has even been suggested that this might be the solution to the so-called puzzle 
of the Creative Explosion (Tattersall, 2002) (my own solution, in fact, offers a variation on this 
type of response). The cultural aspects involved in language learning and development are, in 
turn, underpinned by various biological adaptations for socialisation, complicating further the 
task of detailing the evolution of language. 
 
What is clear is that, because these multiple adaptations appear gradually in our 
evolutionary history, our evolutionary ancestors would have also possessed varying degrees of 
communicative (or ‘linguistic’) ability. Studies in comparative psychology suggest that apes 
have an awareness of others as goal-possessing agents, and their natural gestural communication 
consists of flexibly-used intentional signals (Tomasello, 2010). This being the case, it seems fair 
to suggest that Homo erectus would have possessed abilities beyond these – perhaps, even, a 
‘protolanguage’ allowing for complex communication with a closed-class vocabulary, but 
lacking fully-developed syntax with features such as tense and aspect (Bickerton, 2009). Ruhlen 
(1994) suggests that such a system might represent a ‘mid-point’ between extant primate 
communication systems and fully-syntactic human language. However, even prior to any 
discussion of possible protolanguages, philosophers such as Descartes have disputed whether or 
not human language lies on a continuum at all with other (non-human) communication systems 
given that our linguistic utterances are both stimulus-independent and capable of expressing an 
infinitude of thoughts (Descartes, 1637, Chomsky, 2009). 
 
The basis of this expressive power is the grammatical system that language employs, 
and the biological basis for grammar is the central topic of debate currently in the evolution of 
language. Tomasello (2010) sees grammar as essentially ‘falling out’ of biological adaptations 
for shared intentions and cooperation, whereas others such as Hauser et al. (2002) suggest that 
syntax-specific adaptations (though not necessarily restricted to use in language) may be an 
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essential part of our evolutionary story. The desire to explain language within an evolutionary 
framework has put pressure on proponents of the latter view to minimise the number of 
mechanisms responsible for syntax, giving birth to the ‘Minimalist Program’ in linguistics that is 
primarily associated with Noam Chomsky. It has been suggested by those involved in the 
program that the computational basis for syntax might be as simple as a single operation 
working recursively. The attraction of this view is that a single neurological adaptation in the 
final stages of human evolution might be able to explain both the problem raised by Descartes 
regarding the difference in kind between human language and non-human communication 
(moving from a finite system to an infinite one through a single recursive operation) and also 
provide an answer to the supposed puzzle of the Creative Explosion by offering a dramatic shift 
in cognitive power in order to drive sudden and rapid cultural developments. 
 
To some extent, the precise history of when and how these various adaptations appear 
doesn’t seem hugely important to help us address the puzzle concerning us here. If fully-
syntactic language requires all of these adaptations, plus some cultural input, then the only date 
that matters is when all of these co-occur. Language is, to my mind at least, our defining 
species-trait. As suggested above, it was most likely in place ahead of the diaspora of our species 
from Africa between 130,000 and 100,000 years ago, but there is (currently) no reason to 
think fully-syntactic language emerged as a behavioural trait any earlier than that (even if the 
biological adaptations were in place long before that point. The issue that is relevant here is not 
the chronology of the evolution of language, but instead what the implications of syntax are for 
human creative cognition. I turn to this specific issue in Chapter 3. The purpose of examining 
this will be to see what syntax brings to human cognition, and how this might be co-opted for 
the purpose of creativity. Now, however, I want to shift our focus to outlining creative 
behaviours that would have been available to us prior to the evolution of language, by examining 
creativity in non-human animals and pre-cursor hominids. 
 
Specifically, I will focus on creative acts that appear to involve use of the imagination. 
This focus on the imagination is not arbitrarily selected. Chomsky (2007b) argues that the 
primary beneficiary of the evolution of syntax is thought (see Ch.3, §2.1). Any attempt to 
demonstrate the contribution of syntax to creativity will, therefore, be via whatever it brings to 
creative cognition. Some attempts to connect Chomsky’s work to creativity have been made in 
the past (e.g. D'Agostino, 1984, 1986) but these have largely been focused on Chomsky’s 
analysis of the ways in which language-use bears the hallmarks of creativity. As such, these 
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discussions focused on the definition of creativity rather than on creative cognition. I think this 
is something of an oversight given Chomsky’s beliefs about the connection between syntax and 
thought. I, therefore, explore this connection in this thesis, focusing on a specific mode of 
thought which (as we saw in Chapter 1) is closely connected to creativity: imagination. 
 
3. Origins of the Human Imagination 
 
 Examining the connection between the evolution of language and the imagination, 
then, requires that we first establish what kinds of imaginative capacities are possible and 
available prior to language getting in place. I begin this task by examining possible candidates 
for imaginative capacities in non-human animals in §3.1-§3.3, before moving on to pre-cursor 
hominid capacities in §3.4. This discussion sets up the opportunity to examine one attempt 
(that of Piccuito and Carruthers, 2014) to explain what was required beyond language to 
transform human beings into the creative beings we see at the point of the Creative Explosion. 
 
§3.1 Non-Human Animals: Imagining the Future 
 
 It is fairly obvious how certain kinds of imagination are adaptively advantageous. 
Visually imagining, for instance, what may lay around an unexplored corner might helpfully 
lead to adopting a cautious approach in the subsequent exploration. This kind of (objectual) 
imagining has been referred to as a kind of ‘mental time travel’ by Suddendorf and Corballis 
(2007). For Suddendorf and Corballis, this kind of activity is dependent upon episodic memory – 
being able to mentally relive past events. Clearly, there is a difference between being able to 
relive past events and being able to make predictions about future ones, but on Suddendorf and 
Corballis’ view it is this latter capacity, rather than the former, that would be evolutionarily 
advantageous. Being able to anticipate the future allows you to be in the right place at the right 
time, and thus take advantage of any observed regularities. Many animals have evolved 
behavioural predispositions that exploit long-term regularities, such as those that migrate or 
hibernate seasonally. However, these behavioural predispositions are often deeply entrenched 
and inflexible, which is why many species are at high risk of extinction due to the increasing 
pace of climate change. The kind of mental time travel described above, in the case of humans, 
is far more flexible: there is essentially no limit to the events we can imagine. 
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Whilst they are ultimately sceptical of evidence of the capacity for mental time travel 
into the future in non-human animals, Suddendorf and Corballis suggest that there may be 
some inconclusive but nonetheless favourable evidence of some degree of episodic memory in 
non-human animals. Scrub jays, for example, appear to be able to recall great detail about past 
food caching events, keeping track of what was stored, where it was stored, when it was 
stored, and who was watching at the time. Observation of other animals, such as rhesus 
monkeys, rats, pigeons, and dolphins imply a similar capacity but with varying success rates. 
But how could we move, evolutionarily-speaking, from past-only mental time travel to the 
more useful (predictive) future mental time travel? 
  
One possibility might be through another kind of imagining: dreaming.  Whilst the 
Cartesian view of dreaming was to see it as a mode of belief, recent accounts of dreaming have 
suggested that it either is a kind of, or involves, imagining (Walton, 1990, Sosa, 2005, 
Ichikawa, 2008, 2009; see Chapter 1, §3.3 for a discussion on dreaming and imagination). 
Walton, for example, characterises dreams as “spontaneous, undeliberate imaginings” (Walton, 
1990: 16). If Walton’s account is correct and dreams are an involuntary form of imagining, 
then (percept-based) episodic memory would likely be the basis of this.21 Research has, in fact, 
been conducted on determining the content of the dreams of rats (Louie and Wilson, 2001). 
The results of their neurological investigations suggested that, during REM sleep, their 
laboratory rats were accessing memory in a pattern previously shown to be associated with 
their previous experience of navigating a maze. Furthermore, Bendor and Wilson (2012) 
discovered that dream content could be manipulated by external auditory stimulation, with 
maze-navigation noises causing them to access memories of that task. 
 
 Of course, we may wish to reject the notion that episodic memory is a variety of 
imagining, and we may be especially inclined to do so in cases where it is involuntary such as 
dreaming. What possibly leads us to characterise human dreaming as imaginative may be the 
(still involuntary) creation of novel worlds or scenarios which, even when clearly based upon 
them are still far removed from the actual experiences that led to us forming the memories 
being accessed in the dream state. However, it doesn’t seem unreasonable to suggest that the 
accidental adjunction of perceptual information could occur in animal dreaming, especially given 																																																								
21 Dreaming is seen as on a continuum with fantasy by Levin and Young (2002): “waking [fantasy] and dreaming are 
not discrete states of consciousness with clearly defined parameters but rather represent continuous attentional 
states which comprise the ‘stream of consciousness’ endemic to human cognition” (ibid., 201). 
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that animal dreams are manipulable through external auditory stimulation. Our own memories 
are not perfect reproductions of experience, and some flawed reconstruction is probably 
involved in animal cases too. If recalled information in one domain (number, object-property 
etc.) is different to the original perceptual experience leading to the creation of the memory 
being accessed in the dream state, then such cases might even lead to occasional insights if the 
dreams themselves are remembered, and the maze navigation task repeated. If there is any 
merit to this idea, then involuntary imagination (or imagination-like) processes such as 
dreaming might be the genesis of mental time-travel capacity that is future-oriented. All that 
would be required for this to be the case would be some genetic basis for increasing the 
regularity of the production of dreams that differ from (mere) remembered events where a 
proportion are beneficial when later remember. This would make this trait visible to evolution, 
and selected for because of the behavioural advantages it confers with relation to foraging.22  
 
 Whether or not this genesis story is correct, there is some evidence that rats could be 
engaging in something like future mental time travel. Dragoi and Tonegawa (2011) reported 
that rats placed in one arm of an L-shaped maze displayed neurological patterns in a way similar 
to that described above not only when sleeping, but also while they were resting at a barrier to 
the other arm of the L-shape. They term this activity ‘pre-play’ (as opposed to ‘replay’ in 
memory), and some of the neurological activity recorded matched that recorded when they 
were subsequently given access to the second arm of the L-shape. Moser and Moser (2011) 
suggest that this process may be one of generating predictions about environments never visited 
before. 
 
 However, it is wise to be cautious in interpreting this (actually very complex) data with 
reference to imagination. Predictive mental states aren’t sufficient for imaginative ones, and 
philosophers have been careful to distinguish between imagining and anticipating – imagining S 
doesn’t require that we expect that S, and it is difficult to say in these cases whether the 
predictive activity displayed here is perhaps just one of expectation-forming in the absence of 
imagination (which presumably has the adaptive advantage of either encouraging or 
discouraging exploratory-behaviour to aid foraging or avoid predators in unknown 
																																																								
22 A similar image-combining process but without any obvious adaptive advantage might be hallucination. 
However, Boska (2009) points out that empirically investigating the possibility and nature of hallucinations in 
animals is fraught with some quite obvious difficulties. 
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environments, respectively).23 As noted above, Suddendorf and Corballis’ review of the 
literature prior to Dragoi and Tonegawa’s experiment didn’t persuade them of the existence of 
this capacity outside of human beings (not even in our closest evolutionary ancestors) and this 
scepticism appeared to be the prevailing view prior to the results of Dragoi and Tonegawa’s 
experiment. As Gilbert and Wilson (2007) explain: 
 
Although some animals have evolved strategies to solve problems involving future 
events such as impending food shortages, it seems unlikely that they achieve these 
solutions by simulating future events. Indeed, the ability to simulate and pre-
experience the future does not appear in human children until the third or fourth year 
of life, long after other complex intellectual abilities such as language have bloomed 
(Gilbert and Wilson, 2007: 1352). 
 
§3.2 Animal imagination: inventiveness 
 
 A further survey of literature on animal imagination by Whiten and Suddendorf (2007) 
focused on animal inventiveness. This focused on the number of innovations or solutions the 
animal imagination can produce in response to a given environmental stimulus. It is clear that 
Whiten and Suddendorf are running the risk of conflating creativity with imagination here, 
though I’ve suggested in Chapter 1 that I’m prepared to let the connection between the two 
run a little closer than others. In particular, it seems like what Whiten and Suddendorf have in 
mind is something like the kind of objectual imagining we saw in Yablo (1993), with the 
imaginer holding in mind different states of affairs and attempting to bring them about in the 
world. This capacity isn’t very different from the notion of pre-play described in §2.1 above, 
though it clearly involves more executive control (pre-play might even be entirely involuntary). 
At least some inventive behaviour in non-human animals could be explained as a result of 
combining (probably separately evolved) capacities for generating mental representations of the 
world using the perceptual features derived from it, and the capacity for storing these 
representations in working memory. The amount of detail and number of representations any 
animal is capable of operating with will naturally depend upon the working memory resources 
it has available to it (though if the creative behaviour it produces is adaptively advantageous then 																																																								
23 Whilst it seems fair to say that imagining S doesn’t require us to expect S, it is much harder to conceive of a way 
of expecting S without imagining it where S is a future state of affairs. I presume this might turn on the difference 
between conceiving of S and imagining that S. We need not explore this difference here though. 
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this would, in turn, drive the development of working memory). When confronted with some 
novel problem, non-human animals can utilise these capacities to generate behavioural 
responses in accordance with the desire to get the associated reward. 
 
 A powerful capacity to generate novel and diverse behavioural responses to a given 
stimulus in non-human animals could, therefore, be based on relatively simple generative 
mechanisms - consider, for instance the basic operations of mathematics and the unbounded 
results they can generate (Kleene, 1971). So, despite lacking fully-syntactic language, non-
human animals might still generate a wide range of creative behaviours across domains. As 
such, human creative behaviour may actually build upon an already rich yet evolutionarily 
ancient resource. Whiten and Suddendorf’s best evidence for diverse and (seemingly) 
imaginative behaviour comes from analyses of great ape cognition. They found that 
inventiveness was over-represented in great ape populations in comparison to other animals, 
including more evolutionarily distant relatives like old-world monkeys (see footnote 20 for 
chronology of our evolutionary divergence from these species). For example, one study 
involved chimpanzees trying to ‘shell’ an ‘artificial fruit’ (Fig. 2). Those who had learned a 
particular problem-solving method invented variants on this approach when confronted with a 
novel problem that the learned method couldn’t solve. According to Whiten and Suddendorf, 
the explanation for the relatively impoverished number of behavioural responses offered by 
monkeys in comparison to apes ‘is [that] baboons cannot imagine doing all that the young 
chimpanzees can’ (2007: 41). 
 
Fig. 2 An ‘artificial fruit’ being manipulated by a young chimpanzee (from Whiten and Suddendorf, 2007: 37) 
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 In these cases, Whiten and Suddendorf claim that the chimpanzees appeared to be 
‘inventing around a theme’ to solve the problem they were confronted with. Interestingly, this 
capacity is not restricted to the ‘functional’ domain of foraging for food, but present also in 
‘playful’ situations such as playing with a rope (Parker, 1974a, Parker, 1974b) and possibly also 
the social domain in cases of deception (Whiten and Suddendorf, 2007). This suggests that 
while this kind of innovation might have evolved initially for problem-solving, generating 
diverse responses without a view to functionality might in itself be rewarding. That certain kinds 
of cognitive activity are inherently rewarding is discussed below in §4. And although only 
tentative evidence, the fact that this inventive behavior appears across domains might be 
another reason to think that Whiten and Suddendorf have correctly identified the imagination as 
the cognitive capacity permitting this – it has been noted that the imagination is fundamentally a 
domain general capacity (Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002). 
 
What might be the cause of these relative imaginative limitations of monkeys compared 
to great apes? I have already suggested that the mechanism for inventiveness might be a matter 
of simultaneously holding different mental representations and then attempting to bring them 
into being. For instance, chimpanzees may hold a representation of the learned (successful) 
sequence of actions in working memory alongside a representation of the steps taken in the 
current attempt to solve the problem. Failure to reproduce the successful result could be 
expected to prompt variations on the successful method as a means of ‘correcting’ the method 
being applied.24 Relative imaginative limitations in monkeys might be explained, then, simply 
by an impoverished working memory. Chimpanzees have quite astonishing working memory, 
even outperforming human beings in experimental situations (Inoue and Matsuzawa, 2007). 
Working memory in monkeys is relatively impoverished, with this capacity enhancing and 
changing over the course of primate brain evolution (Courtney et al., 1998). Similarly, 
evidence from neurological analysis of corvids points to the emergence of this kind of 
imaginative capacity in other species. Even though corvids lack the neurological structures 
associated with working memory in mammals, they appear to have developed alternative 
																																																								24	We ought to be cautious when speculating about this imaginative process. Producing behavioural responses to 
discrepant mental representations in accordance with desire does not (contra-Whiten and Suddendorf) require the 
animal to hold some notion of a ‘theme’ that governs the kinds of responses generated, even though that’s how we 
might be inclined to interpret their behaviour. It is, to my mind, an imaginative act utilising the ‘visuo-spatial 
workspace’ the animal possesses in virtue of its working memory and percept-based mental representations. But 
there doesn’t seem to be any reason to suggest that the apes are, for instance, representing an available schema of 
actions as falling under some particular concept (PUSH or PULL): the fact alone that their actions are restricted to 
ones similar to the learned method is not obviously evidence for conceptual thought. 
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neurological structures for the same purpose (Veit et al., 2014), and perform similarly well in 
complex, sequential problem-solving tasks, just like chimpanzees (see, for example, Döhl, 
1966, Clayton, 2007). 
 
Perception itself might provide some of the cognitive apparatus required for 
imaginative problem solving of this nature. On Hinzen and Sheehan’s (2013)   account of 
perception, it is a process of filtering incredibly rich environmental stimuli and extracting from 
these stimuli the information relevant to the organism. In this sense: 
 
Perception is of objects as falling under meaningful categories: we see sunlight beaming 
into the room or persons walking in the street… We do not perceive photons, acoustic 
waves, or molecules, which physically corresponds to such objects of perception. 
Instead, stimuli that can be otherwise quite different are grouped together into more 
abstract classes equivalent under perception (Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013: 35).  
 
Perception therefore carries with it its own semantics. At least some organisms 
(depending upon neurological complexity), then, form mental representations, percepts, from 
the filtered information, which represent different environmental variables. Mental 
computations can then be performed over these representations.25 Even before language enters 
the picture, perception can involve classes of considerable abstraction. Pre-linguistic human 
infants can individuate objects via sortal kinds e.g. BOX, CAR, TOY, CAT (Xu, 2005), even 
though objects falling under these categories are often enormously varied in terms of perceptual 
content. Yet more abstract are representations of OBJECT, AGENT, CAUSE, ATTENTION, and 
PLURALITY, though these still clearly have some (hard to identify) perceptual basis and, perhaps, 
content. Although perception is largely an involuntary process, occurring with the stimulus, its 
relatively abstract content suggests it has a semantic content that is not stimulus-determined i.e. a 
content that does not simply mirror objects ‘out there’ in the world. 
 
If perception itself includes abstract classes, and percepts are encoded as mental 
representations for non-human animal minds to operate upon, then this leaves open a large 
‘semantic space’ even in the absence of language. If non-human animals can recall percepts 
related to past events (learned problem-solving methods included) as mental representations 
																																																								
25 See, for example, the case of bee navigation discussed in Gallistel, 1998. 
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over which they can perform computations, and hold these in working memory alongside 
current perceptual experiences, the level of abstraction involved in the percepts themselves seems 
to offer a lot of room for behavioural improvisation. Consider corvid tool-selection tasks that 
depend on size: if corvids represent OBJECT, SIZE and CAUSE in perception, the tools appropriate 
for the task can be appropriately selected precisely because any currently-perceived tool bears 
some abstract SIZE/CAUSE-relation to the object it is intended to operate on, even if that object 
is not currently being perceived. The fact that they can do this sequentially seems to depend 
further only upon their ability to hold multiple representations of correct pairings of tools and 
objects in working memory while relevant computations are performed. Even with a limited 
working memory, solving a problem that is perceptually present shouldn’t be impossible as 
completed tasks can be removed from the ‘workspace’ as new ones need to be considered. It is 
nonetheless impressive when corvids complete these tasks with little training. 
 
§3.3 Animal imagination: pretence 
 
For Whiten and Suddendorf, a further kind of imaginative act – pretence ("operating 
mentally in a 'pretend' world", Whiten and Suddendorf, 2007: 31) – seems to depend upon 
much the same cognitive apparatus. Whiten and Suddendorf argue for a great ape capacity for 
‘secondary representation’ (see Perner, 1991), taken to be heavily implicated in pretence, 
before suggesting that the very limited but intriguing behavioural evidence of pretence in non-
human animals can be taken at face value provided the apes possess this representational 
capacity. Accordingly, apes can not only represent some object in thought as the object itself, 
but also simultaneously hold a parasitic, secondary representation where that object is 
represented as something else. For example, in pretending a banana is a telephone, the 
pretender must hold on to the primary representation of the banana as a banana, and also 
simultaneously generate a secondary representation of the banana as a telephone. Evidence for 
the capacity for secondary representation in apes includes:  
 
o tracking invisible displacements: determining an object’s position based on an 
initially-perceived trajectory that later becomes occluded; 
o means-end reasoning: mentally constructing a series of actions required to solve a 
novel problem, or ‘imagining [a] hypothetical world within which newly 
created means will attain the ends desired’; 
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o using external representations: for example, using a scale model of the 
experimental environment to find a hidden object;26 
o mirror self-recognition: although less than 50% of apes are successful here, their 
performance is still way beyond that of other animals, including monkeys; 
o recognising simple states of mind, namely intent (as opposed to accident) and 
visual attention (Whiten and Suddendorf, 2007: 48-51)27 
 
The putative examples of animal pretence come (as Currie, 2004 points out) from apes 
exposed to human language and encouraged to imitate human behaviour. This small handful of 
cases includes apes playing with logs, dolls or toy animals ‘as if’ they were living creatures, for 
example, hugging them, bathing them, or making them ‘bite’ themselves or others (Savage-
Rumbaugh, 1986, Matevia et al., 2002, Boyd, 2009). The bonobo Kanzi has also been observed 
engaging in imaginative play acts, apparently hiding invisible objects under blankets or leaves, 
and later returning and pretending to eat them (Savage-Rumbaugh and McDonald, 1988). 
Whiten and Suddendorf note also the case of the chimpanzee Viki who was described as pulling 
along a pretend pull toy (as she had done with real ones) and acting as though the cord had 
become tangled on a plumbing knob on two separate occasions, a week apart (Hayes, 1951). A 
similar case is reported where Koko, a sign-language-using gorilla, appeared to make a doll 
respond to an experimenter’s question using sign language i.e. as though the doll itself were 
signing (Matevia et al., 2002). Given the wider evidence for the capacity for secondary 
representation, Whiten and Suddendorf’s position on these cases is very permissive: 
 
[T]he corpus of putative pretend actions of great apes, although often weak when 
scrutinised individually, viewed as a whole does suggest an ability that appears rather 
different from anything seen in other primates and is sometimes consistent with the 
kind of pretence that signals secondary representation’ (Whiten and Suddendorf, 2007: 
48). 
 
However, Tomasello and Call (1997) suggest that this isn’t really a case of pretence, 
and these heavily socialised apes are simply mimicking human behaviour. Whiten and 																																																								
26 Penn et al express some scepticism about this claim (Penn et al, 2008: 115). 
27 Recognising simple states of mind like intent and attention could be accounted for by the semantics of 
perception set out in §3.2: it might simply be part of a perceptual apparatus geared toward seeing the world in 
terms of agency. It need not, for instance, involve anything like holding beliefs about others’ mental states i.e. 
these states are directly perceived rather than recognised in conscious thought.	
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Suddendorf are unimpressed by this kind of response, pointing out that other animals with just 
as much socialisation, including monkeys, do not perform such acts, suggesting that this 
behaviour is ‘meaningful to great apes in a way it has not been recorded as doing in home-reared 
monkeys’ (Whiten and Suddendorf, 2007: 47, emphasis added). Instead, Whiten and 
Suddendorf suggest that these apes may be acting within a (set of) pretend beliefs or desires, as 
young children do when ‘mopping up’ an empty cup filled with pretend juice. 
 
It seems to me that a lot of Whiten and Suddendorf’s interpretation of the evidence for 
secondary representation and pretence turns on how they describe the underlying cognitive 
processes. It seems as though none of the capacities demonstrated above (tracking invisible 
displacements etc.) requires thought with the propositional structure that typifies what we 
would recognise as a ‘belief’ in human beings. Conversely, suggesting that apes are acting 
within a set of pretend beliefs or desires requires just such thought. If the imagination is the 
generative mechanism for forming pretend beliefs, some story needs to be told about how 
animals can form beliefs which have the relevant structure and semantic content. This seems to 
go beyond the kind of objectual imagining we have already discussed and into the truth-
evaluable realm of propositional imagining. If, however, such episodes of animal pretence can 
proceed from much the same processes evident in the corvid tool-selection cases discussed 
above, then we need not worry about what beliefs or suppositions the animals are operating 
upon. There would only be a question of motivation to answer: why, if they possess the capacity 
for pretence, do apes not engage in episodes of pretence more often? This may be because 
neurological ‘reward circuits’ are simply not attuned to episodes of pretence in non-human 
animals, though they may be with imaginative problem-solving in (some) non-human animals 
(see §4.4 for further elaboration on this suggestion). 
 
Alternatively, we might try to offer plausible alternative explanations for the 
imaginative cases while granting the capacity for secondary representation. For instance, it may 
be the case that Viki was not inventing an entirely novel scenario: the real pull toy may have 
become tangled, and this may be repetition of some old behaviour that she, nonetheless, 
internally represents and operates upon. We might also suggest that the ape/monkey difference 
in pretence is not a result of a capacity for secondary representation, but instead an enhanced 
capacity for imitative learning which doesn’t depend upon secondary representation (the results 
of the studies focused on inventiveness seem to lend themselves to this interpretation too given 
the difficulties monkeys found in learning a method for shelling the artificial fruit). This might 
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explain, for instance, Koko’s ‘signing doll’ as a case of imitating the methods used to teach 
Koko herself to sign. 
 
Whiten and Suddendorf’s account at least attempts to place human imaginative 
capacities on a continuum with those of great apes, and with some success the evidence they 
examine suggests imaginative capacities that clearly do not depend upon the possession of full 
language. These no doubt developed further with pre-cursor hominids whose cognitive and, in 
all probability, linguistic capacities would also be beyond that of signing apes. In fact, there may 
be reason to think that imaginative capacities develop in tandem with linguistic ones, and I turn 
to evidence that tentatively points in this direction in Chapter 6 by examining the connection 
between language disorders and imaginative disorders. However, our immediate focus is to 
move to a much later point in our evolutionary history by examining the imaginative and 
creative capacities of our Hominid ancestors. 
 
§3.4 Pre-cursor Hominid imagination 
 
 Carruthers (2005) suggests that by the time of Homo ergaster (c. 400,000 years ago) we 
can see clear evidence of a ‘deepening’ of the cognitive capacities described above. According 
to Carruthers, Homo ergaster cognition had developed to the point that it had formed a system of 
naïve biology (evidenced by an increasingly varied diet as groups rapidly adapted to new 
ecological environments containing wide variations in flora and fauna) and a form of naïve 
physics (evidenced by their apparent ability to predict tidal patterns, allowing the introduction 
of marine creatures into their diet; see also Mithen, 1996). Carruthers also points out that new 
cognitive capacities appear to have evolved too, such as a social-exchange/cheater-detection 
capacity (Carruthers, 2005: 77) most likely as a result of selection pressure introduced by an 
increasingly complex social environment. All of these capacities seem to build upon the 
capacity to simultaneously hold multiple mental representations, and our Hominid ancestors 
may even have developed basic analogical relational reasoning by this point (certainly beyond 
that of our closest living primate cousins) as these new environments would require going 
beyond mere perceptual similarity when confronted with new potential food sources.28 
Analogical reasoning itself might be thought of as (yet another variety of) imagining.  
 																																																								
28 See Penn et al, 2008: 113 for some critical discussion of limitations in, or absence of, non-human animal 
analogical relational reasoning. 
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 In terms of the imagination, Wynn (2000) makes a compelling case to suggest that 
Homo ergaster had precisely the kind of voluntarily manipulable mental imagery that I suggested 
above was absent in animal dreaming. This case is grounded in evidence of the fine symmetries 
that typify the stone tools they made. Wynn suggests that this involved planning strokes in 
advance and holding in mind an image of the desired shape that the stone would have when seen 
from the other side. This appears to involve the ability to mentally rotate percepts in order to 
compare them to present perceptual experience, representing the stone as it is and as it is 
intended to be (modern-day ‘stone-knappers’ can demonstrate the techniques employed by our 
ancestors, and presumably the cognitive basis of these skills isn’t radically different when the 
behavior is replicated by our own species). 		 Despite these new cognitive capacities, the archaeological record of the stone-tool 
industry actually demonstrates relatively narrow bounds for creative thought and imagination. 
The tool-making capacities of our ancestors remained static over tens of thousands of years. As 
such, it seems as though they still lacked a powerful generative mechanism for new ideas.29,30 It 
is precisely this glacial pace of innovation in earlier hominid species that gives rise to the puzzle 
of the Creative Explosion outlined in §1 above. What is it that makes our species, and our 
species alone, so prolifically creative? It is at this point that we can turn to an attempt to solve 
the supposed puzzle. 
 
4. Picciuto and Carruthers’ Pretend Play Hypothesis	
 
 This attempt to address the puzzle comes from Picciuto and Carruthers (2014) 
(developing upon an earlier work by Carruthers in Carruthers, 2002). You will no doubt recall 
that the puzzle arises from the gap between speciation and the onset of widespread creative 
																																																								
29 Carruthers takes these limitations to reflect support for his thesis of modular encapsulation. 
30 Interestingly, Berger et al (2015) have recently published findings relating to a new species of hominid whose 
cranial morphology is similar to that of Australopithecus, suggesting they may have lived between 2-3mya, and yet 
whose behaviour may have included ritual burial, something previously only associated with much later hominid 
species. The remains of 15 individuals from that species were discovered in a cave that is incredibly difficult to 
access, suggesting the bodies may have been placed there (though it is possible that they went to the cave as a group 
and perhaps became trapped). We might question whether this ought to be regarded as symbolic or ritualistic 
behaviour in the same sense associated with the later hominid species – there are no ‘burial goods’ associated with 
the site (bird and rodent bones at the burial site are not presently thought to be associated with the hominid 
remains). Nonetheless, this is a potentially important discovery if for no other reason than it once again reveals the 
non-linear nature of human evolution: the skeletal and behavioural features observed to separate later and earlier 
hominins can no longer thought to have arisen as a single adaptive package. 
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behaviour in multiple domains of human activity. In his 2002 paper, Carruthers suggests that to 
explain the 60,000-year gap in the archaeological record, it looks like we will:  
 
either have to claim that human creativity resulted from a series of gradual 
cognitive/cultural accumulations, independent of genetic change and built up 
independently by different human communities over many millennia; or we shall need 
to claim that some change occurred in the human genotype which could be selected for 
independently of the nature of the ecological environment (Carruthers, 2002: 227). 
 
As Carruthers rightly points out, neither of these approaches looks initially plausible, 
because we would have to explain in either case why the relevant developments (cultural 
and/or genetic) took place at the same time in geographically dispersed groups of human 
beings. Carruthers goes on to suggest a range of possible explanations of human creativity, 
assessing each for their ability to plausibly explain the 60,000 year gap in the archaeological 
record, eventually settling with his Pretend Play Hypothesis. I won’t discuss all of these 
alternatives here, and there are perhaps many more besides the ones discussed by Carruthers, 
so I will only focus my attention on the alternative explanation most relevant to my own 
proposal – that involving the emergence of the human language faculty. 
 
§4.1 Carruthers’ case for Pretend Play 
 
Pretend play appears to be a universal human trait, and conversely only tentative 
evidence for it appears outside of our species (see §3.3). Normally-developing humans engage 
in pretend play from around 18 months old, including participation in imaginary conversations 
with fictional characters (e.g. talking to dolls or imaginary friends) and pretending to take part 
in a various adult or imaginary activities (e.g. talking into a banana as if it were a phone, or 
flying by pretending to be a bird or an aeroplane). For Carruthers, adult creativity and 
childhood pretend play ‘can be seen as sharing essentially the same cognitive basis, insofar as 
both involve exercises of imagination’ (Carruthers, 2002: 228-9). Moreover, according to 
Carruthers, such creativity in thought and action as an adult is precisely what childhood pretend play 
is for; in other words, because of the benefits in flexible and creative thought it confers later on 
in life, the disposition toward pretend play in children was selected for by evolution once it 
appeared. Such creative adult behaviour may have been selected for because of the adaptive 
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advantages it conferred (natural selection) or because it was a reliable indicator of protean 
cognition (sexual selection). 
 
Other species, it might be thought, engage in other kinds of play geared towards 
making them more effective members of their species as adults. For examples, kittens will 
engage in play-stalking, play-jumping, and play-biting, skills which will latter be used in 
hunting as an adult cat. But perhaps only human beings engage in pretend play – play which 
involves generating and reasoning with novel suppositions or imaginary scenarios – and it is 
therefore, according to Carruthers, worth asking what this pretend play is for. Carruthers is 
quick to note the many uses of suppositional reasoning in adulthood: the ‘construction of a new 
theory, seeking a novel solution to a practical problem’, or even ‘composing a tune’ 
(Carruthers, 2002). It does, therefore, seem initially plausible that pretend play could be the 
origin of these capacities.  
 
What, then, is the cognitive basis for this disposition toward pretend play? According 
to Carruthers, the two most important features of the cognitive basis for human creativity more 
generally are the capacity to generate new ideas, together with the ability to see the significance 
of those ideas. It turns out that episodes of pretence rely on much the same basis. Episodes of 
pretence begin from an imagined initial supposition or scenario, such as a banana being a 
telephone; the child then follows established behavioural scripts, acting as though that 
supposition were true, and draws appropriate inferences from the (set of) supposed truths, for 
example by ‘dialling’ the telephone, or inferring that someone has answered the call. The 
significance of enacting these behavioural scripts is in the rewards that they inherently confer in 
terms of enjoyment (see §4.4). 
 
§4.2 The case against ‘just’ language 
 
 The suggestion that pretend play might be inherently enjoyable is something that I will 
return to later (this point will actually be co-opted in favour of my alternative hypothesis). 
However, I will now, following the structure of Carruthers’ 2002 paper, turn to his case 
against the emergence of fully-syntactic language as a sufficient explanation for the emergence 
of human creativity (the Language Hypothesis). Versions of the Language Hypothesis have been 
put forward by Bickerton (2009) and Noble and Davidson (1996). Supporters of this hypothesis 
typically believe, firstly, that natural language is the vehicle for human beings’ distinctive kind 
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of thought and reasoning, a belief that both Carruthers and I share to some extent (see Chapter 
3 for specifics on the connection between language, thought and creativity), and, secondly, that 
the creative potential of human thought and imagination is underpinned by the flexibility and 
recursive power of natural languages. 
 
 A version of the Language Hypothesis might note that the appearance of pretend play at 
18 months co-occurs with a ‘language spurt’ – a period of heightened vocabulary acquisition. 
However, as Carruthers notes, the Language Hypothesis rests not on the lexical but rather the 
syntactic element of language in explaining human creativity. The deeper problem, however, is 
the pretty-much universal consensus that the genetic basis for language must have been in place 
prior to our ancestors dispersing from Africa somewhere 130,000 and 100,0000 years ago. 
This still leaves a 60,000-year gap between the emergence of language and the Creative 
Explosion. What seems to be required, then, is something in addition to language in order to 
explain the emergence of human creativity. 
 
 Carruthers surveys some possible candidates. These include the discovery of the 
benefits of inner dialogue with oneself (Dennett, 1993, Bickerton, 1996) or the gradual 
accumulation of material culture (Mithen, 2000). I won’t go through the specifics of any of 
these in this thesis, and I am largely happy to adopt Carruthers’ reasons for ruling them out as 
alternatives. Instead, I will turn to Carruthers’ remaining arguments for the Pretend Play 
Hypothesis. 
 
§4.3 Experiential and Propositional Imagination 
 
 For Carruthers, with the language faculty in place, the cognitive pre-requisites for 
creative thought were thus present at the emergence of the first anatomically-modern humans 
100,000 years ago. One of these cognitive pre-requisites was that of experiential imagination: 
‘the capacity to form and manipulate images relating to a given sense modality’ (Carruthers, 
2002: 241). This kind of imagination is similar to the objectual imagining that Yablo outlines 
(see Chapter 1). Carruthers takes this capacity to be a by-product of, and thus come ‘for free’ 
with, the ‘conceptualizing processes’ inherent in our perceptual input-systems: 
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There are extensive feedback neural pathways in the visual system, for example, which 
are used in object-recognition when ‘asking questions of’ ambiguous or degraded 
input. And these very pathways are then deployed in visual imagination so as to 
generate quasi-perceptual inputs to the visual system (Carruthers, 2002: 241). 
 
Carruthers explains this idea in more detail elsewhere, but the basic gist is that pre-
cursor Hominids seem to have developed the capacity to experientially (i.e. perceptually) 
complete ‘incomplete’ data in current perceptual experience (Carruthers, 2005).  This is in 
evidence, for instance, in precursor Hominid adaptability when faced with new ecological 
niches, as discussed in §3.4. More strikingly we see this kind of experiential imagination in 
evidence in their stone-knapping abilities, which suggest they must have had the capacity to 
mentally rotate ‘their image of what would happen to a stone if it were struck in a particular 
way, to imagine how it would look from the other side’ (Picciuto and Carruthers, 2014: 203). 
 
The second cognitive pre-requisite that Carruthers suggests is propositional imagination: 
‘the capacity to form and consider a propositional representation without commitment to its 
truth or desirability’ (Carruthers, 2002: 242). This too, Carruthers suggests, comes ‘for free’, 
this time with language. As Carruthers points out, even with such capacities in place, the ability 
to creatively generate novel sentences or images won’t be sufficient for creative thinking (as we 
outlined in Chapter 1) – there is nothing especially creative in generating just any sentence or 
image; instead what we need is the ability to generate valuable (i.e. relevant, fruitful, 
interesting) ideas. And this is precisely what Carruthers has claimed pretend play is for. 
 
§4.4 Pretence and Motivation 
 
This still doesn’t provide a full evolutionary account, as it hasn’t accounted for the 
emergence of children’s disposition toward pretend play. Carruthers suggests that children may 
be ‘wired up’ in such a way that they receive intrinsic gratification from episodes of imaginative 
play. Such a connection between gratification and imaginative activity is seemingly already in 
evidence in primates as mentioned in §3.3. It seems as though imaginative behaviour is 
demonstrated in non-functional domains in the behaviour of our primate cousins, and research 
into the neurology of apes performing problem-solving tasks suggests that they enjoy 
completing experimental tasks regardless of whether or not any externally bestowed reward is 
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associated with that task (Clark and Smith, 2013) since the brain confers its own chemical 
reward for success. In other words, certain types of (quasi-) creative or imaginative behaviour 
might be their own reward. The evidence from Whiten and Suddendorf discussed above 
suggested that where great apes were particularly inventive and (possibly) inclined toward 
pretence, monkeys performed comparably poorly on similar measures. I suggested in §3.3 that 
this may be an issue of motivation – if apes are simply more motivated, that would explain their 
greater success. There is some tentative evidence to bear this out in Harlow (1950). Evidence 
here, and from Whiten and Suddendorf (2007), suggests that monkeys may simply be much 
harder to teach specific methods of problem-solving to as their reward circuits are much more 
closely associated with exploration than with imitative learning. 
 
On Carruthers’ view then, the rewards in human beings for pretence come from 
imaginative engagement with, and the partial satiation of, the agent’s desires and interests. 
Imagination, Carruthers points out, appears as though it is connected to the appetitive and 
motivational systems in a similar way to belief, such that: 
 
…imagined sex can make you feel sexy, imagined insults can make you angry, 
imagined food can make your mouth water, and so on. This is the basis of the 
enjoyment we take in story-telling, cinema, and works of fiction – imagining doing and 
experiencing interesting things is itself interesting (Carruthers, 2002: 243).  
 
 So, a young child may be fascinated by telephones – their parents use them all the time, 
yet they aren’t allowed to play with them – and they may enjoy talking to their grandma. By 
engaging in pretend play whereby the child picks up a banana, ‘dials’ a number and speaks to 
grandma, the child gains part of the motivational rewards of its real-world counterpart. This 
connection between the generation of suppositions and the rewards of thinking and acting 
within those suppositions explains why children are disposed toward pretend play, and once 
activated this disposition would function as practice for later uses of supposition in theory-
building and problem-solving as an adult. If this hypothesis is true, it makes empirical 
predictions about the connection between a disposition toward pretend play in infancy and 
creativity in adulthood. In the next section I briefly summarise some recent findings that 
suggest, however, this prediction does not bear out.  
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5. Problems with the Pretend Play Hypothesis 
 
Before turning to the empirical data concerning pretend play in infancy and creativity 
in adulthood, it is worth noting a couple of concerns that might cast some doubt on the Pretend 
Play Hypothesis in their own right. Firstly, we might wonder how pretend play is supposed to 
give rise to the particular kind of artistic creativity that is ubiquitous across human populations 
and present at the point of the Creative Explosion. It seems fairly obvious how pretence might 
give rise to dramatic performances of a sort (for example, re-enacting a battle or hunt, but 
embellishing for dramatic effect): composition and appreciation in this medium seem to clearly 
depend upon propositional imagining (as Carruthers describes it), and it is perfectly conceivable 
that pretend play in infancy, being as it is a process of acting within suppositions and coming to 
realise the (evolutionary) value of doing so, might give rise to the same process in adulthood. 
Dramatic performances are effectively pretend play episodes for adults. But what about the 
cave paintings that emerge around 40,000 years ago? There doesn’t seem to be an obvious 
route to explaining why pretend play in infants might spur on the kind of imaginative thinking 
that would manifest itself in this particular form of adult creativity (there are no clear battle 
scenes depicted, and hunting images are rare and often accompanied by some ambiguous 
images). This point isn’t damning, of course, as the claim is simply that pretend play in infancy 
makes individuals more creative as adults via enhanced suppositional reasoning skills, and this 
might manifest itself in various ways including naïve scientific theory-formation and composing 
songs. However, it is not unreasonable to expect that there might be a stronger connection 
between the form of the explanans and that of the explanandum. I will suggest below, and 
revisit this suggestion in detail in Chapter 4, that Carruthers has been too quick to dismiss a 
particular kind of imagining that offers a broader spectrum of possible creative behaviours – one 
which retains many of the strengths of the Pretend Play Hypothesis, but that can address this 
concern too – fantasy. 
 
Another concern is with Carruthers’ inclusion of tune composition amongst the 
creative activities stemming from the suppositional reasoning abilities enabled by pretend play 
in infancy. It is not implausible that dance and music in some form may, in fact, predate all of 
the other creative behaviours that are ubiquitous across human populations. In Steven Mithen’s 
view, there is good evidence to think that they long predate our species, and so pre-date the 
point in the history of our species where pretend play had become an evolutionarily stable 
feature of infant behaviour (Mithen, 2005). According to Mithen, song and dance might have 
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been a feature of the lives of Homo ergaster, a common ancestor of Homo sapiens and Homo 
neanderthalensis. If this is so, then composing tunes does not depend upon the suppositional 
reasoning skills engendered by pretend play. Again, this might not be particularly damning – 
perhaps Carruthers would wish to draw a distinction between the ways in which our 
evolutionary ancestors composed tunes and the way we do, with the former drawing on similar 
capacities to songbirds.31 Nonetheless, it is tempting to want to exclude song and dance from 
the phenomenon associated with the Creative Explosion unless we insist that the only or best 
evidence that can count for its presence in early hominid populations is the discovery of musical 
instruments (such as that noted in Fig.1 above). Whilst it obviously constitutes a creative act to 
invent such instruments, every normally-developing human being already has access to a 
(potential) musical instrument in the form of their voice. Mithen’s picture seems intuitively 
more appealing, as the invention of musical instruments around 41,000 years ago would surely 
be a refinement to a highly creative and long-established social practice rather than the origin of 
one. 
 
The most pressing objection to Carruthers’ account, however, comes from Carruthers 
himself. Why, given that the rewards for pretend play are supposedly linked to the imaginative 
act itself, would ‘a disposition to play (involving overt movements) rather than to merely 
fantasise [emerge]?’ (Picciuto and Carruthers, 2014: 245, emphasis added). Carruthers’ answer 
comes in two parts. Firstly, he suggests that children probably lack the ‘sort of introspective 
access to their own mental states which would be necessary for enjoyment of mere imagination’ 
(Ibid.) This may be so, but as Carruthers notes, this only defers the problem since it doesn’t 
seem ‘crucial’ that fitness-enhancing activity begin at 18 months. If what is (sexually) selected 
for is creative behaviour in adults, then it is only if it is true that pretend play is the ontogenetic 
basis for this that this picture holds; if it transpires that pretend play in infancy doesn’t enhance 
creativity in adults, then the central claim of Carruthers’ thesis falls away. Carruthers therefore 
moves to avoid this charge of simply deferring the problem by claiming that young children 
would already have possessed a disposition toward what Lillard et al. (2012) call Physical Play 
i.e. rough-and-tumble, just as many other mammals do, and that this could be co-opted in 
service of the development of creativity by becoming a disposition to engage in pretend play. 
This, in turn, could become shared pretence (a form of social imagining; see Chapter 1), and 
therefore contribute to the development of the mind-reading faculty (following Leslie, 1987) as 
																																																								
31 One model that he could adopt to do so is that of Miyagawa et al., 2013. 
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well as the development of the physical skills utilised in object control and manipulation. 
However, there are empirical reasons to doubt this, and I turn to these reasons now. 
 
§5.1 Review of empirical data relating to the Pretend Play Hypothesis  
 
  Lillard et al. (2012) conducted an extensive survey of empirical research into the link 
between pretend play in infancy and various measures of cognitive development in adulthood. 
A table summarizing the data is provided below as Fig. 3. One interesting point that emerges 
from Lillard’s review is that pretend play might not be as ubiquitous across human populations 
as Carruthers seems to think. In a recent survey, mothers in only 5 of 16 countries surveyed 
suggested that their children often participate in imaginative play (Singer et al., 2009) and other 
studies suggest that children in non-Anglo cultures play much less (Gaskins and Goncu, 1992, 
Lancy, 2007). I won’t press that point here, however, as there are bigger concerns about the 
Pretend Play Hypothesis raised by the review. 
 
 Lillard et al. examined the results of a range of studies on play and cognitive 
development, focusing primarily on pretend play, with a view to investigating three hypotheses 
proposed by Smith (2010): 
 
1. That pretend play is crucial to optimal development (the one most relevant to 
Carruthers’ hypothesis, shown in Fig. 3 under ‘Causal’) 
2. The equifinality hypothesis: that pretence helps some developments, but that it is only 
one possible route. 
3. The epiphenomenal hypothesis: that pretending is an epiphenomenon of some other 
selected-for capability, but in itself makes no contribution to development. 
 
If Carruthers’ Pretend Play Hypothesis is correct, we should expect to see a correlation 
between pretend play and cognitive development, particularly in the areas of creativity, Theory 
of Mind and problem-solving. The most important headline is that this does not turn out to be 
the case at all: in fact, pretend play was even found on some studies to hinder cognitive 
development in these areas. The hypothesis that emerged as the most plausible was the 
epiphenomenal hypothesis – the worst possible result for Carruthers. Ideally, then, my own 
explanation of what drove the evolution of human creative behaviour should fit with the idea 
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that play is an epiphenomenon of the drivers I identify. I suggest in Chapter 5 that this is the 
case. 
 
In the domain of creativity, the evidence overall was inconclusive and did not strongly 
favour any of the hypotheses. Interestingly, however, one study (Wyver and Spence, 1999) 
linked fantastical pretend play to the promotion of semantic creativity, which might please 
supporters of the Language Hypothesis. I pick up on this point again in Chapter 4 when looking 
at the connection between fantasy and the evolution of language. Most of the studies which 
supported the hypothesis Carruthers favours turned out to be methodologically problematic, 
and the support disappeared when these issues were masked. 
 
In the domain of Theory of Mind, the evidence was again inconclusive, most strongly 
supporting the epiphenomenal hypothesis (as noted above, the worst result for Carruthers). 
Leslie et al. point out that the evidence which did appear to support the kind of view favoured 
by Carruthers could have just as easily been explained by linguistic abilities, and that one study 
even suggested that it is Theory of Mind that enables socio-dramatic play, thus reversing the 
direction of effects. The most reliable study showed ‘no improvement in Theory of Mind from 
either skills or pretend play training’ (Lillard et al., 2012: 16). 
 
In the domain of problem-solving, a kind of physical play (construction, e.g. building 
with blocks) was found to promote creativity, but importantly this was not the case for pretend 
play. Pretend play was even found to interfere with using objects as tools, which perhaps casts 
doubt on the evolutionary advantage of co-opting physical play into the services of pretend play 
as Carruthers suggests as his ultimate way out of the objection that he raises: that by his own 
account, merely engaging in fantasy should be sufficient to explain the development of 
creativity. I will suggest in Chapter 4 that Carruthers, as I noted in Chapter 1 was the case with 
many philosophical discussions of the imagination more generally, has been too quick to dismiss 
the importance of fantasy, and ultimately offer an account of how fantasy might, in fact, be one 
of the main drivers of the evolution of creativity. 
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Fig. 3 Summary of Evidence for Each Position 
 
Domain or sub-
domain 
Support for hypothesis? (Reason) 
Causal Equifinal Epiphenomenal 
Creativity 
No (inconsistent 
correlations) 
No (when experimenters 
are masked or filmed or 
have other hypotheses, null 
results) 
Best supported, but not 
clear what of (adult 
interaction, materials, social 
mix?) 
Intelligence 
No (although correlations, 
direction of effect is 
uncertain; skills training 
suggests adult interaction 
could be underlying third 
variable. 
No (music training is more 
effective) 
Best supported (adult 
interaction or other features 
of intervention) 
Problem-solving 
No (construction but not 
pretend play) 
No (construction but not 
pretend play) 
No (construction but not 
pretend play; associations 
might result from 
propensity to construct) 
Reasoning 
No (getting children to 
focus on premises is as 
effective) 
Yes Possible (f pretend as 
operationalized is also a cue 
to pay attention to 
premises, and this is true 
reason for results) 
Conservation 
No (correlational studies 
find no relationship; 
training results ride on 
adult questioning) 
No (when experimenters 
are masked and other 
aspects of intervention 
equalised, null results) 
Best supported (adult 
interaction – structured 
questioning) 
Theory of Mind 
No (inconsistent. Some 
correlations to social 
pretend play with more 
recent tasks, but direction 
of effects is unclear) 
Possible, yet sounder 
methods fail to show. 
Best supported (considering 
inconsistent findings and 
hints of reverse direction of 
effects; adult interaction) 
Social skills 
No (correlations 
inconsistent with both 
solitary and social pretend 
play. Direction of effects is 
an issue) 
Possible (other routes 
unexamined) 
Possible (crucial variable 
could be practice) 
Language 
Possible (consistent 
relationships to different 
aspects of language. Effects 
could be bidirectional) 
Possible (other routes 
unexamined) 
Possible (adult interaction 
could explain training study 
results) 
Narrative 
Possible (correlations 
inconsistent and to different 
aspects of narrative 
development but one solid 
but small training study 
needs replication) 
Possible Less likely but one solid but 
small training study needs 
replication. 
Executive function 
Not likely (if so, limited to 
subsets of children and 
tests) 
Not clear that pretend play 
leads to. 
Not clear that pretend play 
is reliably associated. 
Emotion regulation 
Possible (parent rating 
consistent in single study; 
other results have other 
interpretations) 
Not clear that pretend play 
leads to. 
Too few studies. 
Adapted from Lillard et al., 2012 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
 In the light of these results, it is therefore worth returning to the issue of what it was 
that occurred between 100,000 years ago and the Creative Explosion to prompt the rapid 
expansion of creative activities that followed. It is this issue that I pick up in the remainder of 
this thesis. Although Carruthers might not have successfully solved the puzzle of the Creative 
Explosion, his work does give us a clear structure for approaching the puzzle. What needs to be 
explained is what emerged besides language to spur on the evolution of human creativity. But 
his work also shows the need to adequately explain the emergence of that thing too. My own 
answer will be the emergence of a culture of storytelling, and Carruthers has actually given us a 
head start in explaining the emergence of just such a culture: engaging in fantasy is inherently 
rewarding. With the issue of motivation already partly resolved, in the remainder of this thesis I 
need to elucidate and explain the other components required for us to begin telling stories. 
With that in mind, in the next chapter I aim to set out some specific details on what the 
emergence of syntax would have brought to human cognition, and the impact that this would 
have had on our imaginative capacities. Chapter 4 explores the role that fantasy might have 
played in driving human creative behaviour and the development of rich lexical resources that 
would begin to ramp up cultural evolution in our species. The result, I argue in Chapter 5, is 
the development of a culture of storytelling which builds upon a natural inclination to engage in 
fantastic imaginings. This account overall, I will argue, offers a stronger explanation than 
Carruthers’ Pretend Play Hypothesis, and one which coheres better with the empirical data we 
currently have. 
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Chapter 3: 
LANGUAGE & HUMAN CREATIVE 
COGNITION 
How did the evolution of language in our species change creative cognition? 
 
Introduction 
 
 Chapter 2 began to outline both what language is and how and when it emerged as a 
capacity unique to our species. I stated that human language essentially consists of two parts – 
lexicon and syntax. This chapter will begin to unpack the role that syntax, in particular, plays in 
human cognition, suggesting that features specific to human thought perhaps only emerge when 
grammar is in place. I will, however, discuss the importance of the lexicon in subsequent 
chapters. The important new features that language brings would be available for the diverse 
faculty of imagination to deploy in a number of ways to assist creative behaviour. However, 
given the puzzle presented in Chapter 2 – the apparent delay between the emergence of 
language in our species and the emergence of the widespread, diverse creative behaviours seen 
at the point of the Creative Explosion – we need to begin to sketch some sort of explanation for 
this delay. I lay the groundwork here for the argument in Chapters 4 and 5 that specific cultural 
accretions needed to occur before we could expect to see the behaviours that typify human 
creativity today (e.g. in the artistic, scientific and technological domains). In particular, I will 
argue in Chapter 5 that storytelling should be seen as a crucial driver of human creativity, but 
that this practice is ultimately enabled by imaginings that utilise our unique capacity for 
language. 
 
1. What is language (in the sense relevant here)? 
 
§1.1 Two approaches to studying language 
 
Language can be studied both as a cultural object and as a natural object. The idea that 
language is a cultural object is perhaps the ‘natural-seeming’ way of understanding it (Morris, 
2007: 1). This view can be seen, for instance, in the work of Locke (1689; 1998) and Aristotle 
(1996), who suggest that language is invented by man for the purpose of communicating ideas 
(see §2.1 below). The two components of any given language – the lexicon and the grammar – 
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are, according to this view, simply conventions established and preserved over a number of 
generations. Language, therefore, can be studied in much the same way as other aspects of 
human culture, such as commerce or cooking, by examining its historical development. 
However, it has been argued (by Chomsky, amongst others) that traditional grammarians ‘often 
failed to realise that the standard language is, from a historical point of view, merely that 
regional or social dialect which has acquired prestige and become the instrument of 
administration, education and literature’ (Lyons, 1970: 20). As such, there are deeper roots to 
each of these preferred dialects that could in turn become the focus of linguistic inquiry for 
traditional grammarians as they seek to trace the historical origins of specific dialects. 
 
Generative grammarians, by contrast to the Traditional grammarians of the sort above, 
study language as a natural object. On this view, human beings are endowed with a biologically-
based ‘language faculty’. All normally-developing human beings are capable or learning or 
acquiring language, yet this is a capacity unique to our species and unaffected by cultural 
differences. No matter how extensive the training given to non-human animals, they are never 
able to do what every normally-developing four-year-old child can do: construct novel 
expressions to freely express thought. This inability to acquire language suggests that there is a 
biological difference between ourselves and non-human animals that accounts for our ability to 
acquire language and their inability to do likewise.32 As noted in Chapter 2, this difference may 
be language-specific (e.g. the neurological changes required for syntax) or not (e.g. adaptations 
enabling co-operation). 
 
From the 1920s up until the 1950s, the first of these approaches to language was 
popular amongst linguists seeking to make the study of language ‘more scientific’ by viewing 
language through the prism of Behaviourist psychology. The influential linguist Leonard 
Bloomfield epitomised this kind of approach, seeking to explain language ‘mechanistically’ in 
terms of stimulus and response. On the Bloomfieldian view, all aspects of language acquisition 
and performance can be explained in terms of the cultural transmission of certain established 
																																																								
32 This is not intended as a knock-down argument: I simply take it that it’s a fair assumption that if we possess 
some capacity uniquely as a species then there must be some biological and evolutionary explanation for this 
uniqueness. This isn’t the same as saying there is a specific biological adaptation for language (see Ch. 2), only that 
there is some biological difference between ourselves and other species that enables every normally-developing 
member of our species to acquire language without explicit instruction. 
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conventions for symbols and their meanings.33 More recent work in linguistics by Noam 
Chomsky has argued that such an approach can’t account for the ‘creativity’ of language – that 
even by the age of five or six years, human beings can produce and understand an indefinitely 
large number of appropriate utterances that they have not previously encountered. Chomsky 
doesn’t deny that aspects of language are cultural, nor does he believe that there is nothing to 
be gained from studying individual languages. But in order to explain the universal capacity of 
human beings to produce and understand novel sentences in the way noted above, in 
Chomsky’s view there must be some biological basis allowing the internal generation of such 
sentences, and it is this basis that is the subject of investigation in his linguistic inquiries. For 
Chomsky, the underlying cognitive basis for language not only enables linguistic ability, but also 
provides the limits or constraints for all possible human languages, in much the same way that 
the visual system enables but simultaneously constrains possible visual experiences. A theory of 
these constraints is called Universal Grammar. 
 
The aims of this thesis are to establish the relationship between the emergence of 
language and the imagination, and to explain the role that this relationship played in the 
emergence of widespread and diverse creative behaviours within our species. The claim that 
there is a biologically-grounded universal grammar i.e. a set of constraints on all possible 
human languages, provides us with a route to investigate the relationship in the first of these 
two aims: by examining the basic operations permitted by universal grammar and manifested 
across all human languages we can establish what new cognitive features are available to the 
imagination once full language is in place. With this in mind, I offer some further detail on 
Universal Grammar and the specific mechanisms of language below. 	
§1.2 Studying Universal Grammar 	
The grammar of every language consists of three inter-related parts:  
 
(i) syntax, which accounts for the regularities governing the combination of words 
(ii) semantics, which describes the meanings of words and sentences, and  
(iii) phonology, which deals with the permissible combinations of sounds in speech. 																																																								
33 Perhaps the most well known rejection of this approach to language is Noam Chomsky’s damning critical review 
of Skinner’s Verbal Behaviour (Chomsky, 1967); his arguments against this kind of approach have remained largely 
unchanged. 
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Chomsky believes that elements of each of these are universal. However, ‘universal’ 
here does not mean that these elements are present in every language. Instead, this Universal 
Grammar (UG) provides all of the available options from which different languages select. In 
this sense, UG is said to be the (genetically transmitted) ‘initial state’ of the human language 
faculty, playing the role of a ‘language acquisition device’. As Chomsky puts it: 	
A plausible assumption today is that the principles of language are fixed and innate, and 
that variation is restricted in the manner indicated. Each language, then, is (virtually) 
determined by a choice of values for lexical parameters: with the array of choices, we 
should be able to deduce Hungarian; with another, Yoruba. … The conditions of 
language acquisition make it plain that the process must be largely inner-directed, as in 
other aspects of growth, which means that all languages must be close to identical, 
largely fixed by the initial state (Chomsky, 2000:121-2). 	
On this account, an individual child learning a language must determine, from the 
linguistic information they are exposed to, the set of options in use in their native language (a 
process driven by UG). No language uses all of the options that UG makes available, and it 
could be (depending upon how broad UG turns out to be) that no one particular option is used 
by every language (though this seems unlikely e.g. some likely candidates for the options used 
universally include negation, tense, quantification etc.) As the genetic component of language, 
UG is ‘unconscious’ in that it is not available to introspection, and the nature of UG therefore 
has to be deduced by Generative grammarians from the ‘primary linguistic data’ (pld) generated 
in the utterances of language-users, and these language-users’ judgements about what 
constitutes an acceptable utterance. 	
However, the matter is not straight-forward as the pld does not directly mirror UG. 
Linguistic production is affected by a variety of factors such as lapses of memory or attention, 
or malfunction in the mechanisms underlying speech. As a result, many of the sentences 
actually produced by native speakers may be ungrammatical. The pld therefore cannot be taken 
at face value, and must be ‘idealised’, eliminating from it utterances which the native speaker 
would intuitively recognise as ungrammatical. Chomsky introduces the distinction between 
linguistic performance and linguistic competence to capture the nature of this disparity; 
‘competence’ describes the system of linguistic knowledge possessed by native speakers, and 
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‘performance’ describes how this system is manifested in actual instances of communication.34 
This distinction is important to Chomsky’s linguistics more generally, since the Generative 
tradition sees competence as the ultimate object of study due to its connection to UG, but it is 
also important to his comments on the creative aspect of language use, with some criticism of 
Chomsky’s views centring on the perceived ambiguity as to which aspect of language is said to 
be creative: competence or performance (see Drach, 1981). Crucially for our purposes here, 
and speaking in idealized terms, examining linguistic competence to establish the structure of 
UG should allow generative grammarians to establish the basic computational processes 
involved in generating linguistic utterances in every language. The project of doing so (known 
as the Minimalist Program; see Ch.2, §2) is not without its critics, but it is not my intention to 
address those critics here – that is best left to the linguists. Instead, I will work outwards from 
the findings of specific generative grammarians, taking their credibility for granted, to try to 
establish what the (supposed) computational basis of language would bring to human creative 
thought.  	
§1.3 Generative Grammar 
 
 The generative linguistics introduced by Chomsky and his colleagues differed 
significantly from the then-dominant Bloomfieldian approach. Generative linguistics not only 
‘made it respectable to talk about the mind again’ (Fitch, 2010), but introduced ideas which 
seemed impossible to explain via the general learning mechanisms which the behaviourists had 
at their disposal. The central idea was the mathematical notion that an infinite set of meaningful 
sentences could be generated by a finite set of rules. This capacity for ‘discrete infinity’ is often 
said to be the most striking difference between human language and the communication 
systems of all other known creatures.35 Chomsky and his colleagues also realised that existing 
models of syntax, which posited rules for building sentences by manipulating individual words, 
couldn’t adequately explain the power of language. Instead, rules must act upon phrases, which 
																																																								
34 This distinction was drawn in Chomsky 2002 as a distinction between language and corpus, but adding to the 
number of meanings for ‘language’ would be unhelpful here. 
35 Bees are (in principle) able to communicate an infinite number of locations of food by varying the intensity of the 
signal. However, there is a simple and fixed correlation between the signal and the signal’s ‘meaning’ e.g. the 
location of food. Human language enables novel combination of discrete units, rather than simply varying 
continuously one of the parameters of the signalling system (for instance, solely by changing emphasis on a 
particular word in the same sentence) in accordance with a corresponding variation in meaning, and thus is a far 
more powerful and expressive system. 
	 90 
in turn can be recursively re-embedded in a sentence.36 Language therefore has a tree-like, 
rather than linear, structure, and because of its recursive nature generates an infinite number of 
possible sentences. I explore this structure in more depth in §2.2 below. 	
We may summarise the view of language relevant here as follows: at its core language 
is a biologically-based generative or productive mechanism characterised by its capacity to 
generate an infinite number of novel, meaningful sentences. Generative grammarians, such as 
Chomsky, therefore posit that UG must minimally be a ‘rich, abstract and restrictive’ 
(Chomsky, 2003: 388) mechanism yielding these features, with UG perhaps reducible to a 
single operation, Merge (see §2.2 below). To make clear the relevance of this approach to 
language to my thesis, it is first necessary to examine the link between language and thought on 
this view. 	
2. (The Structure of) Language and Thought 
 
 The aim in this section is to explain a particular view of the relationship between 
language and thought which I take to illuminate what happened when the final adaptations 
enabling full language appeared with our species. This, I claim, would put into place a capacity 
for easily generating thoughts of a kind unique to human beings i.e. thought with a subject-
predicate structure, that is truth-bearing, and can flexibly refer to objects, events and 
propositions, and which could then be externalised in communication, in turn driving the rapid 
development of culture associated with anatomically modern human beings. The view of 
language and thought that interests me here is that defended by Wolfram Hinzen (2006, 2007, 
2013). Hinzen’s view of the relationship between language and thought establishes part of the 
picture I am aiming to clarify in this thesis; a further, independent argument is required for why 
language would be co-opted by the imagination for the purpose of story-telling, and it is in 
developing that argument in Chapters 4 and 5 that the relevance of our earlier discussion of 
fantasy should become clear. The focus of this section, however, is the emergence of the kind 																																																								
36 That recursion is a property of all human languages is contested by Everett (2005, 2012), who claims that Pirahã 
lacks this feature. This is sometimes said to pose a problem for proponents of UG, though Everett’s proposals have 
also been subjected to a number of criticisms which, as a non-linguist, I am not qualified to adjudicate on. 
However, Chomsky’s response to this issue has been to remind us that recursion may be a property of UG, but 
that like any other property of UG it may not be selected by every language (Chomsky 2006; see §1.2 above). 
Regardless, it seems that Everett does not wish to deny that recursion is a property of the thought of Pirahã 
speakers, and in Chomsky’s view the primary beneficiary of UG is thought (Chomsky 2007; see Ch.2, §2), so the 
views may not be irreconcilable anyway. 
	 91 
of thought that provides the content for what we say, which Hinzen convincingly argues derives 
its structure and semantics from what he terms narrow syntax. 
 
§2.1 Against Nominalism about language and thought 
  
Hinzen rejects the long tradition in the philosophy of language that assumes that 
thought is logically and explanatorily prior to language – a view Covington (1984) describes as 
Nominalism. Examples within this tradition include those (as alluded to in §1.1 above) of 
Aristotle and Locke. Thought is suggested to be logically prior to language because Nominalism 
suggests that the rules of natural language can only be explained in virtue of a more abstract set 
of rules belonging to an independent ‘Language of Thought’ (LoT) and encapsulated in the 
artificial logical languages philosophers have developed, for reasons discussed below. Such a 
position is taken by Fodor (2001). Hinzen’s view, by contrast, claims that the grammar of 
human language yields the distinctive character of human thought, and that no such independent 
language of thought is required to explain this character. Thought is taken to be explanatorily 
prior to language because, on the Nominalist tradition, language expresses thought, thus the 
existence of language is explained in virtue of the prior existence of thought. 
 
Hinzen suggests that ‘narrow syntax’ is what marks out human thought as distinctive 
from non-human animal thought. Narrow syntax is ‘the mental-computational path leading 
from a selection of a number of lexical items stored in long-term memory to a syntactic 
representation of “logical form” at the syntax-semantics interface’ (Hinzen, 2013: 2). In other 
words, it is the process of selecting a lexical item as a starting point for generating a proposition 
for internal (mental) representation and then processing that lexical item through a series of 
computational cycles to transform it from (the basis of) a word into a sentence. The specific 
details of what this computational process contains is precisely what generative grammarians are 
interested in, and one which proponents of the Minimalist Program attempt to reduce to as few 
computational processes as possible. The range of possible outcomes is what we described as 
UG above. On this view, then, UG indicates the full range of thoughts available to human 
beings. 
  
To clarify, the view being asserted here is not that there is no thought without 
language. There is non-linguistic thought (e.g. purely associative thought) and thought that 
requires little-to-no grammar (e.g. imperatives) and this is available not only to non-linguistic 
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creatures but also to human beings alongside the kind of thought which is distinctively human – 
that which is reflected in the essential ontology of semantics, i.e. thought with a subject-
predicate structure, that is truth-bearing, and can refer to objects, events and propositions. The 
referentiality and propositionality of human thought is that which is generated by the 
computational system of human language, and which characterises the cognitive style of 
(normally-developed) humans. In other words, once language emerges, so does a new cognitive 
style and new possibilities for thought. 
 
This contrasts starkly with the Nominalist view of thought. Nominalism sees language 
as an arbitrary system of conventionally-agreed ‘labels’ for objects, with the meaning of a given 
sentence depending upon a language-independent ‘proposition’ which the sentence expresses. 
One argument that has been posited in favour of this view is the fact that multiple sentences can 
express the same thought. The suggestion here is that if two different sentences, y and z, can 
express the same ‘thought’ or have the ‘same meaning’, then they must both express a distinct 
and underlying proposition P. For instance, the sentences ‘John hits Bob’ and ‘Bob was hit by 
John’ might be taken to express the same meaning, though they are voiced differently. The 
Nominalist explanation for this is that there is an underlying proposition that these sentences 
pick out (which is why both sentences would be expressed by a single sentence in formal logic). 
This suggestion often appears in the introductory chapter of any introductory logic book (see, 
for example, Copi et al., 2014) as a justification for the importance of formal logic. However, 
Hinzen points out that this rests upon a misunderstanding of the nature of sentences: that they 
can only be individuated at acoustic or morpho-phonological levels of representation i.e. at the 
level of externalisation, as when spoken or written. Since the Nominalist sees sentences as an 
‘outer sign’ or conventional label expressing some inner thought, sentences are treated as mere 
‘noise’ or a ‘string of symbols’ expressing an underlying, ‘meaningful’, thought. However, this 
runs contrary to contemporary linguistic theory, which demonstrates that sentences can be 
individuated more abstractly. As Hinzen explains: 
 
Two sentences … when processed by a human brain, [can] be assigned identical 
underlying syntactic and semantic (and perhaps pragmatic) linguistic representations, 
even if these are then mapped to different morpho-phonological strings at the interface 
of syntax and the sensory-motor systems underlying language use (Hinzen, 2013: 5). 
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In other words, a single sentence may, at the point of production, be represented by 
two different sets of sounds (or symbols, in the case of writing). However, it doesn’t follow 
that these sentences, while different at the level of externalisation, aren’t identical at the level 
of internal representation (i.e. at the level of thought). To a certain extent, it seems obvious 
that the ways in which we externalise language are irrelevant – the same sentence can be 
expressed through speech or through sign language, in English or in Mandarin etc. However, 
there is more to Hinzen’s claim here than that simple observation. Hauser et al. (2002) draw a 
helpful distinction between the Faculty of Language in the Narrow Sense (FLN) and the Faculty 
of Language in the Broad Sense (FLB) to distinguish between the aspects of the language faculty 
that are shared by non-humans and yet not used linguistically, and the aspects of the language 
faculty that only human beings possess (i.e. the ones that are used for language, and perhaps 
only for language)37. The ability to externalise language in some sensory-motor channel or 
another (speech, gesture, etc.) is actually shared with non-human animals and precursor 
hominids. Even in the absence of language, some animals can talk, as Descartes pointed out 
long ago (Descartes, 1637). Similarly, it has been suggested that Neanderthals could talk 
(D’Anastasio et al., 2013). Sensory-motor exernalisation is therefore neither language- nor 
species-specific. So the production of noises and symbols that the Nominalist takes to be 
expressive of propositional thought are possible even in the absence of linguistic ability. The 
FLN, by contrast, is whatever aspects of language are language-specific – namely, its internal and 
cognitive ones. It is these aspects of language which interest the generative grammarian, and it 
is these aspects which belong only to our species and that account for the open-ended 
generativity and recursiveness of language. The Nominalist works on the assumption that 
thought precedes language, and thus even prior to the emergence of language, thought of the 
kind that language expresses must have already existed. 
 
Accepting the Nominalist position leaves the explanation of human thought untouched. 
Assuming we favour a naturalistic explanation of this, human thought needs to be explained in 
an evolutionary context as a (partly) species-specific, genetically-based, contingent aspect of 
human cognition. This requires discovering principles that underlie its evolution and 
development. In the case of sentences y and z, which both have the same meaning P, the task is 																																																								
37 I’ve been deliberately cautious by adding these parentheses here. The computational process Merge (see §2.2 
below) may have evolved specifically for language and yet become co-opted for other purposes such as writing 
music. It has been argued by Katz and Pesetsky (2009) “all formal differences between language and music are a 
consequence of differences in their fundamental building blocks (arbitrary pairings of sound and meaning in the 
case of language; pitch-classes and pitch-class combinations in the case of music).  In all other respects, language 
and music are identical.”	
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to explain the existence of P, its character, and precisely how both y and z express P. The 
explanatory problem is this: if we say that the language faculty evolved so that we could 
communicate the complex propositions which make up thought (as is claimed, for example, by 
Pinker and Jackendoff, 2005), then we are left with the issue of explaining where the relevant 
forms of semantic complexity that belong to such thoughts actually come from. The Nominalist 
answer can’t be grammar since this is an arbitrary post-hoc invention. Even if thought in non-
human animals can take us some of the way there, it seems highly suspicious to claim that all of 
thought or semantics was already in place and that grammar simply adapted to it (contra-
Chomsky, 2007a). 
 
On Hinzen’s view, the syntactic constraints of language systematise and organise 
semantic information, with no need for recourse to independent semantic explanations. This is 
precisely the kind of view that is rejected by the Fregean-Russellian tradition. It has 
traditionally been assumed that natural language grammar is imperfectly aligned with 
semantics, and this is part of what motivated the development of modern logic. However, the 
supposed disparity between syntax and semantics has increasingly been shown by modern 
linguistics to be misconstrued. For instance, perceived problems of quantificational scope 
thought initially to only be explicable within a logical rather than linguistic framework, can be 
explained by syntactic principles such as the Proper Binding Constraint and Non-Vacuous 
Quantification (Huang, 1995). What Hinzen takes this to show is that syntactic theory can shed 
light upon and provide relevant structures for ontological distinctions, a view which runs 
contrary to the Nominalist approach. Rather than having ‘meaningless’ syntax mapped onto an 
independent, meaningful system governing propositional thought, ‘narrow syntax – once 
supplied with lexical items – actually yields (or itself is) a language of thought’ (Hinzen, 2013, 
my emphasis). As Chomsky puts it: 
 
[I]t appears that language evolved, and is designed, primarily as an instrument of 
thought. Emergence of unbounded Merge in human evolutionary history provides what 
has been called a “language of thought,” an internal generative system that constructs 
thoughts of arbitrary richness and complexity, exploiting conceptual resources that are 
already available or may develop with the availability of structured expressions 
(Chomsky, 2007b: 22). 
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If we can eliminate the need for an independent LoT, we can not only benefit from a 
more parsimonious account of thought, but actually begin to explain why human thought has the 
character it does. With an independent LoT out of the picture, we can also see that human 
thought doesn’t derive its character from the nature of the external world. As Hinzen explains: 
 
A grammatically unbiased look at the world… will leave open how we ontologically 
categorise it using certain grammatical forms. Suppose we refer to some particular 
event with a nominal such as Mary’s smile as opposed to a sentence such as Mary smiles: 
these grammatical forms are radically different, as is their semantic use, yet what goes 
on in the world may be exactly the same. While referring to some external scene, 
therefore, that scene will not predict or explain how we refer to it; nor will it explain 
the range of ways in which [we] can do so, having grammar at our disposal (Hinzen, 
2013: 11). 
 
So, human thought isn’t simply a reflection of the unprocessed perceptual data we take 
in from the world – we see the world as being in some way. Our descriptions of the world are 
not determined by the perceptual information the world makes available to us: the exact same 
scene may be described in multiple ways. And yet we needn’t look beyond the grammatical 
distinctions we utilise in order to capture all of the ways in which we can, in fact, think about 
the world (Hinzen, 2013; see §2.2). If narrow syntax provides the computational system that 
underpins thought, then it is essentially a device for generating propositional configurations that 
can then (later) be externalised as communication. It is at this point, I will argue in Chapter 5, 
that we can begin engaging in social practices like storytelling, which I suggest is the 
manifestation of a tendency to engage in fantasy, and which in turn leads to the development of 
a variety of creative practices such as the production of the representational art we see at the 
point of the Creative Explosion. However, for now, we need to unpack exactly how this 
computational process is thought to generate the propositional configurations just described. 
 
§2.2 Narrow syntax: the computational cycle behind thought 
 
The computational process begins with a lexical root (Halle and Marantz, 1993) – a 
structureless element which has not yet been categorised for use in a noun phrase, verb phrase 
or clause. For example, the Latin words ‘dol-or’, ‘dol-enter’ and ‘dol-eo’ (‘pain’, ‘painful’, 
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and ‘I feel pain’, respectively) all share the root ‘dol-’. The root itself doesn’t determine how it 
will combine within a sentence: it must first be categorised. This categorisation takes place as 
the root enters the computational cycle that generates propositions, which is itself split into 
three phases. At each phase, a single derivation can be performed, for example changing the 
root by adding an affix in order to generate a lexical head which falls under some category. 
These derivations are what link the natural language sentence to its underlying logical form. 
The category under which the lexical item now falls will determine the derivations that can be 
performed within the rest of the cycle. For instance, if a derivation begins with a nominal head 
such as ‘water’, the number of other heads available in that cycle becomes restricted to a 
classifier, e.g. [glasses of [water]], a classifier and a numeral, e.g. [three [glasses of [water]]], or 
a classifier, a numeral and a determiner, e.g. [these [three [glasses of [water]]]], and in this 
order. It will never contain Tense, which would require a new cycle beginning with a lexical 
root that is categorised as a verb (‘watering’, ‘watered’, ‘waters’). In such a case, the options at 
the first (and thus each subsequent) phase will differ, and a different sentence will be generated. 
 
Within this computational cycle, Merge operates on the individual syntactic units as they 
are generated (e.g. it operates on noun phrases, verb phrases etc.) For instance, if the phase 
cycle is operating upon the nominal head ‘water’, and generates a structure with a classifier e.g. 
‘buckets of water’, this new structure becomes a single computational symbol capable of being 
embedded and re-embedded in ever-longer sentences. For instance, ‘buckets of water’ might 
be paired with ‘these’, as in the example above, or with ‘weigh six kilograms’, or with both – 
‘These buckets of water weigh six kilograms’. This new structure can again be merged into a 
single unit and embedded again, e.g. ‘These buckets of water weigh six kilograms and are far 
too heavy for me to carry’. In this way, the computational cycle used to generate sentences 
works from the ‘bottom up’, beginning with smaller syntactic units and combining them to 
reach the largest one we eventually see at the point of externalisation, the sentence.38 This kind 
of bottom up process is arguably reflected in the phenomenology of language-use: we don’t 
pre-plan our conversations, so our experience of language-production is one of us not really 
knowing exactly how we’re going to ‘get there’ when we start talking.39  																																																								
38 Linguists will no doubt be unhappy with this fairly simplistic and undetailed rendering of Merge. However, the 
details of this operation not included here aren’t particularly relevant to the argument being made and, though 
simplistic, I take it the rendering I give is broadly accurate. 
39 Linguistic comprehension, by contrast, is the other way around – to ascertain meaning we are required to 
process and deconstruct the entire sentence, utilising our ability to de-embed embedded clauses to understand what 
is being said e.g. in a sentence such as ‘John, whose mother I met on Tuesday, told me today that he met Sally, the 
girl I was best friends with at school, and they fell in love.’ This kind of processing requires not only a good 
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 Returning to the details of the phase cycle, Hinzen (2011) suggests that the three 
possible phases are nominal (as in the above example), verbal and clausal. The only difference 
between these phases is which lexical items enter the cycle; the structure of the cycle is the same 
across phases, and each phase is closed off by the introduction of a lexical category specific to 
each kind of head. Something that begins with a nominal head is closed off by a determiner 
(something which expresses reference, e.g. the, these), a verbal head is closed off by 
aspect/voice (how the event or state relates to the flow of time, e.g. the –ing suffix for verbs in 
English), and a clausal head is closed off by a complementiser (something that turns that clause 
into a subject or object, e.g. that).40 The phase cycle described by Hinzen has some interesting 
implications for the discussion of ‘complex concepts’ in the philosophical and psychological 
literature on compositionality (e.g. Fodor, 1998). It has long been suggested that we can 
combine bare concepts like RED and CAR to form the complex concept RED CAR. Hinzen 
suggests that there is actually a lack of evidence that concepts combine systematically and 
compositionally in the way just described. Instead, the evidence suggests that it is formal 
concepts rather than bare concepts that combine: ‘what the computational system “sees”, in 
other words, when it combines the word ‘car’, is ‘N’, not CAR’ (Hinzen, 2013: 14). In other 
words, when generating the proposition, the phase cycle treats the word ‘pain’ differently only 
with respect to its grammatical (or formal) classification, not with respect to its ‘Fregean 
sense’. If ‘car’ is seen as a noun, it is treated just like any other noun, and so on with any word 
treated as a noun, or as a verb etc. 
 
Hinzen claims that this three-phase computational process is sufficient for generating 
every available option for human language and thought. And each way of categorising a lexical 
root allows for only a finite set of possible outcomes: a root categorised as a noun, upon 
entering the cycle, can ultimately only generate a structure which locates the corresponding 
predicate in space (allowing us to refer to objects); categorised as a verb, all that can happen is 																																																																																																																																																														
working memory but also the ability to pay attention to the entire sentence. Our attention, of course, doesn’t 
always hold. Upon hearing a particular word one might be sent on some sort of reverie (about our old school 
friend, for example). In this way, words can trigger new thoughts, often about only tangentially related issues. 
Hinzen has nothing to say about how lexical roots come to enter the computational cycle to begin with, but this 
observation might give us an answer: a lexical root ‘pops into’ our mind as a response to some sort of linguistic or 
sensory input, which sets us off on a path which ultimately leads to us forming a thought about that (or a related) 
topic. 
40 Note that this means that reference in human language is inherently mediated by the cycle, again unlike 
reference in animal communication, which is ‘causally-controlled, stimulus-specific, functional as opposed to 
intentional, domain-specific, non-propositional, non-compositional, emotional in content, strictly finite, and 
innately fixed’ (Hinzen, 2013: 15-16). See also Seyfarth and Cheney (2014) and Fitch (2010) on the difference 
between human and non-human animal reference. 
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to fully specify the argument structure e.g. who does what to whom (allowing us to refer to 
events). The phase closes, in each of these cases, when a speaker achieves the amount of 
referential specificity needed for the object or the event. Finally, the third phase can occur. 
Here, structures for describing events (produced at the second phase of the cycle) can be 
finitely tensed (i.e. locating the event in time) and thus become (part of) a truth-evaluable 
proposition. This three-phase process: 
 
[…] yields the essential ontology of semantics: an object, an event, and a proposition 
put forward with a truth value, respectively… No propositional configurations can be 
generated without first generating a verbal one, no verbal one without first generating 
a nominal one… Each phase is thus not only radically finite, but enables reference in 
discourse to an object, an event, or a proposition, depending on which category we 
initially choose in the cycle (Hinzen, 2013: 15). 
 
The presentation given of Hinzen here is obviously brief, and it isn’t my intention to 
defend his claims in this thesis as much as it is to explore the consequences of them with 
reference to the evolution of human imagination and creativity. The rest of this chapter does 
just that. For Hinzen, the implications that follow for human thought more generally from the 
introduction of language are radical: thought driven by the grammatical system just described 
above are thoughts of a different kind to those not driven by that same system. Non-human 
animal thought, therefore, mirrors this difference, lacking the referential functions associated 
with the three phases Hinzen describes. According to Hinzen, it might even be that 
propositional minds simply cannot evolve in the absence of this computational cycle, which 
would suggest a radical discontinuity between human and non-human animal thought.41 It is my 
contention that it is therefore precisely this ability to generate thoughts referring to objects, 
events and propositions – a result of the emergence of narrow syntax within human evolution – 
and coming to externalise these thoughts in a natural language preserving their distinctive 
semantics that augmented human imagination. This position is implied in the work of Francois 
Jacob, who sees the infinite representational power of language as centrally involved in the 
moulding our notion of reality through the “mental creation of possible worlds” (Jacob, 1982: 																																																								
41 I’m not sure whether I actually wish to commit myself to this claim. What would be required to persuade me 
otherwise would be an account of how animal thought could gain propositional structure and yet still lack the 
flexible referential capacities that seem unique to human beings. It seems that having truth-functional, belief-like 
states may occur in the absence of language (e.g. Dennett, 1995) but animal communication seems to betray an 
inflexibility in referential function. This absence may be because animals do not need to communicate certain kinds 
of thoughts, but any suggestion along these lines is purely speculative. 
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59). I turn to the issue of precisely how language augments our imaginative capacities now, 
leaving until Chapter 4 the issue of why the imagination, specifically, would co-opt this new 
linguistic ability. 
 
3. What does language bring to human creative cognition? 
 
The capacity for language described above would bring about a variety of cognitive 
changes that could impact upon human imagination and creativity. I sketch out below some of 
the key changes relevant to this thesis, but this is not intended as an exhaustive list of changes, 
nor as a full defence of each of these claims. 
 
§3.1 An unbounded creative computational mechanism 
 
Noticeably, the explanation of how we choose to categorise a lexical root at the onset of 
the computational cycle i.e. at the first phase, is left unexplained by Hinzen (see footnote 38 
above). It is essentially in attempting to answer this question (before eventually throwing up his 
hands in surrender) that Chomsky utilises the term ‘the creative aspect of language use’ – an 
attempt to describe the essentially unpredictable nature of human language-use.	For Chomsky, 
the creative aspect of language use is the “central fact to which any significant linguistic theory 
must address itself [thus] a theory of language that neglects this ‘creative’ aspect is of only 
marginal interest” (Chomsky, 1964: 7-8). ‘The creative aspect of language use’ refers in part to 
the ability, which all normal language-users display evidence of every day, to produce and 
understand an infinite number of novel sentences. Chomsky (2009) identifies the philosophical 
roots of his discussion of the creative aspect of language use in the Cartesian view that this 
ability to form new sentences expressing thoughts in an appropriate but not directly causal 
manner is what distinguishes human beings from other animals. This observation led Descartes 
to propose the thesis that this must entail a form of substance dualism, realising that: 	
…a fully adequate psychology requires the postulation of a ‘creative principle’ 
alongside of the ‘mechanical principle’ that suffices to account for all other aspects of 
the inanimate and animate world and for a significant range of human actions and 
‘passions’ as well (Chomsky, 2009: 61). 	 	
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 In Chomsky’s view (shared by Descartes), because language-use appears not to be 
determined by external stimuli or internal physiological states (posing an initial problem for 
attempts to scientifically explain language), language ‘can serve as a general instrument of 
thought and self-expression rather than merely as a communicative device of report, request or 
command’ (Chomsky, 2009: 64). As we have seen, Hinzen favours a stronger view: language is 
actually generative of the precise ontological distinctions that characterise human thought and 
that are ultimately expressed in natural language. 		 The creative aspect of language use does not refer only to the infinitude of possible 
sentences which a generative grammar enables. Chomsky has been careful to stress this 
throughout his work, though this fact seems to have been missed by some critics (see below). 
‘Unboundedness’ certainly is one feature that makes it apt to describe language use as ‘creative’ 
(cohering, as it does, with the originality criterion for creativity; see Chapter 1), but it is not 
the only feature of language, nor is it unique to language. Because generative grammars posit a 
recursive principle (i.e. Merge) they are able to make infinite use of finite means by embedding 
structural objects within other instances of themselves. For instance, there doesn’t appear to be 
any logical limit to how many place concepts we can embed within other place concepts in a 
sentence. Consider, for example, ‘... in the wood by the caravan park behind the hill to the 
north of the wall…’ etc. These recursive structures are present also in the set of natural 
numbers and in music (see Jackendoff and Lerdahl, 2006, and footnote 6 above). What this 
suggests is that the principles that govern language might be operating in domains other than 
language (and thus not really be language-specific), and this seems to be the view currently 
favoured by the Minimalists. 	
 D'Agostino (1984) terms this kind of infinitude linguistic productivity. One notable thing 
about linguistic productivity is that a computer could be programmed with the appropriate 
grammatical rules of a given language in order to generate novel sentences; novel both in the 
sense that that computer has never generated that sentence before, and in the sense that a given 
sentence has never been uttered by any user of that language previously. It is because of this 
thought that Boden (1994) claims that Chomsky has misappropriated the term ‘creative’ – 
mere novelty is insufficient for creativity. But beyond infinitude, Chomsky has emphasised the 
freedom from stimulus-control of language. This contrasts sharply with other forms of animal 
communication, even in our closest primate relatives (see Tomasello, 2010), whose 
communicative output is triggered in a one-to-one way by particular stimuli (seeing an eagle, 
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for instance, will always and only illicit an ‘eagle alarm call’ in vervet monkeys, and will 
continue to do so even after the signal ceases to be useful). Thus, despite Boden’s criticism, 
Chomsky’s use of the term ‘creative aspect of language use’ has always been qualified so as to 
stress other features of language in describing its creativity. As Chomsky puts it: 	
One would not refer to an act as “creative” simply on the basis of its novelty and 
independence of identifiable drives or stimuli. Hence the term “creative aspect of 
language use” is not entirely appropriate, without qualification (Chomsky, 1966: note 
30). 	
Human language is ‘guided but not determined by internal state and external 
conditions’ (Chomsky, 1999: 17) such that a further feature of the creative aspect of language 
use is appropriateness to circumstances. Human language use is uncaused, unlike animal 
communication, but is also (typically) recognised as appropriate by other language users.42 
D’Agostino terms this ability to produce novel sentences in a way appropriate to, though 
undetermined by, circumstance, Cartesian creativity. It is precisely the phenomenon of Cartesian 
creativity which Chomsky believes cannot be explained by any straightforwardly behaviouristic 
account.43 	
 This distinction between linguistic productivity and Cartesian creativity is important, 
especially given some of the criticisms aimed at Chomsky on the issue of creativity. For 
instance, Drach (1981) has criticised Chomsky for claiming that while aspects of linguistic 
competence might be explained, the creative aspect involved in performance will always 
remain a mystery. However, this claim is unsurprising when we consider that linguistic 
productivity appears to involve no more than making use of the mechanisms which enable the 
generation of novel sentences (an issue of competence), but that Cartesian creativity further 
involves appropriateness to circumstances (an issue of performance). As Chomsky puts it: 	
The rules and principles of grammar “provide the means” for the [creative aspect of 
language use], thus shedding light on it, but not giving anything like a full account of it, 
and not resolving the mysteries it poses (Chomsky, 1982: 425). 																																																								
42 Of course, propriety when discussing language-use needs to be construed broadly enough to include linguistic 
ambiguities such as allusions, metaphors, irony, etc. 
43 This thought also forms the basis of Chomsky’s defence of free will (Chomsky, 1999). 
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So, in the first instance, narrow syntax provides us with a computational mechanism 
for generating an infinitude of novel sentences. But that mechanism appears to operate 
independently of external stimuli and internal states to the extent that they do not determine its 
operations. Nonetheless, we usually deploy it in a way which is appropriately responsive to 
these states. Given the complexity of this dynamic relationship between the computational 
mechanism and the multiplicity of internal and external states, the output of this computational 
mechanism is highly unpredicatable. Thus, what language ultimately gives us is a way to 
generate sentences that are, to some extent, themselves (minimally) creative – even before 
they are deployed in highly creative ways, as they are in poetry, metaphor or storytelling. 
 
§3.2 Truth 
 
 As long ago as 1651, Thomas Hobbes realised that language brings with it some rather 
important cognitive changes. Hobbes observed that: 
 
When two Names are joined together into a Consequence, or Affirmation; as thus, A 
man is a living creature… If the later name Living creature signifie all that the former name 
Man signifieth, then the affirmation, or consequence is true; ortherwise false. For True 
and False are attributes of Speech, not of Things. And where Speech is not, there is 
neither Truth nor Falshood (Hobbes, 1651 (1985): 104-5). 
 
If correct, Hobbes’ observation here describes a major cognitive shift once language 
appears with our species.44 Hobbes is claiming here that the concept of TRUTH emerges with 
language – once our thoughts are given a specifically linguistic structure (a subject-predicate 
form in his example) then those thoughts can be judged to be true or false. Conversely, in the 
absence of such a structure, thought-content is without a truth-value from the subject’s 
perspective. As we saw in Chapter 1 (§3.1), propositional imagining (e.g. Yablo, 1993) is 
																																																								
44 Though Hobbes uses the term ‘speech’ here, he must be, in fact, talking about language as Hobbes sees language 
as expressive of thought. Clearly, in order to form a proposition some kind of language is required to give it the 
sort of subject-predicate structure he indicates in the passage just quoted. If this isn’t natural language, it is still 
some kind of language that must share structural features with natural language. Speech is simply the mode of 
externalisation of this linguistically-structured thought; given that thoughts can be true or false just as much as 
utterances can, TRUTH must emerge at the level of thought, not at the level of externalisation. 
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defined by its capacity to generate such truth-bearing structures, and thus this imaginative 
capacity too must emerge with language. 
 
Although approaching language from a different perspective, the view that truth 
emerges with language is one shared by Wolfram Hinzen (2007, Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013), as 
noted above. Hinzen, like many contemporary philosophers of truth, rejects the suggestion that 
words are arbitrary symbols that relate to an external physical object, wherein the relation gives 
the meaning of the symbol (the Hobbesian view). This kind of approach suggests, for instance, 
that a predicate like ‘wise’ picks out a property like ‘wisdom’, and that a sentence like ‘Socrates 
is wise’ somehow mirrors another external object – a ‘state of affairs’ or ‘fact’. Hinzen sees this 
view of word-external object relations as non-explanatory, if such relations exist at all: 
 
No doubt mentally represented (non-acoustic) properties of linguistic expressions 
stand in various causal relations with external physical patterns in the environment… 
But these causal relations make as such virtually no contribution to the explanation of 
forms of intentionality we find in humans specifically… As things stand, we are the 
only creature [that] intentionally refers, which clearly is a function of our internal 
mental organization – the kind of mind we have (Hinzen, 2007: 2-3). 
 
In other words, the kind of causal relations in which a creature comes to stand are 
(amongst other things) a result of its internal mental organisation. As such, our mind doesn’t 
simply mirror predication ‘out there’ in the world, predication instead exists because our 
minds happen to exhibit it. 
 
Hinzen extends this approach to the notion of truth. Hinzen rejects the correspondence 
theory of truth, which suggests that truth is correspondence to reality; Hinzen points out that this 
again assumes that declarative sentences get their meaning from their relation to a mind-
external fact (or ‘truth-maker’) whose structure somehow mirrors that of the sentence or the 
proposition expressed by it, inviting further questions about the metaphysical status of such 
facts. More recently, the correspondence theory has come to be replaced by ‘deflationist’ 
theories, which suggest that truth carries no metaphysical significance at all i.e. theories that 
suggest that there is no property of truth at all, and thus sentences like ‘X is true’ are equivalent 
to simply asserting X (see, for example, Ramsey, 1927a). But, both correspondence and 
deflationist theories follow an externalist path to their account of truth; Hinzen’s view is, by 
	 104 
contrast, an internalist one – looking, as it does, to the inherent structures of the human mind to 
explain truth. As such, notions of truth (and reference) are turned on their head from those in 
the more familiar philosophical literature. This may perhaps be a more appealing approach to 
the issue than the eliminativist approach of Tarski (1944) or the nihilism of Ramsey (1927b) 
since, for Hinzen, an internalist approach to truth avoids some of the circularity of the 
externalist explanations of it.45 For instance, when pressed on the nature of the correspondence 
relation between a proposition and reality, the relation turns out to be one which makes the 
proposition true. But this depends upon a prior understanding of what truth is, rather than 
explicating it. Hinzen’s internalist approach avoids this circularity by engaging with the concept 
of truth differently: instead of seeking to define it, it simply pursues a naturalistic inquiry into 
the phenomenon of truth, a concept shared across our species – a ‘semantic primitive’ (Hinzen, 
2007: 13) – and evident in the judgements we make about sentences with a particular 
structure. 
 
Crucially, thoughts which take the relevant form for such judgements involve a kind of 
distancing between ourselves and our world. Historically, philosophical discussions of 
intentional thought have stressed the notion that intentionality invokes a relation between 
thought and the world. But much human thought involves abstract objects with no perceptual 
content, such as fairness, joy, social progress, or truth itself. Even when it is directed at the 
external world, it involves a degree of abstraction from what the external world actually gives 
us – such as when we think of love, wars, famine, cities, and people. These concepts, in turn, 
shape how we experience the world around us. Whereas animal (language-like) behaviour (and 
arguably thought) is determined by a stimulus, ensuring they adaptively react to it, human 
thought and linguistic behaviour is not. A propositional form of thought i.e. one that takes the 
subject-predicate form yielded by language, is actually capable of ‘objectifying’ a stimulus, 
allowing us to structure (and infinitely restructure) our experience as a thought we can make a 
variety of truth judgements about. 
 
These truth-evaluable sentences are formed in the way described above – proceeding 
through the phase cycle computation until something emerges which either has the appropriate 
structure for a judgement of truth, or which lacks that appropriate structure. Noun phrases 																																																								
45 For my more practical purposes here i.e. showing that truth is inherently connected to language, it doesn’t 
particularly matter which theory of truth turns out to be the correct one, just so long as the link between language 
and thought posited above is correct, since all of the usual candidates for ‘truth-bearers’ – sentences, propositions, 
utterances, beliefs – are (on this account) essentially linguistically structured. 
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(e.g. ‘Bob’s pushing of Alan’) and Small Clauses (which have the semantic subject-predicate 
characteristics of a clause, but lack the tense of a finite clause), for example, lack the necessary 
structure.46 Nothing less than a clause can have a truth value (Hinzen and Sheehan, 2013). If our 
phase cycle involves [PUSH, Bob (Agent), Alan  (Patient)], then this could develop into the 
noun phrase above, ‘Bob’s pushing of Alan’, and close off without yielding a truth-evaluable 
sentence. However, if this root (PUSH) is categorised as a verb and tensed e.g. ‘Bob pushed 
Alan’, and reaches the required level of referential specificity required for the current 
discourse, it does become truth-evaluable.47 
 
Being able to abstract from the world’s influence over our behaviour, and instead 
reflect upon it in terms of truth or falsity is surely the very basis of theory-making. High levels 
of creativity within the sciences and technology require this capacity in a way that adaptive tool-
use and tool-making (such as when chimpanzees use a stick to ‘fish’ for termites) simply do not. 
This capacity would enable us to build upon the naïve physics and biology of our evolutionary 
ancestors (see Ch. 2, §3.4), relying as they must have on perceptual similarity, to develop far 
more robust theories about cause and effect in nature. 
 
Because of the way the phase cycle operates, the lexical root itself does not determine 
the semantic content of a sentence. Instead, the beginning of the semantic content of a sentence 
comes in selecting how the root will be categorised (as nominal, verbal or clausal) and 
semantics gets into place as syntax does. Given that this is the case, it seems that judgements 
about truth or falsity can occur only once the relevant cycles have occurred, meaning that we 
form thoughts of this structure in the absence of commitments to their truth or falsity. It is 
precisely this kind of computational cycle that seems to be required for the generation of 
thoughts we can entertain as part of the propositional imagination (and, presumably, if they lack 
commitments to their truth or falsity, they can also lack any conative aspect, commitments to 
desirability etc). As Reuland (2010) puts it: 
 
 
																																																								
46 An example of a Small Clause is in the sentence ‘Larry pounded the nail flat’. Here, the small clause is in bold, 
and the underlined word functions as a predicate over the nominal immediately to the left. 
47 Referential specificity here might involve pragmatics as well as syntax. Clearly, if the context of the utterance of 
‘Bob pushed Alan’ is one in which the two interlocutors have just witnessed the event, it is clear who (which 
‘Bob’, ‘Alan’) they are talking about and which pushing event (the ‘when’). This is a clear instance in which 
perceptual information from the outside world can be objectified and become part of rational discourse. 
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The crucial evolutionary advantage of language is that it allows combinatory operations 
to apply blindly, irrespective of preconceived meaning. This has an important 
consequence: it enables unconstrained creativity; combine and see what the result 
means later, escaping the limits of the here and now (ibid: 101). 
 
Reuland describes this process of using the formal rules of narrow syntax to combine 
symbols irrespective of meaning desymbolisation: where the symbols in the system are effectively 
separated (temporarily) from what they symbolise, allowing us to combine them in any way we 
choose and then interpret the result (in other words, the phase cycle operates on instructions to 
create a symbol, rather than on the symbols themselves). This is what allows us to “ignore 
common sense, play with expectations, express the inconceivable, escape from the here and 
now, and create poetry” (ibid.) So, what Hinzen describes is the perfect computational system 
for the generation of thoughts bearing all of the hallmarks of the propositional imagination. As 
such, the emergence of language would enable the emergence of a powerful imaginative tool to 
be used in mental-world-creation. I will suggest in Chapters 4 and 5 that this capacity would 
lead to a dramatic cultural effect that would, in turn, drive human creativity rapidly and in very 
particular directions. 
 
§3.3 Deception and Theory of Mind 
 
Another area in which humans might become more adept as a result of imaginative 
capacities enriched by linguistic cognition is in deception. Sodian and Frith (1992) distinguish 
between deception and sabotage, with sabotage a matter of disrupting a conspecific’s ability to 
attain some goal without requiring any kind of theory of mind, and deception a matter of 
deliberately aiming to cause false beliefs.48 It happens to be the case that mindreading capacities 
(a form of imaginative projection) mature in line with linguistic ones (Fitch, 2010), possibly as 
a consequence of the enhanced representational powers that language confers (see below). As 
such, with the co-introduction of an understanding of false beliefs and an ability to freely 
produce a potentially infinite number of utterances that could deceive, humans could become 
more creative in the social domain in terms of how they manipulate one another (which poses 
something of a puzzle about the selection of language by evolution). So, for instance, we might 																																																								
48 Currie, 2004, suggests that we can regard some animal behaviour as deceptive even in the absence of any 
mindreading skills. The general point here is that, however we draw the distinction, the kind of deceptive 
behaviour that draws on such skills is of a distinct kind to that which doesn’t. 
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easily come to understand that our own judgements of truth and falsity can turn out to be 
incorrect, and we could observe from the behaviour of others that their beliefs are likewise 
incorrect. Once natural language is in place, we could generate propositions we know (or 
believe) to be false and express these linguistically to our conspecifics in the hope of causing 
some behaviour we take to be desirable (developing significantly upon any capacity for 
deception that our evolutionary ancestors might have had; see Ch.2, §3.2). 
 
There may even be a stronger link between the emergence of narrow syntax and theory 
of mind than the one just intimated above. de Villiers (2005) argues that children are brought 
to the point of mastery of the human ‘mind-reading’ capacity through the grasp of specific 
syntactic forms of language i.e. finite sentential complements embedded under verbs like ‘say’, 
‘think’ or ‘believe’. On her view, conceptual maturation co-occurs with syntactic maturation. 
Gleitman et al. (2005) suggest that syntax may even play a causal role in the acquisition of such 
verbs. If this is the case, accounts of the evolution of language that suggest that syntax might 
simply be an arbitrary cultural device resulting from a more general set of cognitive capacities 
like Theory of Mind might find this challenging to explain.49 More to the point, this would give 
language (in the sense relevant here) a more fundamental role in the development of human 
social interaction than is often assumed. 
 
§3.4 A shift in cognitive style 
 
Narrow syntax offers a computationally minimal way of generating these propositions, 
with possibly just a single operation, Merge (Chomsky et al., 2000), ultimately underpinning the 
cycle described above. Such a simple computational operation capable of accessing information 
in any domain of human activity, and capable of working with a range of abstract ideas, if not 
enabling new kinds of thought, would surely make them far easier to process than their pre-
linguistic equivalents. The generative process described above also seems to lend itself to 
greater executive control over our imagination. Dor (2015) describes language as an 
‘imagination-instructing system’, in that it allows us to compose a sentence whose structure 
(and even its individual symbols, see footnote 38) can direct us toward picturing some 
particular thing. Propositional imagining can thus lead to other kinds of imagining, like 																																																								
49 Though certainly not impossible – if syntax is biologically grounded, it must first have been visible to evolution 
to be selected for. If it was initially an arbitrary cultural device, it might have subsequently become biologically 
grounded and then come to play a role in the acquisition for our theory of mind capacity as our cognitive style 
shifted to favour a linguistic one.	
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objectual imagining. This would seem to give us a capacity to direct our imagination that would 
be presumably absent in non-linguistic creatures. If animals can, despite lacking language, 
imagine states of affairs, they might have much more limited ability to do so because the 
generative system might be computationally ‘heavier’ since it is not operating over symbols that 
have been decoupled from semantic and conative content. Although it is impossible to know, if 
animal imagination computes with semantically and/or conatively loaded symbols then their 
ability to freely direct this will be much more limited as those semantic and conative aspects 
cloud their thinking. Animal imagination might, perhaps, be more like some kinds of memory – 
involuntarily triggered by things in the immediate environment. For humans, however, an 
internal language is part of our environment (in that we constantly talk to ourselves), and 
would give us far greater control over what we imagine. This would, in turn, confer great 
advantages in terms of planning, giving evolution reasons to select for language. 
 
The computational process underpinning language may therefore have been selected 
for in evolution primarily because of the advantages this confers in terms of planning 
(Chomsky, 2007b), but could have been co-opted for computational processing in a range of 
domains. For instance, there have been some attempts to suggest that musical cognition utilises 
the same computational principle(s) as language (e.g. Lerdahl and Jackendoff, 1983) – 
reflecting the shared neurological basis between music and language suggested by the musical 
impairments to aphasic patients, which I will discuss in Chapter 6 – though there is some 
dispute about the order of priority between music and language (Mithen, 2005, and Tallerman, 
2013 both argue that musical cognition formed the basis of some kind of musical protolanguage 
in pre-cursor hominids). 
 
The suggestion that language aids cognitive processing does not only apply at the 
syntactic level. There is evidence to suggest that even at the level of ‘labelling’ this can impact 
upon success rates for task completion, even in animals. Various studies show that chimpanzees 
can better differentiate between food quantities once they have learned to associate numerical 
labels with particular quantities (e.g. Boysen and Berntson, 1989). Pre-cursor hominids are 
widely thought to have possessed some form of protolanguage (Fitch, 2010), suggesting that 
they were quite adept at creating abstract categories and labelling them in the way that seems to 
make these chimpanzees better able to differentiate quantities. It might be, then, that the 
development of the linguistic capacities shared with non-human animals and our ancestors 
gradually ramped up cognitive capacities that could be co-opted for the imagination. Homo 
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ergaster, for example, appears to have evolved visual imaginative capacities beyond that of Homo 
erectus that are evident in the differences between the stone-knapping techniques of the two. 
This may be attributable to enhanced abilities to conceptualise their environment, seen also in 
how quickly these later hominids were able to adapt to new ecological niches despite the 
perceptual differences between the flora which made up part of their diet (Stringer, 2002). At 
the point that these concepts are introduced to syntax, they take on a whole new character, 
forming referential propositions capable of being assessed as true or false. 
 
Being able to see the world as structured syntactically may have increased our ability to 
rapidly extract information from a given scene and recognise similarity elsewhere. de Villiers 
(2014), for example, found that when participants of a study were asked to examine an image 
of an event (for instance, a man pushing a woman in a wheelchair) their ability to recognise a 
similar event in a set of pictures subsequently shown to them decreased significantly when their 
language faculty was tied up in another task.50 I propose in Chapter 6 that we could conduct a 
similar experiment to test our ability to fantasise in the absence of language in order to show 
the strong connection between the two. One possible conclusion we could draw from de 
Villiers’ experiment is that, when processing perceptual information extracted from a scene, 
we can do so more quickly and accurately with language at our disposal. If this is the case, it 
would make sense that we would come to lean more heavily on the new cognitive style that 
language offers us, rather than the evolutionarily more ancient ones that run alongside it. As we 
come to do so, we’d come to utilise the propositional imagination more and more, very 
possibly at the expense of the visual imagination, shifting with it the nature of our creative 
output to ones which involve language more heavily. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter has set out both the understanding of ‘language’ that is relevant to this 
thesis and the computational mechanism upon which all human language appears to be based. 
With that computational mechanism in place, we were able to sketch out some of the key 
cognitive shifts such a mechanism would yield, and how these could be co-opted by the 
imagination. Having suggested that language offers so much to the imagination, we once again 
arrive back at the puzzle of why it seems to have taken so long for us to begin exhibiting the full 																																																								
50 There are numerous methodological difficulties with this particular study noted by de Villiers, however. 
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range of creative behaviours that would seem possible once this cognitive infrastructure was in 
place. My answer to this question will now be developed in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4 
FANTASY & LANGUAGE 
How and why did fantasy drive the evolution of language? 
 
Introduction 
 
 In the previous chapter, I set out a number of cognitive differences the emergence of 
fully-syntactic human language would have made to our species. It was argued that the advent 
of language brought with it a new concept, TRUTH, bringing with it the capacity for 
propositional imagining. It was also suggested that, because of its computational simplicity and 
unbounded generativity, we would come to favour linguistic thought over its non-linguistic 
precursors. Yet these changes are all internal, while the creative shifts in our species that we’re 
looking to explain here (see Ch. 2, Fig. 1) are all very much outwardly manifest. How did these 
cognitive changes lead to rapid technological advancements and the emergence of 
representational art? The next two chapters offer an answer to that question – that answer 
being that the new cognitive possibilities for the imagination brought about by the evolution of 
language were co-opted in the form of fantastic imaginings that would ultimately lead to a 
culture of story-telling. This culture reinforced and expedited our shift toward a linguistic 
mode of cognition, but also changed the nature of creative invention itself. Developing this 
answer requires that we now revisit the notion of fantasy. 
 
1. Refining Fantasy 
 
 In Chapter 1 we saw that Freud viewed fantasy as a kind of wish-fulfilment: it is 
imagining the manifestation of our ambitions i.e. for sex, for work etc. In Freud’s view, works 
of popular fiction are expressions of this process – they reveal the author’s desires. Gaut, by 
contrast, sought to separate fantasy from imagination: imagination lacks the intrinsic ends of 
fantasy in that we aren’t committed to desiring or believing the thing imagined. Fantasy, by 
contrast, necessarily involves the conative aspect. Fantasy, for Gaut, is necessarily goal-oriented: 
the goal being to enhance our enjoyment. Entertaining our desires through fantasy brings with 
it some of the rewards of actually accomplishing what we desire.51 We saw that Scruton, by 																																																								
51 According to Gaut, it is because imagination is absent in such commitments that it is ‘peculiarly suited’ as the 
vehicle of active creativity - searching out various solutions and consciously trying out different approaches to solve a 
problem. Yet it is worth pointing out that this kind of imaginative act in turn requires a generative mechanism i.e. 
some mode of thought capable of providing the varied solutions and approaches the imagination entertains. What 
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contrast, views the particular goal of fantasy as escape rather than enjoyment, with imagination 
taking up the task of attaining a better understanding of reality. I want to address some of these 
points here and suggest that much more work needs to be done to refine our understanding of 
the relationship between fantasy and imagination (particularly because I suggested, with Currie 
and Ravenscroft, that fantasy is a way of imagining). Doing so, I argue, can carve out a more 
significant role for fantasy than has been previously acknowledged. 
 
§1.1 Fantasy and Desire 
 
 As I suggested in Chapter 1, because of its association with desire, there’s a tendency in 
the philosophical and psychological literature to denigrate fantasy’s usefulness. Perhaps this is 
because we think the mere satiation of desires is base, whereas imaginative engagement with a 
practical problem yields tangible benefits and imaginative engagement with works of art leads 
to intellectual enlightenment. Yet it seems to me that no imagining can get off the ground 
without desire, at least inasmuch as it is desire that motivates us to act, even if that action is one 
of imagining. We desire a solution to the practical problem, and we desire a greater 
understanding of the world, and so we imaginatively engage in appropriate ways to achieve 
these things. Simply examining what motivates fantasising and what motivates imagining isn’t 
likely to tell us much about the differences in the acts themselves, any more than looking at 
what motivates somebody to play snooker rather than tennis will tell us anything about those 
sports. Instead, we must look at the content of fantasies and imaginings to try and note any 
instructive differences. 
 
 The suggestion common to Freud and Gaut is that the content of fantasy is focused on 
its conative aspect: we imagine getting what we want. A sexual fantasy, for instance, is imagining 
having sex with the particular person (or persons) we desire. A gastronomic fantasy might be 
imagining eating a delicious piece of hot chocolate fudge cake. The success of a given fantasy is, 
therefore, determined by how closely it simulates its counterpart in reality (even if the goal is 
itself unrealistic or unattainable – for instance, fantasizing about eating a long-extinct animal). 
Gaut explains this as follows: 																																																																																																																																																														
is notable about human creativity is the seemingly endless ways in which we can solve and re-solve the same 
problems, from the utensils we use to eat to how to systematise a one-person, one-vote democracy. The 
generative mechanism described in the previous chapter stands out as the strongest possible candidate, allowing, as 
it does, an infinitude of possible combinations of ideas that are computed first and evaluated afterwards (thus 
lacking any commitments to truth or credulity or desirability until that evaluation has taken place). 
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I can aim, for instance, to imagine whatever is required to make me feel good about 
myself and to give me pleasure. That is the central aim of personal fantasy. However, 
even in this case my imagination does not operate in a normatively unconstrained 
fashion: for what I should imagine is determined by my goal of maximizing personal 
pleasure. If I find myself imagining scenes of personal misery and humiliation, I have 
failed in my project of fantasizing. The constraints on what and how one should 
imagine are fixed then by one’s goal in imagining (Gaut, 2007: 152). 
 
 Gaut here identifies the goal of personal fantasy: imagining satisfying one’s own desires. 
No doubt such a kind of fantasy exists, and its entire and only purpose may be (partial) satiation 
of our personal desires. But this leaves open the possibility that we can develop the notion of 
impersonal fantasy, which may contrast with personal fantasy in numerous ways. 
 
 The term ‘impersonal fantasy’ is not entirely new: it crops up in discussions of sexual 
fantasy in the psychological literature, and is used to describe fantasies involving looking at 
obscene images and watching other people have sex (in, for example, Wilson and Lang, 1981). 
What is being described as ‘impersonal’ in the latter case here is presumably the idea of viewing 
a scene in our imagination from the ‘outside’ i.e. we aren’t part of the scene that provides the 
gratification, so it is impersonal inasmuch as we are not part of the scene we imagine. Other 
examples of ‘impersonal’ fantasy given involve using an object for stimulation and sex with 
strangers. This sense of ‘impersonal’ seems to be that of lacking particular affection for the 
person or object that provides the gratification i.e. a lack of emotional connection. So there 
seems to be two senses in which fantasies could be impersonal according to Wilson and Lang: if 
the fantasy involves a third-person perspective and/or there is no personal connection to the 
object of gratification. 
 
 While this notion of fantasy might still ultimately be about satiation of (sexual) desires, 
it is noticeably distinct from another kind of sexual fantasy Wilson and Lang identify, intimate 
fantasies. i.e. those that involve intimacy, such as fantasising about a person we love. Such 
fantasies would certainly count as personal fantasies on Gaut’s definition. But Wilson and Lang 
also identify a group of fantasies they describe as exploratory – those that involve group sex, 
promiscuity and homosexuality. What makes these exploratory (though their account is scant 
on explanatory detail) appears to be the fact that they take us beyond the norm: we explore 
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unfamiliar situations via the fantasy (so, we imagine what it would be like, or what would be 
enjoyable about having sex with multiple partners or someone of the same gender). And whilst 
they add sadomasochistic fantasies as a final grouping of sexual fantasies, this final grouping are 
arguably also exploratory and/or impersonal. Sadomasochistic fantasies include being forced to 
have sex; if rape is necessarily non-consensual, then fantasies of rape seem to somehow fall 
short of this if they are somehow meant to reflect the actual desires of the person having the 
fantasy. It would seem that either the fantasy is imagined from an impersonal perspective, or 
that it is an exploration of a situation beyond the norm. The notion of impersonal fantasy here 
is, I want to suggest, instructive. Most noticeably, it has features that are characteristic of 
narratives. When we develop a narrative it is often done from a third-person perspective, and 
quite often is about people or things to which we have no personal connection. These narratives 
might provide gratification to us, and thus ultimately be a reflection of personal desire, but 
nonetheless differ to personal fantasies bound up with intimacy. Impersonal fantasies might also 
objectify the self, allowing us to become part of an imagined scene to which we have no 
personal connection, yet which still gratifies us by allowing us to explore an unfamiliar situation 
– again, a characteristic feature of many narratives. I will return to the significance of narratives 
in the next chapter. At this point, we need only note that our fantasies might not involve either 
ourselves or things or people we regard with any affection. I think this suggests something 
beyond that which Freud and Gaut regard as fantasy. 
 
 Given that personal fantasy is necessarily bound up with our personal desires, it is 
worth exploring the possibility that impersonal fantasy might not be strictly subject to this same 
bind. One way in which this could be the case is if personal fantasy was mere escapism (see 
§1.2). Another way, however, would be to suggest that impersonal fantasy could be an 
imaginative exercise in which we engage in fantasy from another person’s perspective; that is to 
say, we simulate the satiation of someone else’s desires. As such, fantasy is still bound to desire, only 
in this case to someone else’s (imagined) desire. 
 
 We engage in this kind of activity often, though not always in an indulgent manner. 
Acts of kindness, for example, are often motivated by understanding the desires of others. Such 
an understanding can be gained through adopting the beliefs and desires of another person, and 
then imagining how their desires would be satisfied by choosing certain courses of action (see 
Stotland, 1969 on how empathy can be enhanced by asking the experimental subject to imagine 
the feelings of an observed person in a given situation instead of focusing on the situational 
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facts). Buying Christmas gifts for my family requires this process of me on an annual basis – I 
can imagine what it would be like to enjoy golf, Christian rock music, or zombie movies, and 
then consider whether I would enjoy receiving this or that gift. We could do this via 
suppositional reasoning about the bare facts (if x likes Z, and Y is similar to Z, then x should 
like Y), but (when done right) a more effective way to choose gifts would involve considering 
someone else’s desires (rather than their behavioural tendencies). Simulating the fantasies of 
another would be an extension of this kind of imaginative process. What would be the benefit 
of such a process? If personal fantasies are connected to intimate desires, then such desires are 
likely to be revealing about that person’s character, and thus give us a greater understanding of 
them.52 Simulating another person’s fantasies is therefore a useful way of exploring the 
psychology of our conspecifics – whether those desires relate to sex, food, social status, or any 
other thing which might be greatly desired. This is useful both in building social bonds with our 
closest friends and family, but equally useful in getting a greater understanding of our rivals. 
 
§1.2 Fantasy and Escape 
 
 Another way in which we could conceive of impersonal fantasy is where fantasy is 
about escaping reality, rather than imagining satiation of our desires. It is true that there could 
be some overlap here: indulging ourselves in an alternate reality in which our desires are 
satisfied is one way to escape our reality. But it seems to me that there are plenty of examples 
in which we indulge in escapism to worlds that are simply unlike our own, rather than more 
desirable. The popularity of the fantasy genre of books, television and movies is a testament to 
this. Currently the most popular show on TV is Game of Thrones, but the world depicted in that 
show is certainly no more desirable than our own. We might be forgiven for thinking that 
people who enjoy such texts do so because they identify with the heroes of these stories, and 
thus imagine themselves walking in that particular character’s shoes. However, this particular 
show is notorious for the proximity within which tragedy and heroism live in the fantasy world 
it creates, so it is unlikely that anyone actually desires vicarious escape through those 
characters. It is more likely that it is simply entertaining and enjoyable to engage with a world 																																																								
52 We appear to engage with works of fiction in a similar way. Currie (1997) argues that we empathise with 
fictional characters by simulating their beliefs and desires, and Miall (2011) suggests that our body follows suit, 
physically responding to the fictions we engage with in such a way as to suggest we put ourselves in the shoes of 
another person. I suggest we use this capacity in many daily examples like the gift-giving one above: in persuading 
someone to do something they’re reluctant to do, in trying to reassure someone who is confronting something 
they’re afraid of, in watching tragic events unfold on the news and deciding to donate to a related charity, and so 
on. 
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that is radically unlike our own (containing, as it does, magic and dragons).53 Fantasy for the 
purpose of escapism, then, might not be bound to our desires in the way that personal fantasy 
is. It may even be the case that some fantasy worlds are simply too unrealistic to be desirable – 
they require too much suspension of belief from us. 
 
  There is something else worth noting about the view of fantasy as escapism. We saw in 
Chapter 1 that Currie and Ravenscroft disagreed with Scruton’s distinction between fantasy and 
imagination. In their view, fantasising to escape and imagining to attain a better understanding 
of reality are just the imagination put to different uses. I’m inclined to agree that both are kinds 
of imaginings, and clearly both do aim at different things. But I think this also skips over an 
important question: can fantasizing actually help us achieve a better understanding of reality? If 
this turned out to be the case, then fantasising would carry clear evolutionary benefits because 
of its impact on our ability to function effectively in the real world. 
 
 Gopnik (2005) notes that children as young as 3 spend a not insignificant portion of 
their time inhabiting paracosms – fictional universes with their own political and social systems. 
These may be those gifted publicly to children through movies and literature like Harry Potter or 
Star Wars, but more often than not, they are paracosms of their own making. Much public 
discussion of this phenomenon is centered on the moral implications of creating such worlds for 
children i.e. whether those worlds are suitable for children to inhabit, but given a child’s 
tendency to invent their own paracosms we must question why it is that children are drawn to 
fantasy worlds and, if the escapist view of fantasy is correct, away from reality. 
 
It turns out that the claim that fantasy is some kind of act of escapism (e.g. Scruton, 
Currie and Ravenscroft) isn’t really a solid explanation for fantastic imaginings in childhood. 
Gopnik (2005) argues that it, in fact, tends to be happier, healthier children who spend more 
time immersed in their imaginary worlds, and the work of Freud and Piaget suggesting children 
may not be able to discriminate between reality and fantasy is still unsupported after some 30 
years of empirical research (ibid). Rather than being an attempt to escape reality, Gopnik 
suggests that fantasy is a child’s attempt to comprehend reality. 
 
																																																								
53 Consider, also, our enjoyment of works depicting dystopian fantasies such as Margaret Atwood’s A Handmaid’s 
Tale, George Orwell’s 1984, Anthony Burgess’ A Clockwork Orange, and so on. 
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 Creating fantastic imaginary worlds utilises many of the same cognitive processes as 
theory-building. A scientific theory describes how the world is, but it also does much more 
than that – it makes predictions about how the world was in the past and will be in the future. 
Climate science, for example, describes the rate at which sea levels are currently rising; but it 
also predicts a very bleak near future for human populations living in areas that are currently 
just a few metres above sea level. Theory-building is therefore intimately tied up with the 
process of generating a map of possible worlds, and provides a guide as to how we get from this 
world to each of those possible worlds. Fantasy utilises these same processes to construct 
alternate realities, but it is very probably driven by the same instinct that pushes children to 
constantly ask ‘why?’ about our own world. As Gopnik puts it: 
 
A human being who learns about the real world is also simultaneously learning about all 
the possible worlds that stem from that world. And for human children those 
possibilities are unconstrained by the practical exigencies of adult survival. The link 
between the scientific and the fantastic also explains why children’s fantasy demands 
the strictest logic, consistency, and attention to detail. A fantasy without logic is just a 
mess (Gopnik, 2005). 
 
Gopnik is suggesting that children engage in impersonal fantasy more than adults 
because they are less concerned with the practical issues that consume much adult thought. We 
protect our children from as many concerns as possible to allow them this protracted period of 
immaturity in which they can learn by conceiving of the world in ways limited only by their 
own imagination. This can often backfire – children sometimes build fantastic theories which 
unsettle or frighten them. The squeaky floorboard in the corridor outside must mean that a 
giant has come to steal them from their beds; the shadow in the corner of the room is a 
crocodile waiting to pounce. But even these theories, whilst perhaps not qualifying as fantasies 
under the common definition because they lack the desire component, can be useful mental 
explorations of emotions for a child, allowing them to learn to respond under emotional 
distress without having to be in any real danger. 
 
It seems, then, that the relationship between fantasy and desire, and fantasy and escape, 
is more complex than has previously been suggested. We may construe fantasy in both personal 
and impersonal ways, and in doing so change the relationship that fantasy has to desire. This 
may (I hope) elevate the status of fantasy above that where other philosophers and psychologists 
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have previously placed it. I have suggested that it is useful in developing our social 
understanding when we simulate the fantasies of others. Furthermore, it appears that, rather 
than it being a means of escaping our reality, it is (actually) a way of better comprehending 
reality, giving fantasy a clear and positive role to play in cognition. 
 
2. Fantasy and Language 
 
 It is not enough for this thesis to simply show the general cognitive benefits of fantasy – 
the claim here is that it is a co-evolution of fantasy and language that drives human creativity. It 
is clear that fantasy as an aid to theory-building would be, in and of itself, evolutionarily 
beneficial – making more accurate predictions about how the world around us behaves is the 
basis of our very survival. However, there are other consequences to this fantasy behaviour, and 
some are specifically linguistic ones. To understand the link between language and fantasy, we 
have to return to the discussion in Chapter 2 of the evolution of language. It was briefly 
mentioned in Chapter 2 (§2), that linguist Michael Tomasello (2010) saw the central biological 
adaptations ‘for’ language as non-linguistic; in his view, language falls out of non-linguistic 
adaptations for shared intentions and co-operative behaviour. Tomasello’s ‘cooperation model’ 
of human communication takes as a basis for language shared intentionality.  
 
Tomasello argues that the ‘code’ of natural languages must be derived from shared 
conceptual resources (consider the difficulties Quine’s radical translator faces in the absence of 
such resources; Quine, 1960), and that these resources would have been developed out of 
communicative acts like deictic pointing and pantomiming. Kendon (2004) suggests that this 
kind of human gestural communication functions in essentially two ways: (1) to direct the 
attention of a conspecific to something in the immediate perceptual environment, or (2) to 
direct the imagination of a conspecific to something that (typically) is absent by (iconically) 
simulating an action, relation or object. In the first case, this can be done with a simple point, 
and in the second it may involve a more complex series of steps (miming the action of drinking, 
answering a phone etc.) Tomasello points out that even the simplest of these actions is rich in 
communicative information. For example, if a man catches the attention of a bartender and 
points to his empty glass, it can communicate that the man would like his drink refilled, thus 
directing attention and communicating a request. 
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The cooperation model of language, however, makes a more important observation 
about what is unique about human communication, even in its gestural form. Because, 
Tomasello argues, the basis of human communication is shared intentionality, it has a unique 
form: 
 
[S]hared intentionality refers to behavioural phenomena that are both intentional and 
irreducibly social, in the sense that the agent of the intentions and actions is the plural 
subject “we”… [B]ecause humans are able to engage with one another in acts of shared 
intentionality – everything from a joint walk together to joint participation in 
transforming people into institutional officials – their social interactions take on new 
qualities (Tomasello, 2010: 72-73). 
 
Human beings, uniquely amongst species, have a capacity to create a rich ‘common 
ground’ by considering not only what is in the immediate environment when we communicate, 
but also what is absent, yet still relevant to our conspecifics. This depends upon the process of 
‘recursive mindreading’ – where person A knows that person B knows X, and A also knows 
that B knows that A knows that B knows X, and so on. Tomasello argues that this distinguishes 
human gestural communication, even amongst prelinguistic infants, from great ape gestural 
communication in a key way. Common ground allows our conspecifics to determine not only 
our referential intention, but our social intention too. Consider again the bartender and 
customer; if there is a shared common ground in which the bartender and customer are both 
aware that they attend the same Alcoholics Anonymous meeting, the customer may be pointing 
at his empty glass to indicate that he has managed, after sitting at the bar for quite some time, to 
resist having a drink. Thus common ground takes us beyond our own egocentric perspective on 
the world. 
 
This discussion, and the examples therein, reveal something that is incredibly 
important to note about human language use and communication: we do not only communicate 
to request (help, information), but also to inform and share (information, emotions, attitudes 
etc.) Again, the ability to do this in a stimulus-independent manner (see Ch. 2) is a trait unique 
to human beings and present in pre-linguistic infants. Non-human animals rarely use pointing to 
communicate, but even when they have been trained to do so (a process with a low success 
rate) they typically do so only to request – for instance, pointing to food they want, or at its 
most complex, pointing to a tool they want to help retrieve some food that they want. Human 
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infants, however, point to things from a very early age simply to inform or share. Consider, for 
instance, a young child pointing at an aeroplane in the sky. They do not do this to request that 
we get the aeroplane for them, they do it so that they can direct our attention to something they 
find interesting (and think that we might also find interesting). It is therefore deeply entrenched 
in human communication that we share things of interest. And it is this fact that connects to the 
real usefulness of fantasy for creativity. 
 
Human beings love to share things of interest. As we have seen in §1, fantasy is perhaps 
unique amongst kinds of imagination for its intimate connection with desire – either our own 
or (what we imagine are) someone else’s – so fantasies are presumably of the utmost interest to 
us. This is why, I want to suggest, that we would start externalising both personal and 
impersonal fantasies as soon as it was communicatively possible: we are hardwired to do so, 
both in terms of our communicative needs and in terms of the connection between imaginative 
communication and our reward circuits as observed by Picciuto and Carruthers (2014; see Ch. 
2). Walton (1990) too, as we have seen, also suggests that fantasy is peculiarly enjoyable 
(though he seems to conflate it with daydreaming) because of its ‘spontaneous’ and surprising 
nature. Because of their looser connection with reality, fantasies, like a good joke, can lead us 
in unexpected directions and, like a good joke, they are enjoyable to hear. 
 
The obvious constraint on our capacity and tendency to fantasise early in human 
evolution would be a lack of linguistic resources with which to both have and to communicate 
fantasies. Lacking a ‘fantasy lexicon’ would limit both what we could fantasise about, and how 
rich our fantasies could become.54 For instance, before the term ‘mermaid’ (and its equivalents 
in other languages) entered common parlance, it would be more difficult to communicate 
about a fantasy world involving such creatures. But once the term enters the common lexicon, 
it would be far easier to create imaginary worlds in which some of the inhabitants were 
mermaids, giving us a computationally easy token with which to construct a fantasy and freeing 
up cognitive resources with which to create new ideas to incorporate (like a siren). So the 
process of externalising fantasies would actually make the process of fantasising easier, as well 
as making richer and more varied fantasies possible. 
 																																																								
54 The earliest entries into the ‘fantasy lexicon’ might even have been accidentally created. Consider the suggestion 
in Chapter 1 that dreaming is an evolutionarily ancient kind of imagining, though it is involuntary and spontaneous. 
Perhaps what gave us some of the earliest fantastic entities was the accidental combination of ideas in dreams, 
which we then attempted to describe to our conspecifics using the ‘real-world’ lexicon available to us. 
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 With rich lexical resources available, the fantasy worlds we could create are potentially 
infinite. Young children engaging in pretend play demonstrate this on an almost daily basis, 
with seemingly little to no effort. Pretend play routinely creates new symbols – a ball becomes 
a cat, a blanket becomes a lake etc. But it also tends towards the fantastic, creating symbols for 
impossible creatures, as I recently discovered while playing with a friend’s 9-year-old son. In 
this particular game (which essentially involved walking on a wall of an enclosure surrounding 
some decorative garden stones and the odd gardening implement), a plastic cup containing 
some sprouting daffodil bulbs can become a pack of ‘lava prawns’ (prawns capable of shooting 
lave from their mouths). This new fantastic creature would also persist into another play 
session, operating in a totally different context. Possessing a linguistic system which decouples 
labels from their real-world counterpart to allow them to be utilized in the absence of any 
visual stimulus offers us the capacity to imagine the physically impossible, communicate it to a 
conspecific, and then build a shared imaginary world around the new lexical items we have just 
created – a kind of social imagining which helps build relationships with conspecifics. And it is 
really this notion of ‘fantasy’ that is neglected in the philosophical literature: the one where 
fantasising is about creating paracosms unconnected to any real-world desires beyond our own 
desire to play.55 
 
 Fantasy may be closely intertwined with language as a cultural artefact, but what about 
its connection to language as a biological endowment? That is to say, what role does the 
computational cycle described in Chapter 3 play with respect to fantasy? One obvious way 
follows from Hinzen’s claim that the concept of TRUTH emerges with syntax. Presumably our 
understanding of fantasies depends upon our ability to distinguish them from reality i.e. to say 
which parts are real and which are not. However, this is not a particularly interesting 
observation. More interesting is the suggestion that the computational cycle is ‘blind’ to 
content: it begins with a lexical root and generates a sentence which is only evaluated once the 
computational cycle is completed. This makes language a particularly powerful tool for 
imagining impossible, or highly improbable, worlds: it doesn’t matter whether ‘lava prawns’ 
could or couldn’t exist, we simply put those words together and now we are suddenly able to 
(jointly) imagine them, however impossible that world might seem. Access to a generative 
system like this is precisely what would allow us to imagine in unconstrained ways, and upon 																																																								
55 There is a question raised by the claims here about whether imagination is impaired alongside language. I discuss 
some challenging empirical information in Chapter 6, and propose areas for further research that would test the 
claims I make at various points in this thesis. 
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finding something useful we could then codify our findings in natural language, disseminate 
them to others, and begin to develop a lexicon specific to our group. This is a central feature of 
developing a culture – having shared ideas specific to your particular group.56 Culture could 
develop in the absence of language, but it couldn’t disseminate as easily or spread as far and 
wide as it can once language is in place. 
 
3. Fantasy and Evolution 
 
 The suggestion above, then, is that fantasy actually drives the evolution of language. 
Remember that language is both a biological endowment and a cultural artefact. The cultural 
aspect of language i.e. natural languages, could be enhanced by the process of externalising 
fantasies, introducing as it would new items into the lexicon. That fantasy aids lexical 
development isn’t an idle suggestion, there are other reasons to believe this too. Skolnick 
Weisberg et al. (2015) found that children acquired vocabulary more easily from fantastical 
stories or play sessions (using toys) than they did from their realistic counterparts. As Skolnick 
Weisberg et al point out, this is actually surprising given what a large body of psychological 
literature suggests about learning and transfer, namely that the more similar the learning 
context is to the context where the information is eventually going to be applied, the better. 
Realistic books and toys should, predicting from those studies, provide better vocabulary 
learning for the words with a real-world use (e.g. cooking vocabulary). Yet this was the precise 
opposite of what they found. 
 
 Skolnick Weisberg suggests two possible explanations for this. The first is that children 
may be more engaged and attentive in the face of fantastic stories and play because the events 
therein challenge their understanding of how reality works. The added attention required to 
spot the difference between the imagined and the real worlds may account for their increased 
learning. Alternatively, they suggest, there could be something about fantastical contexts in 
particular that aids learning. Perhaps engaging immersively in such fantasies engages cognitive 
processing at a deeper level, requiring them to check the fantastic world against both the real 
																																																								
56 Arguably, there is no more significant a shared idea than natural language with regards to indicating group 
membership. This is true not only of the divide between natural languages (e.g. English speakers vs German 
speakers) but also within natural languages, where dialect differences can indicate geographical and class 
differences (a ‘Newcastle accent’ vs a ‘Sunderland accent’, or pronouncing ‘with’ with a ‘th’ sound at the end vs 
an ‘if’ sound). See Ghafournia, 2015, for an overview of the ways that language can indicate group membership.  
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world physics and logic they have thus far developed and the internal physics and logic 
established in the imaginary world. 
 
 Elsewhere, a broad survey of the literature on the connection between play and 
creative problem-solving by Wyver and Spence (1999) found that there was a reciprocal 
relationship between the two: the development of divergent problem-solving skills (being able 
to generate creative ideas by exploring many possible solutions) facilitates the development of 
play skills, and vice versa. Notably there was a strong correlation between fantastical pretend 
play and the promotion of semantic creativity (problem-solving involving words), particularly 
when this was social in nature. So it appears that engaging in fantasy aids the use of language for 
creative purposes, and using language for creative purposes helps us to engage in fantasy, 
particularly where this is shared with others (in play), pointing to a complex co-evolutionary 
story. Note that this co-evolutionary story also explains the development of pretend play in our 
species, something which we saw in Chapter 2 would be required of the best solution for the 
puzzle of the Creative Explosion. 
 
If the findings of these studies are correct then, we can start to piece together an 
understanding of the delay between the emergence of our species and the emergence of 
widespread diverse creative behaviour, and its explosive nature when it does appear. If we’re 
hard-wired to enjoy engaging in fantasy, and engaging in fantasy helps with both the 
development of language and language acquisition itself, then once natural language reached a 
sufficient degree of richness to enable us to externalise our fantasies then we should expect that 
to significantly drive the development of new lexical resources and speed up the process of 
language acquisition throughout the human population. Tattersall hints at a similar thought 
when he suggests that: 
 
[O]ur imagination and creativity are also at least partly implicit in the symbolic process, 
for only once we have created mental symbols can we combine them in new ways and 
ask key questions such as “what if?” (Tattersall, 2014: 201) 
 
Reaching this point would take some time – the tendency to engage in fantasy would 
not stabilise as an evolutionary trait until it yielded some benefits that were actually visible to 
natural and/or sexual selection. Whilst the process may be intrinsically rewarding i.e. always 
pleasurable to engage in, this would not make that trait something that evolution would select 
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for unless that experience of pleasure was somehow adaptive to our ecological niche or 
attractive to members of the opposite sex. It’s unclear how simply fantasising could match that 
description. It would need to be the outward manifestations of fantasising that were adaptive or 
attractive. As we have seen, one such outward manifestation is childhood pretend play – but it 
turns out that this tendency doesn’t, so far as we know, correlate with any adaptive advantages 
(see Chapter 2). It must, therefore, be some other outward manifestation that explains our 
universal ability and tendency to engage in fantasy. If language is itself adaptively advantageous 
– and it would seem indisputable that it is – then fantasy may in turn be adaptively 
advantageous because of the benefits it confers in terms of language acquisition and in 
developing the lexicon itself. This would mean that fantasy and language would co-evolve.57 
 
 There are, of course, other candidate explanations for the evolutionary selection of a 
tendency to fantasise, and we may think them more persuasive. We have already noted that 
sexual fantasy brings with it some of the rewards of actual sex i.e. thinking about sex can lead to 
arousal. It is conceivable that this could be at the root of evolutionary selection of fantasising as 
it would encourage sexual activity, and thus procreation, passing on the genes of those who 
engaged in fantasy. Boncinelli et al. (2013) have demonstrated that sexual fantasy can be used as 
a treatment for hypoactive sexual desire – perhaps in a species where we tend to stay with our 
mates for a long period of time this would be beneficial in promoting sex more frequently 
within couplings. But it is also seemingly true that our tendency to fantasise has moved well 
beyond the sexual domain, so it perhaps has other adaptive benefits besides encouraging a 
willingness to engage in more sexual activity. 
 
 Another suggestion is that positive fantasies about idealised futures can help us turn 
those fantasies into realities. This kind of ‘positive visualisation’ is the terrain well-trodden by 
self-help books: jobseekers should imagine themselves as future CEOs to help them find work. 
However, this suggestion has come under fire over the past twenty or so years, with numerous 
studies suggesting that positive thinking in other domains doesn’t seem to yield the benefits 
promised by self-help gurus. Oettingen and Wadden (1991) found, for example, that there was 
no correlation between positive fantasies and weight loss (subjects who negatively fantasised 																																																								
57 I wonder if linguistic error is another way in which the lexicon could expand, as well as being a source of 
creativity e.g. puns. For example, in writing an earlier chapter I made a typing mistake and wrote ‘articstic’, 
which I read to myself as ‘arctic-stic’, which immediately created a rush of simultaneous images and ideas in my 
mind of polar animals and human inhabitants engaging in art-making. Could such errors lead to things like this 
becoming part of the lexicon when shared amongst social groups? Or would they bring to light the very possibility 
of word-play? This would possibly be seen as a creative act and an indicator of protean cognition. 
	 127 
actually fared better), and Oettingen and Mayer (2002)’s subsequent study confirmed the 
suggestion in the former that expectation has far more impact on attainment then fantasising. 
One reason for this is suggested by Kappes and Oettingen (2011) – fantasies fail to generate the 
‘energy’ to actually pursue our desires.58 
 
 Whatever the reasons to evolutionarily favour fantasy in the first place, it is still 
seemingly the case that it has a connection to linguistic development, and that would be a 
further reason to encourage it –evolutionarily or socially. If fantasies are shared, then we can 
develop our understanding of those closest to us (see §1.1); but we can also cause enjoyment in 
others by directing their attention toward the paracosms we have created. Children at play 
often co-author paracosms, each contributing to the system of physics or logic that it contains 
(often a cause of dispute when one boy attempts to ‘kill’ another boy in the paracosm – “No, I 
can’t be killed by lava because I have lava armour!”) This kind of activity is a basic form of social 
imagining that I suggested in Chapter 1 (§3.3) has been neglected in trying to explain what may 
have driven the cultural accretions required to explain away the gap between the emergence of 
the biological basis for language and the Creative Explosion. Specifically, sharing fantasies 
would drive the expansion of the lexicon in the way described above, leading to more 
systematic ways of externalising our fantasies. Of course, Picciuto and Carruthers’ candidate 
explanation is pretend play, which is one way in which we can externalise and share fantasies. 
However, I will argue in the chapter which follows that the earliest systematic way we would 
have found to externalise our fantasies is through storytelling, and that storytelling in particular 
can explain the appearance of new kinds of creative behaviour in our species.59 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 I have argued that there is a need to further develop our understanding of fantasy and 
its relationship to the imagination, to desire, and to escape. I suggested both here and in 
Chapter 1 that one of the reasons that our understanding of fantasy may be impoverished is 
because we focus on examples that are less informative than the more common occurrences of 
fantasising, such as that which we see as manifest in childhood play, but also in jokes, in 
improvised bedtime stories, and so on. Traditionally focus has been on personal fantasy (e.g. 
Freud, Gaut), rather than impersonal fantasy, but where there is discussion of impersonal 																																																								
58 For a critique of these studies and their findings, see LaBier 2011. 
59 Arguably, shared episodes of pretend play depend upon an ability to construct and tell stories. 
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fantasy (though not in those terms – e.g. Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002) those discussions have 
tended toward works of literature and visual art. Artworks are important to giving us an insight 
into the nature of creativity and its evolution, and I think a tendency to fantasise is a crucial part 
of the evolutionary story behind their existence also, but because of their cultural status relative 
to less ‘serious’ artworks I think they haven’t helped move our understanding of fantasy on in 
the way I suggest is required. 
 
 In any case, we are starting to develop a solution to the problem of the Creative 
Explosion i.e. the gap between the emergence of language in our species and the emergence of 
widespread, diverse creative behaviour (a gap which, according to Hublin et al., 2017 may be 
bigger than was initially thought). That answer would, I argued in Chapter 3, come partly 
through the emergence of the ability to form thoughts with the semantic properties 
characteristic of human language, something which would clearly augment the imaginative 
capacities homo sapiens inherited from our evolutionary ancestors. But it would also come 
partly, I have argued above, from the gradual development of the lexicon as a result of our 
tendency to engage in fantasy (an idea I develop further in the next chapter). To some extent, 
this parallels the ontogenetic development of language: for individuals within our species to 
fully develop their linguistic capacities they need to be exposed to a certain amount of language-
use before a particular age. If this is overly impoverished, the language capacity fails to get off 
the ground. Similarly, for language to impact significantly upon creativity, natural language 
would need to be sufficiently rich. Once it reaches a certain degree of richness, all kinds of 
imaginative possibilities open up. For example, two human children with access to a shared 
lexicon to describe their imagined environment would suddenly (if so inclined) be able to 
construct rich narratives for pretend play by engaging in acts of imagination and fantasy and 
communicating their most interesting findings to one another. This could include any number 
of situations: some perhaps based very closely upon reality, such as pretending to hunt together 
or pretending to do battle, to fantastic ones, such as pretending to live underwater as a half-
human half-fish. Such fantastic cases would, as I have said, help increase the lexicon as terms 
were coined as shorthand expressions for these newly-generated ideas, creating new symbols 
that would make future episodes of pretence easier to get going. It would also, according to 
Gopnik, help these children form a better understanding of the natural and social worlds they 
inhabit; according to Skolnik Weisberg, it would have the added benefit of helping them 
acquire lexical items of an ordinary nature. From this position of being armed with a rich 
lexicon and a fertile imagination that enjoys building imaginary worlds, coupled with a more 
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evolutionarily ancient propensity for sharing information, attitudes and emotions, it would 
seem as though we became a species well designed for, and poised to, begin developing stories 
and telling them to one another. 	
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Chapter 5: 
STORY-TELLING & CREATIVITY 
How did story-telling drive human creativity? 
 
Introduction 
 
 Consider again the puzzle we set out in Chapter 2: what explains the apparent 60,000 
year gap between the emergence of our species and the sudden and dramatic appearance of new 
technologies and representational art? Technology is not unique to human beings. Animals have 
been observed to fashion tools to help with survival (e.g. a stick to fish for termites, a rock to 
open a nut etc.), but clearly human beings show a greater degree of creativity in this domain. 
But it isn’t just the volume of tools we produce that marks us out as different, it is also the 
purpose for which we develop them. Human tool invention is driven as much by social 
concerns as it is practical ones. Consider the relatively recent invention of social networking, or 
the much older invention of musical instruments. And humans alone make art. Why is it that 
our creative endeavours led to us creating representational drawings of animals on cave walls 
tens of thousands of years ago? Is there any story that can be told that can explain this specific 
innovation? I address these questions here by examining stories themselves. In §1, we learn that 
the practice of storytelling is much older than we might have initially thought, and that some of 
the stories we are familiar with today are as old as the cave art that features in our puzzle. §2 
seeks to address the questions of how and why we began to tell stories in the first place. Finally, 
§3 suggests that storytelling provides us with an explanation of the nature of human creativity 
that we see at the point of the creative explosion. 
 
1. The (Hi)story of Stories 
  
 The Catalogue of Women, attributed to Hesiod, tells the story of a beautiful young 
woman named Callisto, a devotee of Artemis, the goddess of hunting and chastity. Despite 
having sworn to the goddess a vow of chastity, Callisto was seduced by Zeus and fell pregnant 
with their son, Arcas. Enraged by her husband Zeus’ infidelity, the goddess Hera transformed 
Callisto into a bear and banished her to live alone in the mountains. Arcas would go on to be 
the king of Arcadia. One day, the king took to the mountains to hunt and came across Callisto. 
Recognising her son, Callisto approached him with outstretched arms. Arcas, however, took 
the bear to be attacking him, and took aim with his bow to kill Callisto. Just as he was about to 
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fire the deadly arrow, Zeus swooped up mother and son to avert the tragedy and placed them 
in the sky as the constellations Ursa Major (the great bear) and Ursa Minor (the little bear). 
 
 Hesiod’s story dates back to around 750BC, making it nearly 3,000 years old (West, 
1966). However, this story is not unique to the Ancient Greeks, nor does it originate with 
them. Some version of this story is, in fact, shared with the Iroquois of the north-eastern U.S. 
and the Chukchi and Finno-Ugric people of Siberia. These disparate groups each have a tale 
involving a man or an animal pursuing and/or killing one or more animals, with the characters 
in the story being changed into constellations. As Julien d’Huy explains: 
 
These sagas all belong to a family of myths known as the Cosmic Hunt that spread far 
and wide in Africa, Europe, Asia and the Americas among people who lived more than 
15,000 years ago… The most credible working hypothesis is that Eurasian ancestors of 
the first Americans brought the family of myths with them (d'Huy, 2016: 58-59). 
 
Another story with ancient origins is that of Polyphemus, familiar to most Western 
scholars from Homer’s Odyssey. I briefly discussed in Chapter 1 (§1.1) the suggestion that 
Homer was not a single author, but in fact a tradition (for a detailed discussion of this view, see 
Graziosi, 2002). On this view, the Homeric epics of the Iliad and the Odyssey were sculpted and 
changed as they passed from one oral poet to another over a succession of generations. It has 
generally become accepted that the poems are around 4,000 years old (Croally and Hyde, 
2016: 26), but as with the story of Callisto, versions of the Homeric stories appear in 
geographically and chronologically disparate places and times. The story of Polyphemus in the 
Homeric tradition is that of a one-eyed giant with a proclivity for eating human flesh. The hero 
Odysseus and his crew find themselves in Polyphemus’ lair after they land on the island of 
Cyclops in search of food. After Polyphemus has devoured a number of Odysseus’ men, 
Odysseus gets Polyphemus drunk, which renders the giant unconscious. Odysseus seizes his 
opportunity to blind the one-eyed monster and secure passage out of the cave by hiding himself 
beneath a sheep as Polyphemus sends his herd outside to feed. 
 
As with the story of Callisto, a version of this story exists in North America, this time 
amongst an Algonquian tribe, the Blackfoot Indians, whose survival primarily depended upon 
hunting buffalo. In their version of the story, the heroes escape a human-bird hybrid by hiding 
beneath the skin of a buffalo while the herd charges out of the cave. In many Amerindian 
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versions of the tale, the hero hides inside the animal by entering via its anus. The oldest version 
of the Polyphemus story that d’Huy traces (in d'Huy, 2015) is in the Valais area of Switzerland, 
with suggestions that it could even be as much as 18,000 years old (Tehrani and d'Huy, 2016). 
The core of the Polyphemus story is thus: a hero, typically a hunter, faces one or more 
monsters in possession of a herd of animals. The hero ends up in the location of the monster’s 
herd and becomes trapped by some obstacle. The monster attempts to kill the hero, but the 
hero escapes by utilising the animals of the herd as camouflage. 
 
d’Huy’s research utilises the models of phylogenetic analysis biologists use to attempt 
understand the evolution of species and applies them to myths and folklore to trace the 
evolution of stories such as that of Callisto and Polyphemus. His approach identifies core story 
elements (‘mythemes’) and traces their emergence and appearance across the myths and 
folktales of numerous cultures, and then compares them against anthropological, genetic and 
climatic data which helps us trace the movement of human populations since the emergence of 
our species. We might assume that similar stories being shared by disparate cultures is simply 
the product of a universal human nature – humans the world over have similar desires, needs 
etc. and are, broadly speaking, exposed to similar environment, so would produce similar 
stories as a result. Carl Jung advocates for a similar position when he suggests that myths are the 
expression of the ‘collective unconscious’, the fundamental nature shared by all human beings 
(Segal, 1998). However, if this were the case, we’d expect Cosmic Hunt stories, like that of 
Callisto, to appear everywhere, yet they are virtually entirely absent in Indonesia, New Guinea 
and Australia (d'Huy, 2016).60 d’Huy therefore believes that his work lends credibility to the 
Out of Africa Hypothesis discussed in Chapter 2, with the story following the path of 
northbound groups (ultimately heading both West to the Americas and East to Siberia), rather 
than those who moved southward. This comparative analysis suggests that many of the stories 
we are now so familiar with may have much older origins than previously thought. 
 																																																								
60 The nature of d’Huy’s analysis makes it impossible to say that these stories are entirely absent in these areas: to 
achieve a workable model for phylogenetic analysis of stories d’Huy’s ‘mythemes’ need to be sufficiently broad to 
connect story elements, but this broadness means that some mythemes do appear across cultures. What is being 
claimed as absent here is the specific arrangement of mythemes i.e. a tale involving a man or an animal pursuing 
and/or killing one or more animals, with the characters in the story being changed into constellations. Notably, 
Ursa Major is only wholly visible throughout the year in the northern hemisphere, so where the Cosmic Hunt 
story does appear it seems to be a case of a story-teller taking inspiration from commonly observable features in his 
or her environment. If this tale migrated from a common origin, as d’Huy suggests, then this fact is of limited 
relevance. However, the alternative explanation might be that Ursa Major was simply a commonly received 
inspiration for story-tellers in various cultures all across the northern hemisphere. This is why d’Huy’s research 
calls upon genetic and climate data as further evidence. 
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It is worth noting at this point that there are numerous kinds of stories. Simply 
reporting an event in detail to someone is one way in which we might tell a story. However, 
there is an important distinction between event-reports and the kind of stories that are 
important here, which is the connection to truth. When we recount an event to a conspecific, 
we generally do so in a way which is intended to present events as they happened i.e. we tell 
them the truth. Of course, there are scenarios under which we also intentionally deceive 
someone by reporting an event in such a way that what we report doesn’t cohere with the truth 
(we might say that A did Y, when it was in fact B who did Y, or we might say that A did Y when 
Y never, in fact, happened at all). Fantastic stories, by contrast, are connected with the truth in 
a somewhat more obscure way. Telling a fictional narrative typically involves a prior 
understanding between the storyteller and the audience that the events being described are not 
the literal truth (or a description of actual history). However, they may contain or be grounded 
in truth in that the ‘moral’ of a story might be intended to convey some truth about the world, 
or events in the story might help someone acquire knowledge by helping them to realise the 
truth of some (set of) proposition(s) about a particular topic, even though this knowledge was 
set in a fictional context (for instance, the best technique for hunting a wild animal, or which 
berries to avoid eating). Using stories as metaphors was very possibly one of the earliest creative 
acts we engaged in;61 metaphor-making itself can expand the lexicon (consider metaphorical 
language used to describe music; the language of music may even be essentially metaphorical – 
see Zangwill, 2011, for a discussion of this idea) giving us another way in which storytelling 
could have driven the evolution of language (see Chapter 4). In any case, it is stories with this 
more obscure relation to truth that are of importance here, since they are fantastic stories – 
involving fantasies rather than reality. 
 
I have suggested in previous chapters that storytelling might have been one of the 
earliest drivers of human creativity, which would make it older than even d’Huy has suggested 
above. That isn’t to say that as soon as language got in place we suddenly were telling highly 
structured narratives like the Cosmic Hunt and the Polyphemus stories. Clearly these stories 
will have developed over time, developing in different directions as the cultures of the groups 
retelling these stories evolved. But even before that, it would have taken time to get certain 
ideas into place, establishing themselves in common parlance. So how did we begin such a 
																																																								
61 Gaut (2003) describes metaphors as a paradigmatic example of the creative imagination, though he means this as 
a heuristic notion – teaching us about the phenomenon – rather than as a chronological first. 
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process of developing a precursor to tales like the Cosmic Hunt? It is this question which I 
address in the next section. 
 
2. How and why did we start telling stories? 
 
 First of all, it is worth noting that stories today need not be, and sometimes are not, 
told linguistically. A fairly basic way of telling a story would be through mime and gesture (in 
its most complex form, think for example of the silent films of Charlie Chaplin). We’re rather 
adept at communicating quite specific information using only movement, and could even 
construct a basic narrative (who did what to whom) through pointing, miming and gestures, 
possibly involving props where useful. Yet this repertoire would have been available to our 
evolutionary ancestors for millions of years – even the great apes have a surprisingly rich 
gestural communication system, though they seem to lack the combinatorial capacities that 
would permit communication of sophisticated narratives (Tomasello, 2010). This means that a 
rudimentary form of narrative may well have existed prior to our species. 
 
Consider, as another example, contemporary dance performances, which often 
attempt to establish a narrative using only movement. It is hard to find evidence for the 
emergence of dance within our species, but detailed arguments have been presented 
nonetheless for the existence of both dance and music prior to the emergence of language. 
Mithen (2005), for example, suggests that language itself might emerge from a kind of musical 
proto-language involving proto-symbolic singing and dancing intended to influence the 
emotional states of others (and thus their behaviour). Like language, both singing and dancing 
are ubiquitous throughout our species but, as Tomasello (2010) has argued, gestures might have 
taken on a sort of symbolic meaning before the existence of words, opening up the possibility 
that a ritualised form of dance could do the same. As such, the tendency to create (at least 
simple) narratives might have long been in place before the evolution of fully-syntactic 
language, and long before the existence of the natural languages we use to tell stories today. 
The first narratives, perhaps, would have recreated or predicted the hunt, or a dramatic event 
in the shared memory of a group (Asma, 2017). These narratives wouldn’t require anything 
like the complex hierarchical structuring capacities we see in grammar, but they would 
certainly have required learning a repertoire of moves, gestures etc. that were sequential in 
order to usefully convey information about sequences of events. Learning such sequences 
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would have to coincide with (and/or drive) increases in short-term memory and sequence 
processing power in precursor hominids. 
 
With this in mind, let us now briefly consider why narratives, at their core, are useful. 
Asma (2017) identifies two functions of what he terms ‘imaginative communication’: social 
bonding and information transmission. By constructing narratives, we can strengthen (or weaken) 
social bonds through the emotional manipulation of our audience. Mithen suggests that this 
would be one of the central functions of his musical protolanguage – to make conspecifics feel a 
certain way so that their behaviour would be responsive to those feelings. For instance, creating 
a feeling of fear through some ominous or tense music or a particularly aggressive dance routine 
(consider the purpose of the Maori ‘haka’) might help to intimidate a rival group; upbeat music 
and lively dance might put conspecifics in a celebratory mood. A second function of narratives 
is to transmit information, for instance facts about who did what to whom, or to demonstrate 
skills with which to exploit resources from the immediate environment. Again, these functions 
can be met through non-linguistic means. 
 
 If a tendency toward narratives predates the existence of language, then we would 
predict that language would be co-opted for this purpose once it emerged in evolution. But 
there is still a lot to be explained as to how this might have occurred. An instructive account of 
the evolution of language that can help us here comes from Robin Dunbar (1996). Dunbar 
actually works in the opposite direction to that which I have just suggested. For Dunbar, a 
tendency toward narrative emerges from the invention of language for the purpose of ‘vocal 
grooming’. In Dunbar’s view, language emerged as an efficient replacement for the kind of 
social grooming we see in various animals, and particularly in other primates. Social grooming 
has many benefits. In macacques, for example, it reduces stress and thus decreases the 
likelihood of conflict (Aureli and Waal, 2000); for rats, it seemingly helps prevent mammary 
tumours and extends lifespan (Yee et al., 2008); for baboons, grooming reduces the risk of 
disease spread by ticks (Akinyi et al., 2013). But aside from these health benefits, there are 
social benefits to grooming, and these are often thought to be the primary role of grooming. In 
many species of primate, grooming helps maintain ‘friendships’ (Seyfarth and Cheney, 2011) by 
reinforcing the complex social hierarchies within their groups. For example, in black crested 
gibbons, social grooming promotes social cohesion and stability (Guan et al., 2013), with more 
complex grooming patterns correlating with group stability. 
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 As hominids became more adept at surviving in their environmental niches, social 
groups became larger. However, Dunbar argues that in these larger groups, physically 
grooming all of our ‘friends’ would become increasingly costly in terms of time and energy 
(Dunbar, 1996), and it is for this reason Dunbar suggests we moved to a less costly form of 
grooming – vocal grooming. Making vocal sounds would allow us to service many relationships 
simultaneously, while our hands could be gainfully employed with some other task. Vocal 
grooming, according to Dunbar, would then evolve gradually into vocal language, specifically 
in the form of ‘gossip’ (exchanging information on social matters). For Dunbar, it is because 
language evolved from gossip that it takes the grammatical structure it does, one which he 
suggests is peculiarly suited for narration. 
 
 There are a number of problems with Dunbar’s account. For one, I have already given 
(in Chapter 3) an alternative account of the emergence of grammar which suggests that it is not 
purely a social construct. Moreover, it isn’t clear why exchanging social information would 
have any precedence over pure description in accounting for the structure of grammar. Simple 
reporting and describing of any event requires the same grammatical classes (those relating to 
agents, patients, actions, events, etc.), it is not unique to gossip. ‘The bison can be found on 
the left side of the small hill’ requires the same grammatical complexity as ‘John met Mary in 
the empty coffee shop’, and both involve reference and truth, the core aspects of propositional 
thought. Furthermore, vocal grooming’s ‘cheapness’ is at odds with Dunbar’s claim that it 
would explain the evolution of language, given that its cheapness would undermine the honest 
signalling that the time and energy commitment that physical grooming clearly conveys 
(Power, 1998). The vocal signals involved in gossip are easy to ‘fake’, since for social 
information to be valuable it must be about something outside of the current discourse context 
(anything immediately perceivable by conspecifics isn’t valuable since they would most likely 
have acquired that information themselves in the absence of the gossip). However, this presents 
the problem of verifying the information given: the hearer either has to take what they hear on 
trust, making the reliability of the signal easy to fake, or they must seek further evidence of the 
veracity of the gossip, driving the costs for the hearer up significantly, thus making gossip a 
costly signal after all. 
 
 Despite the criticisms of Dunbar’s account, it is still nonetheless potentially instructive. 
One criticism we might level at Dunbar is that his account doesn’t really explain the transition 
from the production of pleasing but meaningless sounds used in vocal grooming to fully-
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syntactic speech. If, instead, we assume that Dunbar’s vocal grooming predates our species, and 
then the neurological adaptations for grammar came into place quite suddenly much more 
recently, we’d have a species with a highly complex social structure, which was already very 
vocal, but could now begin to arrange vocalisations into meaningful sequences that take us 
beyond the simple sequential structures that might be present in dance, gesture and mime, and 
(eventually) into the complex hierarchical structures present in fully-syntactic language. 
Grammar, therefore, wouldn’t fall out of vocal grooming, it would instead shape the very nature 
of vocal grooming. And if, as Dunbar suggests, vocal grooming was primarily concerned with 
conveying social and emotional content, then grammatical and lexical features would eventually 
emerge to suit those communicative needs. 
 
 More recently, Asma (2017) has suggested that storytelling might partly have its roots 
in the ritual dimension of communication. He points out that social dancing, like self-
ornamentation with beads, paint etc., functions in part as a kind of signal for group 
membership. Asma suggests that the dance or song precursors of storytelling might strengthen 
social bonds inasmuch as knowing and being able to produce the sequence for the dance or song 
would signal that you were, in fact, a member of this group, and not a rival, quoting Sterelny 
(2012: 49) to explain: “Human groups are ‘symbolically marked’; they share distinctive norms, 
customs, rituals, and the like. Symbols are badges or insignia of group membership and 
identity.” The notion of group identity is significant when considering the role that storytelling 
plays in shaping our culture (as I argue below), and it may have taken on greater significance 
when our evolutionary ancestors began to tell basic stories in the form of song or dance. 
 
 Asma goes on to cite the example of the ritualistic chants of Brahmins (Hindu priests 
and teachers, and protectors of sacred learning across generations) to emphasise the importance 
and prevalence of ritualistic performance. Asma explains: 
 
Select Brahmin fathers… transmit elaborate Sanskrit mantras to their sons through 
exhausting repetition of verbal chants, broken into memorisable chunks and paired 
with subroutine body movements… But in addition to these identifiable Sanskrit 
mantras, the singers chant an ancient unidentifiable hymn that no linguist can decipher. 
It is a crucial song that accompanies the seasonal twelve-day fire sacrifice (for Agni), 
performed for thousands of years of Verdic history (Asma, 2017: 141; emphasis 
added). 
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 These chants have a structure, but no linguistic meaning. Yet they still have great social 
significance. The Brahmin believe that these chants are responsible for keeping the cosmos 
ordered and coherent, but on a purely social level they indicate that the ‘speaker’ belongs to a 
certain varna (class or caste), and the hearer who understands them knows they belong to the 
same cultural group. It is possible, then, that beyond the meaningless but reassuring vocal 
grooming sounds, we’d already begun to order vocal noises into meaningful sequences in a 
similar manner to the chants of the Brahmin. On a number of accounts of the evolution of 
language, fully-syntactic language emerges from an existing lexicon made up of meaning-signal 
pairs (a particular noise which signals something with the intention of triggering a particular 
behaviour, similar to the complex alarm call system we see in vervet monkeys). Such ‘holistic 
protolanguages’ might include music- or dance-based protolanguages, or ‘word-like’ noises 
(Bickerton, 1996).62 These signals, on some views, expressed whole propositions, but did not 
involve compositionality since the signals were not ‘broken down’ into words (Arbib, 2008, 
Wray, 2002). What the emergence of fully-syntactic language would bring would be an 
increased capacity to parse prosodic units into ever-smaller pieces, and assign specific meaning 
to each, in order to meet our expanding communicative needs. Ritualistic chants are rhythmic 
but, as Dissanayake (1992) says, so is everyday language. This could, perhaps, be a hangover 
from its ritualistic origins, with rhythmic units gradually being broken down into smaller 
phonemes. It’s also possible that the reverse relation holds: that certain rhythms within 
everyday speech are naturally pleasing to us, and thus took on greater significance in order to 
produce ritualistic chanting (I pick up on this point again in Chapter 6). But the big shift in the 
lexicon at this point wouldn’t be in establishing labels for objects in the external world – it is 
quite likely that this was being done as part of any protolanguage possessed by precursor 
hominids. Instead, it would be in beginning to develop ways of expressing the inner, emotional 
world upon which social bonding is based. This would include ways of sharing our attitudes 
toward various things with our conspecifics (the kind of ‘gossip’ that Dunbar has in mind), 
particularly about persons who weren’t in our immediate perceptual environment. And as we 
saw in Chapter 3, the computational device that language is based upon is ideal for just such a 
purpose. 
 
 One of the features of language discussed in Chapter 3 was the fact that narrow syntax, 
the computational basis of sentence generation, operates blindly over formal categories rather 
																																																								
62 For a general critique of the idea of holistic protolanguages, see Tallerman, 2007. 
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than over symbols with semantic content. The computational system which generates linguistic 
utterances doesn’t operate on words, like ‘pain’, but instead on grammatical categories, like 
NOUN. It is only once a lexical root has been categorised in this way that we can begin building 
a grammatically meaningful sentence. So in this way, fully-syntactic human language constitutes 
a break from any of its precursors in that it is a fully (formal) symbolic system. I have previously 
outlined the ways in which this could aid human creativity in terms of creative thought, but 
here we need to say more about how this can be employed in practice. 
 
 As mentioned in Chapter 3, language is, according to Daniel Dor, an ‘imagination-
instructing system’ (Dor, 2015). As we also discussed it in Chapter 3, we could see its role as 
directing our minds as we attempt to solve problems. But it also allows us to direct the minds 
of other people to very specific imaginings. If someone says to you, ‘The president of the USA 
is on the TV again’, it is natural to decode that utterance and picture Donald Trump in some 
scenario. The more specific the description, the more prescriptive it is for the listener’s 
imagination. Language acts as a scaffolding for the construction of imaginary worlds. When we 
engage with what somebody is saying, it isn’t just our imagination that receives instruction, our 
bodies also naturally and instinctively react to what is being said, betraying the underlying 
imaginative simulation that is going on. For example, if we hear the word ‘cup’, our motor and 
tactile systems engage, possibly based on some memory, simulating the actual holding or 
picking up of a cup (Bergen, 2012). Yet the generative system works differently to those 
governing language comprehension. Narrow syntax, as we have said, works ‘blindly’, operating 
only on the grammatical class, which means that the symbols within the computational system 
(i.e. the words) are decoupled from their semantic content (see Chapter 3, §3.2). This also has 
the effect of decoupling them from any emotional associations.63 
 
																																																								63	Asma (2017) suggests that the development of words themselves might have involved a gradual shift away from 
their referents in order to aid the decoupling discussed above. The thought here is that, for example, an early word 
for ‘cow’, might have involved some kind of sound that mimics the noise cows make. This would later be 
substituted for the far more arbitrary ‘cow’. He cites the kind of ‘toddler talk’ parents use as an example (wherein 
a cow might be a ‘moo-moo’), though notes the difficulty of substantiating the wider historical claim he is making 
here. I’m not entirely persuaded by this example, as I suspect the etymology of the word might reveal a closer 
connection to the ‘moo’ sound than Asma might expect, but his general point seems reasonable: there are plenty 
of words which must be arbitrary given that they lack real-world referents (e.g. ‘on’, ‘there’, ‘justice’ etc.) For 
opposition to this view, see Foster (1978), who claims that today’s linguistic sound-meaning pairs are not at all 
arbitrary. 
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 Recognising the same phenomenon, Asma (2017) suggests that ‘this is an exciting issue 
for the rise of imagination’, noting that once language decouples words from their semantic and 
emotional content in order to generate novel sentences: 
 
…we now have mental headroom to play with concepts, memories, and ideas without 
triggering life-and-death emotional systems that evolved to save our lives. Certain 
kinds of daydreaming… and more structured imaginings could thrive and develop 
unchained from the emotional storms that usually accompany involuntary memories 
and dreams (Asma, 2017: 146). 
 
With language available as a generative mechanism with which to safely play with 
concepts, memories and ideas, and a tendency to engage in fantasy because of the rewards it 
brings (see Ch. 1, Ch. 4) as well as a social need to gossip, it seems that there is every reason to 
think that we would begin telling stories just as soon as we had the lexical resources to do so. 
Telling stories would allow us to manipulate our social environment, tightening bonds with 
those important to us, but also severing the bonds with any rivals we have by triggering 
counterfactual images and events in the minds of those we talk to as we manipulate conspecifics 
through lying (thus developing the kind of social-exchange/cheater-deception capacity 
Carruthers, 2005 discusses; see Chapter 2). It would also allow us to transmit information of 
various kinds – about the natural world (which plants were safe to eat, where to find water 
etc.), about our culture (religious and moral stories, instructional stories on the purpose and 
use of tools etc.), and much more besides. 
 
The adaptive benefits of storytelling has received a great deal of interest in recent years 
in the field of ‘Literary Darwinism’. More well-known accounts include those from Joseph 
Carroll (2004), Denis Dutton (2009) and Jonathan Gottschall (2012). There are many apparent 
benefits to fantastic storytelling in particular, however. Consider again Asma’s suggestion that 
its roots might, in part, be in the ritualised aspects of language. The earliest stories could 
provide an easily memorable account of, or guide to, good parenting, tribal history and 
hierarchy, crucial survival information about our immediate environment and so on. In turn, 
memorising stories that have cultural significance is likely to drive the further development of 
working memory. So, a tradition of oral storytelling early in our species would reinforce 
selective pressures on working memory provided those stories were useful in the way described 
above. Those able to remember stories (or, in precursor hominids, dance- or music- based 
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narratives) and pass on the useful social or practical information would be more likely to 
reproduce, thus improving working memory capacity in the species. This would not only 
enhance our problem-solving skills more generally, but would also further our capacity to 
produce and process more complex linguistic structures, thus develop richer narratives. 
 
We saw in Chapter 4 that language acquisition itself improves when it involves the 
fantastic, and at their very core fantastic stories are simply more entertaining. This is why there 
is a plethora of literature about vampires, shape-shifters, giants, zombies etc. in the best-seller 
lists on an annual basis; it is also why the most popular show on television right now (when 
taking into account illegal streams and downloads) is Game of Thrones. These works of popular 
fiction don’t tend to push any creative boundaries, they are for the most part quite formulaic, 
but they convey central ideas about politics, society and morality in a way that engages the 
imagination – such stories hold our attention (perhaps because of the additional imaginative 
effort required). We are seemingly naturally drawn to fiction as entertainment, but also capable 
of extracting something useful from it at the same time. Thus fantastic stories are excellent 
ways of codifying important social and practical information in order to convey it to our 
conspecifics. As we saw in Chapter 1, Kant and Schopenhauer see works of exemplary 
creativity as instructive because they establish some new standard or rule for production of 
future works. But the real genius of the practice of storytelling is that, by establishing and 
repeating a formula, we can create memorable works capable of codifying a potentially infinite 
amount of useful social and practical information to disseminate. The most useful stories are 
probably not the most highly creative or structurally complex, yet this observation about the 
practice of storytelling gives a clearer guide to the intuition of those defending the Language 
Hypothesis (e.g. Pinker, 1994; see Ch. 2, §1.1, Mellars, 2002) that language helps us quickly 
‘ramp up’ cultural accretions. 
 
Being a good fantastic storyteller could function as an indicator of protean cognition (as 
well as ‘emotional intelligence’). As a storyteller, you minimally demonstrate the ability to 
recite from memory, but as a good storyteller you need to still be able to surprise, since (as 
Walton observed; see Ch. 1) this is what brings with it enjoyment. Being able to conjure up 
surprising and entertaining stories, even by simply improvising around an established theme, 
would no doubt make us more attractive to potential mates, whilst simultaneously signalling 
the enhanced creative and linguistic capacities that lie beneath the fiction. And if stories are 
particularly good information transmitters, then this is likely to aid in parenting too, making 
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your offspring more likely to survive as they are better prepared to deal with the world.64 This 
kind of storytelling to children might even be accompanied by, or it might otherwise inspire, 
episodes of pretend play, reinforcing any practical skills being discussed in the narrative. If this 
is the case, then storytelling might explain why pretend play appears to be an epiphenomenon 
of some other selected-for capability that contributes to creativity, as described by the 
‘epiphenomenal hypothesis’ in Lillard et al. (2012; see Chapter 2). As such, the Storytelling 
Hypothesis proposed here seems to better account for the empirical findings surveyed in Lillard 
et al than Picciuto and Carruthers’ Pretend Play Hypothesis. Storytelling is itself visible to 
evolution and thus something which can, and would, be selected for.65 
 
3. How did storytelling drive human creativity? 
 
 The considerations above explain how and why storytelling would develop at the level 
of the individual, but does not fully discuss how those individual creative acts would take on 
significance at the level of the group. It is this issue I deal with now. 
 
If stories share information, then they can also promote culture within a group, leading 
to an enhanced sense of group identity. For instance, a story with a moral message (a person is 
punished for acting in some specific way) spreads a moral principle; if the story manipulates the 
group emotionally in the right ways, the moral principle will take root, and so one aspect of 
that culture spreads. If a story conveys practical information (a person successfully hunted the 
bear thus), this shares other people’s knowledge and experience, which in turn could lead to 
more innovation based upon these disseminated ideas; this, in turn, drives creativity in the 
technological domain. The entire collection of social and behavioural norms, and the 
technologies they employ, are precisely what a given culture is. And as I noted above (see 
footnote 55), natural languages are themselves an incredibly significant kind of cultural norm 
that signifies group membership – both in terms of belonging to a specific group and to a subset 
within a group. The emergence of fantastic storytelling in linguistic form, then, would mark a 
radical point in the development of cultures, making them far richer than ever before. The 
																																																								
64 We could invoke the controversial evolutionary notion of group selection here: a group with more effective 
stories would be more likely to survive conflict, rapid changes to ecological niches etc. 
65 Stephen Davies offers a pretty comprehensive overview and critique of the many ways in which storytelling 
(following Joseph Carroll, he uses the term ‘literature’ to include the oral tradition of storytelling) is thought to be 
adaptively advantageous: in terms of mate attraction, enhancing social standing, education and acculturation, and 
as an instructive thought experiment (Davies, 2012: 165-172). 
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connection between storytelling and the dissemination of cultural and practical information, 
and the promotion of social bonding, is probably why storytelling is ubiquitous across human 
populations and the primary way in which storytelling drives creativity. But it isn’t just the 
ubiquity of stories and storytelling that indicate the importance of this practice, it is also the 
link between storytelling and other creative cultural practices. As we saw in §1, d'Huy (2016) 
identifies a number of story types that can not only have their origins traced back tens of 
thousands of years but, he claims, can also be (tentatively) linked to another creative practice – 
cave painting. 
 
It was perhaps cave painting that stands out most amongst the numerous cultural and 
technological innovations that appeared around 40kya and set up the puzzle of the Creative 
Explosion. Their appearance in the archaeological record is somewhat jarring – they seemingly 
appear apropos of nothing, with no clear precursors, and little to no gradual development.66 Of 
course, the practice must pre-date what is found in the caves – there was, most likely, a 
practice of creating ‘mobile art’ on rocks that would become exposed to the elements, or 
perhaps figures were drawn in the mud or sand and consequently not preserved. But this simply 
makes the practice of representational drawing older still, and places the possibility of 
supporting the claim out of reach. The interesting question that follows from this, I therefore 
suggest, is not when did we begin producing representational art? It is, instead, what prompted us to 
begin drawing in the first place? In the case of cave art, the question is deeper still: what prompted 
us to make difficult and dangerous journeys into uninhabited caves to draw images on walls? 
 
My suggestion is the practice of storytelling. I outlined above and in earlier chapters the 
ways in which, as linguistic creatures with a predisposition to share information, emotions and 
attitudes, we are predisposed toward telling stories. I have also argued that our fantasies 
(personal and impersonal) would make for naturally enjoyable things to share, and that doing so 
seems to confer various evolutionary advantages. But stories themselves, when shared amongst 
enough people, can take on a cultural life of their own. The fact that certain types of story have 
persisted across thousands of years, and thousands of miles of human migration (d'Huy, 2016; 																																																								
66 It might be tempting to see hand stencils as a precursor from which the more spectacular drawings of bison, 
hybrid figures etc. developed, but I think this would be too simplistic an assumption. It is true that the earliest (on 
some accounts, at least) cave paintings were hand stencils e.g. those found at the Maros-Pangkep caves in South 
Sulawesi, Indonesia (Aubert et al., 2014), but that practice continued within our species up until some 9kya in the 
Cueva de las Manos in Santa Cruz, Argentina (UNESCO, 1999). Moreover, in the same Indonesian caves we find a 
drawing of a pig that is a ‘minimum’ of 35,400 years old, placing it within 5,000 years of the hand stencils found 
there (Aubert et al., 2014). 
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see above), demonstrates their cultural significance. A story can become venerated: the most 
obvious kind of example would be religious stories, e.g. those of Jesus’ miracles, but consider 
also the founding myths upon which many cultures and nations are built. The Ancient Greeks 
seemingly had founding myths for every major city – the story of Cadmus of Thebes, the 
conflict between Athena and Poseidon for Athens etc. Plato, in The Republic, recognises the 
importance of origin stories when he suggests that his republic be built upon a noble lie; even 
hypothetical cities begin with stories for the Ancient Greeks! Of course, for Plato, the noble lie 
plays a social function – it exists to justify the current state of affairs and keep the three tiers of 
his ideal city working in harmony. Justifying (or, at least, explaining) the status quo is perhaps 
the function of all origin myths (Eliade, 1981). Regardless, the stories we tell play a central role 
in delineating one cultural group from another, even today. And it is perhaps unsurprising, 
then, that many of these stories move beyond oral telling and retelling into other modes of 
presentation. The most obvious shift in presentation is from oral to written: writing is a 
relatively recent invention, perhaps as young as 5,000 years old. But this is still a linguistic 
mode of presentation. Another obvious way to present stories is through visual art. We even 
represent the stories of other cultures visually; for example, Fig. 4 shows the story of Callisto 
represented by French painter François Boucher, perhaps some 17,000 years after the story had 
its first telling. 
Fig 4. Jupiter and Callisto, François Boucher, 1769	
	
	 145 
The practice of capturing elements of stories visually, like storytelling itself, may be 
much older than we originally thought. However, we should be cautious in comparing the 
storytelling of our earliest ancestors to that even of the Ancient Greeks. By the time of Hesiod, 
human beings had become literate. As such, we’d developed a system which is capable of telling 
stories of a fundamentally different nature. Oral storytelling differs from its literary counterpart 
in that oral storytelling is done face-to-face, making it far easier to know what common ground 
is shared with the audience. Written stories can travel much further, and so must be 
embellished with additional detail, leaving less room for ambiguity. As such, stories will 
certainly have changed in their details as they moved from the oral tradition to the written one. 
However, following d’Huy’s phylogenetic analysis of the evolution of stories, their more 
ancient origins still give us cause to re-examine the palaeoanthropological record. Specifically, 
d’Huy suggests (and I agree, with the forewarning just mentioned), we should reinterpret the 
cave paintings we find in light of the stories that were already being told at that time: is there 
any evidence that suggests a connection between these ancient myths and the cave art we have 
found? 
  
d’Huy makes a number of suggestions. The Polyphemus myth, for instance, is thought 
to be connected to a belief shared by many ancient cultures that there is some ‘master of 
animals’ who keeps them in a cave, requiring an intermediary to free them so they can be 
hunted. This notion has led some to interpret the production of cave art as part of a hunting 
magic ritual (see, for example, Lewis-Williams, 2002: 47-8 for a discussion of this view). Some 
accounts of this belief system also involve the suggestion that animals emerge from an 
underworld (a belief that plays heavily into Lewis-Williams’ interpretation of rock art from 
many cultures across the world as a kind of religious art associated with Shamanic cultures and 
practices). Under these interpretations of the Polyphemus myth, d’Huy suggests that we can 
reinterpret a well-known figure from a panel at Trois-Frères (shown in Fig. 5 below): 
 
At the Cave of the Trois-Frères (or “three brothers”) in the French Pyrenees, 
frequented during the upper Paleolithic, a panel shows a small creature with the head 
of a bison and the body of a human, which seems to be holding a short bow. Lost in the 
middle of a herd of bison, another animal, similar to a bison, turns its head toward the 
human hybrid, and the two creatures exchange gazes. On examination, the left rear 
thigh of the “bison” is not the thigh of a ruminant; its proportions are much smaller, 
like a human thigh – so much so that archaeologist André Leroi-Gourhan took it for a 
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human silhouette. Moreover, the artist has meticulously drawn the anus and the vulvar 
orifice. These two elements can be compared with some Amerindian versions of the 
Polyphemus story, where the man hides himself in the animal by entering its anus 
(d'Huy, 2016: 63). 
 
Fig. 5 Engraving from the right hand wall of the Sanctuary in Les Trois Frères (from Sieveking, 1979) 
 
 
 
 Certainly many aspects of the Polyphemus myth are present here – most obviously the 
large, stampeding herd of wild animals, a hybrid figure who might represent a monster, and an 
animal with carefully drawn orifices who appears to be fleeing that monster. This cave art dates 
back approximately 15,000 years, fitting with the other evidence presented by Tehrani and 
d'Huy (2016) suggesting that the Polyphemus story is at least as old (clearly, if this is a 
depiction of that story then the myth predates the artwork; Tehrani and d’Huy suggest the 
myth may be some 3,000 years older than this cave art; see §1 above). 
 
Consider also the example of the Cosmic Hunt, involving a hunter and at least one 
animal, with one or more of these parties eventually being placed in the sky as a constellation 
(Ursa Major). d’Huy connects this story to the ‘shaft scene’ found at Lascaux, France (Fig. 6 
below). On d’Huy’s interpretation: 
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The intriguing lone black spot near the bison’s withers would thus be a star. The 
fixedness of the animal, which does not give the impression of actually charging, would 
make sense if it represented a constellation rather than an action. Moreover, according 
to some experts, the man might be upright and the bison ascending, which echoes the 
rise into the sky of the protomythic animal. Finally, the black stains on the ground 
under the bison suggest the bloodstained autumnal leaves of the hunted animal (ibid.) 
 
Fig 6 The ‘shaft scene’ at Lascaux, France 
 
 
 
 Taking a little more seriously d’Huy’s suggestion that the ‘lone black spot’ could be a 
star, if this image connects to the story of the Cosmic Hunt, which in turn connects with the 
constellation Ursa Major, then we might wonder if there are any elements of this drawing that 
connect a little more directly with the constellation. Although it obviously can’t be mapped 
directly onto the image from the cave, there are some basic perceptual similarities between the 
constellation and the image. If the constellation is thought to resemble a bear, then clearly it 
could just as easily be thought to resemble another quadruped with a tail, like a bison. Perhaps 
more interestingly is the set of 3 pairs of dots to the left of the bird-man figure: Ursa Major 
characteristically has three pairs of stars, located at the feet of the great bear. Perhaps these dots 
are a nod to that feature of the constellation. 
 
 Like language itself, (oral) stories don’t fossilize, and thus it is impossible to say for 
certain that some particular piece of cave art is directly connected to a story prevalent within 
the culture that produced that art. However, the existence of those artworks must have some 
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explanation, and an entrenched culture of storytelling would provide a viable candidate. We 
have continued to represent stories visually, just as Boucher did with the story of Callisto, such 
is the inspirational power of these tales, so why shouldn’t the earliest versions of these stories 
have inspired the artists of the Upper Palaeolithic? To connect these artworks to extant myths 
we don’t require an exact match between any familiar version of the tale and the cave art – 
these stories will have evolved just as much as our cultures on the whole have done since these 
artworks were created. The fact that some key ‘mythemes’ can be connected with a degree of 
convincingness to art that dates back tens of thousands of years should itself be a remarkable 
enough a coincidence to make us consider this thesis more seriously, particularly given that the 
details of these stories will have changed over time, as they moved to new regions of the globe, 
and as they became literary tales rather than oral ones. The further facts that human migration 
patterns (evidenced through mitochondrial DNA analysis and climate data) point to the 
conclusion that these stories moved around the world with their tellers should make us yet 
more sympathetic to the idea that stories provided the inspiration for at least some cave art. 
 
If this is the case, stories might be considered a key driver of the most remarkable kind 
of human creativity present at the point of the Creative Explosion. Stories might have provided 
the impetus for the invention of representational drawing.67 As suggested previously, an 
advantage of this view is that if there really is a gap between the emergence of creative human 
behaviours and the emergence of the cognitive basis for language then this can be explained by 
the time it would take to get into place the cultural basis required for storytelling: a wide and 
varied lexicon to allow for some common points of reference – characters, plots, and so on – 
and for lexical items denoting (shared) ‘fantastical’ imagery. As the lexicon for each culture 
expanded, eventually the capacity for narratives would be more readily available, perhaps 
beginning with very simple notions, expanded upon over time, handed down from parents to 
children. They would likely initially involve the people, things or scenes (including 
constellations as with the Callisto story) most readily available, and as populations expanded, 
the significance of these stories might change and become elaborated into origin stories for local 
cultures. But the development of this lexicon would, in turn, have other preconditions such as a 
particular level of population growth resulting in a shift to verbal grooming and the gradual 
development of material culture. But note here that the main cultural driver of creativity is still the 
development of externalized language.  																																																								
67 Though, no doubt, representational markings pre-date the practice of drawing animals and animal-human hybrids 
e.g. the notched ochre at the Blombos caves (see Fig. 7 below) might have represented a quantity of goods. 
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The second key advantage of this view, however, is that it can sensibly explain the most 
difficult item on the list of innovations at the time of the Creative Explosion – art. 
Technological innovations in hunting and food storage might have responded to changing 
circumstances (different prey, climate change etc.), but why do we suddenly see the 
appearance of representational art apropos of nothing? The answer must be that it doesn’t appear 
suddenly, without any reason, but instead that it appears as part of a much broader culture of 
representation – perhaps beginning with dance and music, later taking a linguistic form, and 
eventually inspiring the creation of representational drawings (not initially in caves). As this 
wider practice of storytelling, and the fledgling accompanying practice of illustration, took on 
greater socio-cultural significance, there was an increased desire (or need) to produce more 
spectacular, preserved artworks depicting the core ideas of Upper Palaeolithic culture. This, I 
suggest, gives us a better explanation than that offered by the Pretend Play Hypothesis, and 
possibly even explains the empirical evidence suggesting that pretend play is actually an 
epiphenomenon of some other practice: it is an epiphenomenon of a tendency to represent 
fantasies. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
  We have seen that stories familiar to us today have much more ancient roots than we 
could ever have thought. I’ve independently argued that there are reasons to think that 
storytelling is something we’re naturally inclined to do and that language, once in place, would 
be utilised by the imagination for this purpose. The benefits of doing so are tremendous: stories 
promote social bonding by revealing and sharing our attitudes and feelings, and they transmit 
crucial cultural and practical information to our conspecifics. Casting early human beings as 
storytellers also provides us with a solution to the puzzle of the Creative Explosion: it fills in 
the ‘gap’ with a story about our cultural development, specifically the development of the 
cultural element of human language (i.e. natural language). Once in place, language can be co-
opted by our tendency to fantasise, allowing us to externalise our fantastic ideas. And this 
particular cultural development helps explain the most intriguing part of the puzzle – the 
sudden emergence of representational art. 
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Chapter 6: 
Testing the thesis 
What empirical support is there for this thesis’ central claims? 
	
Introduction 
 
This thesis has argued that the puzzle of the Creative Explosion can be solved by telling 
a story about the co-evolution of fantasy, language and storytelling. Along the way, however, 
we have raised some issues that were left unresolved, such as how long the gap is between the 
emergence of our species and the emergence of creative behaviour. I address that issue here. In 
addition, I outline further evidence that I believe supports the thesis I’m proposing, and I also 
propose an empirical route to further test one of my central claims. 
 
§1 The Problem of the Narrowing Gap 
 
 Probably the first outstanding issue to address is the suggestion that the gap between 
the emergence of our species and the emergence of distinctively human creative behaviours 
appears to be narrowing. Specifically, we might wonder whether discoveries like those at the 
Blombos caves in South Africa (Henshilwood et al., 2009) pose any kind of problem for this 
thesis. At the Blombos caves we (arguably) see representational markings, with some suggesting 
they possibly denoting quantity (see Fig. 7). The comparison seems to be with making tally 
marks as we do today, without any suggestion that this is a full numerical system. Would the 
use of such markings suggest that the timeline for getting fantasy, language and storytelling into 
place is somehow problematic? I’m not certain that it is.  
 
Fig. 7 Blombos ochre 
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The first reason is that there is little evidence to suggest the practice was widespread at 
this time, and evolution functions in such a way that the same traits can appear at different 
points in a species’ lineage yet not be selected for upon their first appearance (see the 
Introduction to this thesis). It might be that some population groups began to demonstrate 
creative behaviours such as making symbolic markings earlier than others, without the 
biological or cultural basis explaining that innovation being preserved. If fantasy has the 
important role that I have suggested that it does, then differences in creative practice between 
cultures may have been effected by what different population groups fantasised about. Förster et al. 
(2009) conducted a study of how fantasising about love and about sex might impact upon our 
problem-solving skills, and their findings suggest that fantasising about love encourages a 
holistic thinking style (because it focuses on long term) whereas fantasizing about sex 
encourages a more analytic thinking style (focused on details), with the former being more 
conducive to creative thinking. Perhaps our ancestors who show the earliest signs of creative 
behaviour were subject to social pressures tending them toward monogamous relationships, 
encouraging them to fantasise about loving, long-term partnerships rather than sex. 
 
Secondly, even if the practice of tally-marking was more widespread than we currently 
have evidence for, it could just as easily be a feature of a quasi-literate point in our 
development, where the lexicon is still developing (perhaps having built some labels for 
quantities at this point), and where our ancestors are starting to flex their relatively new 
linguistic capacities to begin to describe and refer to the world in new ways. Interestingly, we 
see a similar practice of making tally marks in the Czech Republic around 30-40kya on the 
famous ‘wolf bone’ (Flegg, 2002). If the practice persisted during this period, then this could 
suggest that it migrated out of Africa just as I have suggested the practice of storytelling did. If 
anything, the more evidence we have for the migration of relatively sophisticated cultural 
practices the more plausible the claims of this thesis become. 
 
 Offering further evidence for the last of these claims, it is perhaps worth noting that it 
is not only the practice of keeping tally that is shared between the human beings responsible for 
the discoveries at the Blombos caves and the behaviour of their European ancestors. The tally 
markings found in South Africa were made in blocks of red ochre, which is a material 
commonly found at various locations across the globe. This same material was used in ritual 
burial in Wales around 33kya (Richards and Trinkaus, 2009) and creating pigment for the cave 
paintings found in Europe at the point of the Creative Explosion (Curtis, 2007). Whilst it is 
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unsurprising to see a commonly available material utilised for multiple purposes – for instance, 
wood can be used to build homes, create weapons, and so on – the selection of red (and other-
coloured) ochre is interesting because it is seemingly chosen for its aesthetic, or at least 
decorative, qualities. This, in itself, is evidence of a burgeoning material culture, and it is yet 
another one that arguably seems to have possibly followed human migration patterns. If our 
aesthetic tendencies are hardwired, as Dutton (2009) and others have suggested, then this 
might be taken as evidence that they had already begun getting into place by this point. 
 
 A related problem might be the fact that the evidence suggests that culture developed 
at different rates, in different ways, in different places. For example, cave art appears only in 
certain areas, and appears to be absent in others. Similarly, there are regional variations in the 
style of tool making. Does this pose a problem for the claim that storytelling was an influential 
and universal practice early in our evolutionary lineage? Again, I think not. Storytelling doesn’t 
necessarily manifest itself in visual representation, as I noted in Chapter 5. Cave painting is one 
way of expressing a narrative. But live performance (including music and dance) is another, and 
this latter kind of representation wouldn’t fossilize (other than as a continued tradition, which it 
clearly has given its persistence to this day; of course, we can’t pinpoint where or when this 
tradition began for the reasons just given). Of course, despite the suggestion that we may have 
engaged in music and dance (even prior to language), we don’t see any clear evidence of 
musical instrument use until around 32kya (Klein and Edgar, 2002). But this doesn’t mean that 
musical instruments weren’t in use at an earlier point – some instruments made of materials 
that would not be preserved could possibly have been in use (such as animal hides stretched 
over wood to form a kind of drum), and the body offers every normally-developing member of 
the species an instrument for song and dance regardless of any technological innovations we 
might come up with to supplement this.68 
 
 A final point to note is that the most recent evidence suggests that there may, in fact, 
be a much bigger gap between the emergence of our species and behavioural modernity. Hublin 
et al. (2017) have recently written of the discovery of sapient remains in Morocco which date 
to around 315,000 years ago. If these remains really do belong to biologically modern human 
beings, there is an even larger gap than we have assumed. One of the (probably insoluble) 																																																								68	It would make sense for dance and song to be co-opted by storytelling, once that practice emerges, by becoming 
part of dramatic performances. The many accounts of Shamanism involve multi-media performances that include 
stories, dance, song and body decoration. 
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problems in addressing questions about our evolutionary history is the fact that it is pretty much 
impossible to know when we reached biological modernity. We can look to anatomical features 
like skull shape and size, and even see whether or not our brain size was the same based upon 
imprints on the inside of skulls. However, proponents of the Chomskyan view of the evolution 
of language suggest that the final adaptations for grammar were not the result of increased brain 
size, but of a mutation affecting the internal i.e. neurological, organisation of the brain. As 
such, even if the Moroccan hominid shared all other biological features with us, we can’t be 
sure they had a relevantly similar neurological make-up. To address that question, our best 
evidence is still the direct evidence of behavioural modernity – that of cultural innovation. My 
thesis attempts to make sense of the evidence we have available, and to solve the puzzle of the 
Creative Explosion by drawing inferences from a range of evidence as to what else would need 
to get into place to best explain our creative behaviours. Anything like a definitive answer is 
almost certainly impossible, so we can only offer hypotheses that best cohere with the evidence. 
It is my contention that the evidence points to human beings as biologically inclined toward 
storytelling, with such stories providing and inspiring the material culture which explains the 
emergence of other creative practices. I turn again to this issue now. 
 
§2 Humans as Storytellers 
 
 I have argued in previous chapters that fantasy provides both the motivation and 
content for storytelling, and that evidence from our use of language suggests that we are 
naturally inclined to want to share certain fantasies we think might be of interest to our 
conspecifics. The grammatical system that emerged at some point in our evolution, it turns out, 
offers a computationally simple way of generating an infinite number of ways of communicating 
those fantasies. However, it isn’t just that we like to describe (real and imagined) worlds in 
narratives, it seems that we also perceive the world in narratives. 
 
Our perception system is sometimes referred to as a hypersensitive agency detection device 
(Gray and Wegner, 2010) because it has evolved to seek out agency, even when perceptual 
information is incomplete. Failing to spot a potential predator is so costly, in evolutionary 
terms, that mistaking a non-agent for an agent is a small price to pay by comparison – ancestral 
members of our species who failed to attribute the rustling in the bushes to a leopard would be 
less likely to reproduce than those who did; and if a little paranoia about those bushes meant 
that predator-avoidance behaviour was triggered incorrectly at times, then so be it. As a result 
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of this hypersensitivity, we are subject to phenomena like pareidolia, where we see faces in 
things like clouds, buildings, cars etc. (see Fig. 7) when clearly there are none, and we hear 
threats in normal background noises (such as when we’re alone in the house at night). The 
human brain has evolved to become a sophisticated pattern-recognition computer, seeking to 
identify causes and effects at every available opportunity, and seeing things in terms of agency is 
part of just such a system.  
 
Fig. 8 The ‘sneaky house’ 
 
 
 
Consider, for example, the phenomenon observed by Heider and Simmel (1944) in 
which participants in their experiment described the motion of geometric shapes in a video (see 
Fig. 8 below) in terms of one shape chasing another one, or one running away from the other: in 
other words, as a video which involves agents. What this suggests is that we are hard-wired to 
seek explanations of natural phenomena in ways that (often falsely) incorporate stories about 
agency. So, not only are we predisposed to telling stories, we are predisposed toward telling 
stories of a peculiar nature: ones where seemingly anything whatsoever can be cast as an agent in 
order to explain the world around us.69  
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
69 Bruner (1986) puts this in terms of imposing meaning upon the world. 
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Fig. 9 Still from Heider & Simmel animation 
 
 
 
This has led some to the view that cave painting is part of a wider shamanic culture 
involving an attempt to explain (in religious terms) the natural world (e.g. Whitley, 2009). It 
may well be, therefore, that the stories which inspired the cave art we see were (quasi-) 
religious in nature. Even the story of Callisto we discussed in Chapter 5 can be seen as an 
attempt to explain how the night sky took its particular shape, casting powerful supernatural 
agents as the explanation. This ancient story even involves transforming a human agent into a 
non-agent (a star) which is still seen as identical with that agent i.e. it is a transformation 
through which personal identity is retained. This ability to track personal identity through such 
impossible transformations is something which even very young children have a surprising 
capacity for, as noted by Chomsky (see McGilvray, 1999: 73, for an account of Chomsky on 
this issue). Chomsky notes that his young grandchild had no problem tracking the identity of a 
donkey who is transformed into a rock, and later back into a donkey, as part of a story he read 
(see also Kahneman et al., 1992).70  A capacity to see non-agents as agents (or persons) yields a 
fertile ground for fantastic stories, and could even explain our tendency to personify, and even 
hybridise, animals – something expressed in both early stories and early art. I return to the 
connection between these now to discuss a further challenge to this thesis. 
 
§3 Art without Language? 
 
Following d'Huy (2016), I have suggested that the cave paintings we see at the point of 
the Creative Explosion are visual expressions of already-established myths. And it isn’t just 
d’Huy who has noticed similarities between the depictions in the caves and well-known myths 																																																								
70 Chomsky takes this to be evidence for the innateness of the concept PERSON. 
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and legends. Gregory Curtis (2007) too sees the connection when he is struck by the ‘Venus 
and Sorcerer’ image - what appears to be a depiction of a woman (or the female genitalia) with 
the head of a bison (Fig. 9 below). What strikes Curtis is the immediate connection he makes 
with the myth of Zeus raping Europa whilst in the form of the bull, conceiving Minos in the 
process. Although he is cautioned against making that connection by the first archaeologist to 
fully document the painting, Yanik Le Guillou, Curtis can’t help himself:  
 
[W]hen I let my mind go, it goes straight to the minotaur, although I know that Yanik’s 
warning is prudent. I’m sure I should heed it more than I will in the following 
sentences. European culture began somewhere. Why not right here, where someone 
painted a woman and a bison-man on a stone pendant 32,000 years ago? That coupling 
of human and beast is embedded so deeply in our psyche that it has endured in myth 
and spectacle ever since (Curtis, 2007: 215). 
 
Fig. 10 The Venus and Sorcerer or Man-Bison, Chauvet (Clottes, 2011) 
 
 
 
 But note here that Curtis reverses the priority I have suggested of cave paintings and 
myths – for Curtis, the myths begin with the cave paintings, whereas I have argued that the 
paintings represent (elements of) the myths. So, is it possible that a culture of cave painting 
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could have developed in the absence of a corresponding culture of storytelling? One person 
who thinks this is certainly possible is Nicholas Humphrey (1998). Humphrey’s position is, in 
fact, much stronger than this – he suggests that cave paintings could occur in the absence of 
language. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, there may be reason to think that imaginative capacities 
develop in tandem with linguistic ones. This evidence comes from examining the connection 
between language disorders and imaginative disorders. Note that this is a different issue to that 
addressed in Chapter 2 when discussing the pre-linguistic imagination of non-human animals 
and precursor hominids – I have since argued in Chapter 3 that the emergence of language 
within our species brings with it a shift in cognitive style, so examining language impairments 
should reveal something about the way that the human imagination, distinctive for its ability to 
employ (and, I suggest, its reliance upon) language in its service, is impacted when things go 
wrong with the language faculty. Evidence from pathologies in language and the imagination 
demonstrate striking correlations. Such cases include autism, aphasia and (contrary to common 
belief) Williams’ syndrome. I address the specific challenge from Humphrey immediately 
below, and go on to address other pathologies in the sections which follow. 
 
Humphrey’s challenge to this thesis comes from his discussion of the case of Nadia, an 
autistic savant who from an early age was able to produce strikingly realistic drawings whilst at 
the same time showing severe language deficits (Humphrey, 1998, Selfe, 2011). Autism is 
defined by a trio of deficits known as Wing’s triad (Wing and Gould, 1979) with impairments 
to imagination (by showing a tendency toward repetitive or obsessional activities and a lack of 
spontaneous pretend play), social competence (an inability to share and direct attention, to 
collaborate on shared intentions, to imitate, to recognise affect, and to understand and 
interpret the mental states of others) and communication (delayed or absent development of 
speech). Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) even suggest that, on the whole, autism is a disorder of 
the recreative imagination. This is the capacity that underpins perspective-shifting – ‘seeing, 
thinking about, and responding to the world as the other sees, thinks about, and responds to it’ 
(Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002: 8-9). 
 
 Humphrey presents the case of Nadia to challenge the orthodox view that, by the time 
we see cave art emerge, language must have been in place, since Nadia is seemingly capable of 
producing similar drawings in the absence of language. Whilst most of her drawings clearly 
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replicate images Nadia had seen, some are sometimes cited as original pieces of work. For 
instance, that shown in Fig. 10 has been suggested to be one that Nadia had composed by 
combining different animals to create a hybrid figure (Humphrey, 1998). If Humphrey is 
correct that Nadia is able to produce original drawings (and not merely copy images or draw 
from memory) then, rather than cave art being the product of a relatively rich linguistic 
tradition of storytelling as I suggest, cave art might have been produced in the absence of 
language (or, at least, in the near absence of it).71 However, there is reason to doubt 
Humphrey’s analysis based on the evidence from Nadia’s case: Lorna Selfe believes that the 
image in question is in fact a depiction of an okapi (Selfe, 2011). Selfe notes that Nadia was 
fascinated by the Ladybird series of books, and in one such book (Leigh-Pemberton, 1969) an 
okapi does feature (Fig. 11). As such, it looks like Nadia’s ‘hybrid figure’ does not present any 
case more puzzling than the other images Nadia produced. 
 
Fig. 11. Nadia’s okapi/hybrid (Selfe, 2011) Fig. 12 Ladybird’s okapi (Leigh-Pemberton, 1969) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Happé and Vital (2010) suggest that savant skills in a variety of domains (e.g. 
mathematical calculation, perfect-perspective drawing, absolute pitch, instant reproduction of 
newly heard music etc.) may all be explained by an important difference in cognitive style. They 																																																								
71 This approach, of course, ignores all of the other evidence from the time of the Creative Explosion that points to 
the existence of language at that time (see Fig. 1). There is also the separate issue of explaining (without recourse 
to anything linguistic in nature) why someone would take the dangerous trip into the cave to begin with, taking 
with them the materials required to create the cave paintings and selected ‘offerings’, and why people returned for 
generations alongside their children i.e. in the absence of some kind of cultural explanation such as a rich tradition 
of storytelling. 
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see Wing’s Triad as ‘fractionable’ i.e. as potentially dissociable aspects of autism, each bearing a 
different relation to the appearance of special skills in autistic people. Typically-developing 
individuals process incoming information in such a way as to preserve the ‘gist’ at the expense 
of the detail, whereas the reverse is true for autistic individuals (sometimes termed ‘weak 
coherence’ or ‘enhanced perceptual functioning’). On their view, ‘attention to detail and 
tendency towards exemplar-based memory… is the starting engine for talent in the savant 
domains’ (Happé and Vital, 2010: 33). 
 
Savant skills therefore don’t demonstrate any kind of exception to the rule that autistic 
individuals demonstrate deficits in imagination. They are, instead, a reflection of a cognitive 
style that focuses inappropriately on minute details at the expense of the wider ‘meaning’. 
These deficits affect both inventiveness and the capacity for pretence. Autistic children struggle 
with tasks measuring response diversity, for example, coming up with multiple uses for a series 
of standard objects (Ward, 1968) as well as for pretence. 
 
Currie and Ravenscroft’s view on the latter deficit seems to fit with those of Happé and 
Vital. Currie and Ravenscroft point out that autistic children can engage in ‘instructed’ 
pretence, and answer simple questions about pretence quite well. They also cite the results of 
one study (Leevers and Harris, 1998) which suggest that their visual imaginative capacities are 
in line with typically-developing children in tasks such as completing incomplete drawings.72 
They note that in the Leevers and Harris study that this task is cognitively less demanding for 
autistic children than pretend play because they are perhaps better equipped to set aside aspects 
of their visual environment and substitute them with imagined alternatives than they are with 
alternative propositional states – a matter of difficulty integrating these states into the current 
cognitive set.  
 
Currie and Ravenscroft cite further research from Harris and Leevers (Harris and 
Leevers, 2000) in favour of the notion that autistic individuals may favour visual or imagistic 
thought. If this is correct, it seems to me that language deficits might be heavily implicated 
here: the role of language in thought is precisely to give us a mechanism for forming truth-
functional propositional thoughts that can draw on conceptual content across domains (see 
Chapter 3). As the issue isn’t a problem of forming such propositional thoughts ‘full stop’ 																																																								
72 As noted in Chapter 2, pre-cursor hominids also demonstrate clear strengths in visual imagination in the absence 
of language. 
	 160 
(which is why this suggestion doesn’t predict an absence of language), it is integrating them with 
other thoughts of that nature, this too seems like something language can help with: despite 
their richness in content, I have suggested that linguistically encoded representations might 
present a lighter cognitive processing load than visually encoded ones, and by all accounts 
autistic people have impaired linguistic capacities (in production, comprehension and in 
acquisition). Perhaps this difference in cognitive style explains the difficulties they face with 
integration. Moreover, impairments in the linguistic domain may simply push autistic 
individuals toward a more visual cognitive style, strengthening neural connections in this 
domain while weakening them in the linguistic one. This evidence therefore seems to support 
some of the central claims of this thesis: that the emergence of language brings with it a shift in 
cognitive style, and that language can be (and is) co-opted by the imagination in such a way as to 
support pretend play (via fantasy). 
 
There is also an explanatory story of co-development to be told here to support this 
suggestion: the co-development of language and working memory in human beings. Courtney 
et al. (1998) suggest that analysis of the difference in functional neuro-anatomy between 
monkeys and humans points to a distinct and important shift in cognitive style. Neural substrates 
concerned with visual memory are ‘displaced’ in human beings, moving away from the relevant 
cortexes which employ them (thus making information processing in that domain cognitively 
more demanding). The reason, they suggest, is the emergence of language, whose associated 
cortical areas appear to take precedence. So, it would seem, human working memory was 
‘reformatted’ by the emergence of language, supporting the claim in this thesis that (certainly 
later in human evolution) language offers a cognitively lighter mode of processing, making it 
preferable as a cognitive style and prompting a shift away from a visuo-spatial mode of thought. 
 
§4 Imagination and Other Pathologies 
 
 Having (hopefully successfully) responded to the challenge that Nadia’s case presents, it 
is worth turning to evidence from other pathological cases to examine how language 
impairments might affect our imaginative capacities. If there is a strong correlation, then this 
suggests that my claim that imagination co-opted language in its service, and later came to 
depend heavily upon it, is credible. 
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§4.1 Aphasia 
 
Let us first examine acquired aphasia. Evidence suggests that aphasics have 
demonstrated impairments in a range of musical endeavours in which they were formerly 
competent, and in which the imagination might be taken to be heavily implicated. Musical 
examples include the perception of melodies e.g. detecting errors in familiar pieces of music, 
and in determining whether pairs of melodies were the same or different where pitch and/or 
contour were altered. Both of these capacities seem to involve simultaneously holding 
representations of the music as it is currently perceived to be structured and as we otherwise 
believe it to be structured, which we have suggested in Chapter 1 is one function of the 
imagination. The results of studies of the latter kind of example, according to Peretz (1990), 
suggest that musical processing is hierarchical, much like linguistic processing – the individual 
units can only be processed once the overall framework is established.  
 
In one case of Wernicke’s aphasia, that of composer Maurice Ravel, the impairment 
was that he could not translate musical representation into other representational forms. As 
Winner and von Karolyi (1998) explain:  
 
[H]e could not translate musical notation into motor form by playing, and he could not 
translate his auditory imagery of a piece of music into a visual form (by notating it) or 
into a motor form (by playing by heart). Yet he could use each of these modalities 
separately (Winner and von Karolyi, 1998: 380).  
 
Because the cause of the deficit in musical processing seemingly is the language 
impairment, processing for music and for language must either share some neural substrates or 
share contiguous neural substrates. This musical impairment appears to be a similar problem of 
integration as that described by Currie and Ravenscroft above relating to autism, since the 
aphasic patients could not integrate thoughts about their current perceptual states with those 
about the structural features of the music. Graphic representation (drawing), by contrast, has a 
much weaker association with aphasia, with the ability to draw remaining uncompromised even 
in cases of significant aphasia, which is to be expected if the visuo-spatial imagination long 
predates the linguistic imagination (as argued in Chapter 2). If the shared neural substrates 
underpinning language and music processing explain the difficulties aphasics face, the fact that 
autistic individuals struggle with propositional rather than ‘perceptual’ integration, yet can 
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display savant skills for reproducing newly heard music, seems again to only be explicable in 
terms of a cognitive style which inappropriately focuses on detail. 
 
These observations about aphasic cases, then, again support the idea that language (in 
this case, language’s computational mechanism narrow syntax) might have been co-opted by 
the imagination for use in producing and comprehending music, replacing the percept-based 
modality employed by our more evolutionarily ancient imaginative capacities. That also 
suggests that the nature of music itself might have been rather different after the advent of 
language, assuming (as we have in Chapter 5) that music predates language. Once our species 
came to lean more heavily on a linguistic comprehension of the world, music might have 
developed to take on a different (hierarchical) structure - or, perhaps, it became structured. As 
we noted in Chapter 5 with regard to the chants of the Brahmin, rhythmic elements that are 
particularly pleasing to us might come to take on significance. It is possible, therefore, that once 
we began structuring these musical elements that specific structures also became significant, 
taking what would be a more recognisable shape when compared with the music of today. 
 
§4.2 Williams Syndrome 
 
Another case worth considering is that of Williams Syndrome, which looks like the 
pathology most likely to challenge the notion that there is a connection between language and 
imagination. These cases are often taken to be evidence for the modularity of language because 
of its apparent encapsulation from the effects of other deficits associated with the syndrome. 
Children with Williams Syndrome are usually said to show deficits in executive and imaginative 
skills, and yet show ‘precocious’ social and communication skills (Carruthers, 1996). This 
would suggest that the imagination can remain in tact when our linguistic capacities are 
impaired, presenting something of a challenge for this thesis. However, this picture isn’t 
entirely accurate. 
 
Firstly, Currie and Ravenscroft point out that in some social aspects, such as 
performance on false-belief tasks, children with Williams syndrome don’t perform significantly 
better than some autistic children, and that as adults they do, in fact, have considerable 
difficulty in social understanding. If Theory of Mind develops in tandem with our linguistic 
capacities, as has been suggested in earlier chapters, then the poor performance on false-belief 
tasks of both autistic children and those with Williams syndrome might have a common cause: a 
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corresponding language deficit. Of course, the commonly accepted position on Williams 
syndrome is that there is no such deficit. However, an extensive review of language abilities in 
Williams syndrome by Brock (2007) suggests that, while language abilities might be somewhat 
better than in other pathological cases such as Down syndrome, there are some subtle 
differences between typically-developing children in terms of the rate of language acquisition, 
the mechanisms deployed in speech perception, and grammatical capabilities. In the case of 
grammatical capabilities, it is suggested that ‘good grammatical abilities in Williams syndrome 
may be a consequence of good auditory memory and rote learning as opposed to intact 
grammatical skills’ (Brock, 2007: 111). The perceived precociousness of Williams syndrome 
patients in terms of language is likely down to their strengths on receptive vocabulary tests, in 
which they perform better than typically developing children. Yet, despite this strength they 
perform worse on sentence repetition tasks, making distinctive syntactic errors (Brock, 2007: 
113). We might infer from this, then, that something has gone awry with the computational 
mechanism underpinning grammatical thought; and surely it isn’t a stretch to assume that 
(recursive) mindreading skills would be enhanced by a fully functioning computational system 
whose main purpose appears to be the generation of truth-evaluable propositions. If beliefs are 
the archetype of a propositional attitude, then any impairment to the system which generates 
such propositions could certainly impact upon performances on false belief tasks. 
 
§4.3 Psychosis 	
 Another pathological case draws a more indirect connection between language and the 
imagination, and this can be seen by looking again at literature on the evolution of language. 
Crow (2000) suggests that the emergence of language in our species may have brought with it 
an unexpected problem: psychosis. In Crow’s view, psychosis is the ‘price that humans have 
paid for language’. The persistence of mental illnesses like psychosis present something of a 
puzzle for evolutionary biologists, so Crow suggests that psychosis must accompany some 
selected-for trait like language.  
 
As I have previously noted, in Chomsky’s view the main benefits of language are for 
planning in thought (Chomsky, 2007b). But for something to be visible to evolution for 
selection it must become outwardly manifest. It seems obvious that better planning could make 
us more suitably adapted to an ecological niche and less vulnerable to predation, and given that 
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the biological basis for language got in place around 100kya we might expect to see evidence of 
increased population density (evidenced by the number of occupied sites) as a result of this new 
planning capacity. However, we don’t really see evidence of this until the point of the Creative 
Explosion (see Fig. 1 above). As such, we might wonder if the real benefit of language comes 
when it is co-opted by some pre-existing capacity like the imagination, and channeled into 
creative behaviour. If psychosis ‘comes for free’ with language, and language is selected for as it 
begins to enhance our imaginative capacities, then this would perhaps give a better alternative 
argument for the view that psychosis persists in the population because it bestows some kind of 
evolutionary advantage upon those who suffer simultaneously from its disadvantages (Cela-
Conde et al., 2006, also tie psychosis more directly to creativity than to language).  
 
 Crow (2008: 34) describes the symptoms of psychosis as including a sense of 
‘persecution’, as well as one of ‘grandiosity’ (enhanced in male subjects) and the invocation of 
‘paranormal beliefs’. Crow’s proposal is that the nuclear symptoms of schizophrenia are 
abnormalities of language, specifically the transition between thought and speech i.e. when we 
think something we want to say, and speech (perception) and meaning. Thoughts, emotions 
and intentions are generated internally but misattributed to an external agent since they are 
identified as speech and alien control (see Fig. 12). Crow explains the connection to language as 
a functional breakdown in areas of the brain concerned with speech-production and 
comprehension. This is possible because: 
 
The sensory and more phonological engrams, located presumably in Wernicke’s and 
Broca’s areas respectively, are not the same. They must be related – because the words 
that we hear are the basis of the words that we speak, a relationship established in the 
acquisition of language – but the two are anatomically segregated, and in the normal 
use of language must be functionally independent’ (Crow 2008: 39).  
 
In other words, our underlying capacity to ‘hear’ voices in ordinary speech-perception 
is distinct from our ability to produce an inner monologue. In cases of psychosis, just such a 
breakdown is apparently common, and this could account for the sense of external agency in 
certain acts of creation. In particular, a central problem is the function of the indexical ‘I’. In 
speech acts this indexical refers to a unique individual, the speaker (except in cases of reported 
speech), but in cases of psychosis a host of neurological problems appear to cause a breakdown 
in understanding that internally generated thoughts (e.g. ‘I need to eat something’) to take on 
	 165 
the appearance of perceived speech – where the ‘I’ refers to an external speaker who is not 
otherwise perceptually present. This leads the psychotic individual to misattribute the thought 
to an external agent.73 
 
Fig. 13: Nuclear symptoms of schizophrenia (Crow, 2008) 
 
Descriptions of key elements according to the glossary to the present State Examination 
Thought echo or commentary [item 57]: the subject experiences his own thought as repeated or 
echoed with very little interval between the original and the echo. 
Voices commenting [item 62]: a voice of voices heard by the subject speaking about him and therefore 
referring to him in the third person. 
Passivity [delusions of control – item 71]: the essence of the symptom is that the subject experiences 
his will as replaced by that of some other force or agency. 
Thought insertion [item 55]: the essence of the symptom is that the subject experiences thoughts which 
are not his own intruding into his mind. The symptom is not that he has been caused to have unusual 
thoughts [for example, if he thinks the Devil is making him think evil thoughts] but that the thoughts 
themselves are not his. In the most typical case the alien thoughts are said to have been inserted into the 
mind from outside, by means of radar or telepathy or some other means. 
Thought withdrawal [item 58]: the subject says that his thoughts have been removed from his head so 
that he has no thoughts. 
Thought broadcast [item 56]: the subject experiences his thoughts actually being shared with others. 
Primary delusions [item 82]: based upon sensory experiences [delusional perceptions] in which a patient 
suddenly becomes convinced that a particular set of events has a special meaning. 
(Reproduced from Crow 2008: 33) 
 
  
It is precisely this notion of alien control which Whitley (2009) describes as typifying 
Shamanic art-production, and which might also explain the Platonic version of Inspirationalism 
which ties creativity to divine inspiration. The suggestion that artists in these states are (from 
their own phenomenological perspective) acting out the will of another individual is what 
unites these cases. Crow’s view of the link between language and psychosis provides a way of 
naturalising creative acts of this kind, without violating the non-accidental condition of the 
analysis of creativity, seeing as they are nonetheless the authors of their own creative thoughts, 
but are simply unable to recognise them as such. 
 
§4.3.1 Hearing Voices and Creativity 
 
 But there are, perhaps, bigger implications to consider in the connection between 
hearing voices and being creative. Daniel (Dennett, 1997) has argued for the importance of 
learning to talk to ourselves i.e. developing an inner monologue. For Dennett, this takes the 
form of a ‘semi-understood self-commentary’, with Dennett understandably reluctant to 																																																								
73 I am glossing over a great amount of detail here – for a full account of the specific neurological areas affected by 
psychosis, see Crow, 2008. 
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suggest that all thoughts in which we talk to ourselves are fully expressed linguistic 
propositions. But his tentative suggestion for how we come to acquire this capacity does 
(seemingly) depend upon full language. He suggests that we come to associate the warnings of 
our parents (e.g. ‘Don’t touch the stove, it’s very hot!’) with a certain situation and pattern of 
behaviour (in this case, hot stove avoidance). As we enact this behaviour, we recite to ourselves 
the parental mantra, creating a kind of inner monologue which develops further as we come to 
represent our own mental states and activities to ourselves, and not just our parents’ chiding. 
 
 Consider again, then, my suggestion that our tendency to fantasise drove us to 
eventually externalise those fantasies, later developing some of them into stories. Fantasy must, 
at least in part, depend upon our ability to create an inner monologue. Fantasies seem to involve 
an active kind of imagining, not the more passive process of picturing; we seem to control and 
manipulate events in a fantasy, but by contrast other kinds of imagining seem to be quite passive 
experiences. Full language is the perfect tool for instructing the imagination in terms of sequences 
of events, allowing as it does for referential specificity (who did what to whom and when). As 
such, fantasies can be developed into complex narratives with the use of language, all of which 
can be generated in our own minds via a kind of inner monologue. That isn’t to say that there 
are no visual aspects of fantasies, there certainly are; but these visual aspects are perhaps also 
driven in response to linguistic prompts. 
 
 The capacity we have to create an internal monologue today would presumably have 
developed alongside our acquisition of natural language, and prior to the emergence of natural 
language it would be severely restricted by the lexicon of meaning-signal pairs inherited from 
our evolutionary ancestors. The earliest and most basic fantasies would certainly have related to 
our basic needs, since they are almost certainly (based upon observation of animal signaling 
systems) the things we would also create lexical items for first. We might have fantasies, for 
instance, about sex or food. As the relevant lexical items relating to these topics were drawn 
into the computational process of narrow syntax, they could be related to one another in new 
and revealing ways, eventually being arranged into truth-evaluable propositions that take us 
beyond what is given to us in perception.74 But this process, I have suggested, depends upon the 
language faculty. Is there any way to be sure of this? 
																																																								
74 Intrerestingly, Asma (2017: 148) points out that there is psychological evidence to suggest that we have a 
tendency to unconsciously exaggerate perceptions (a process influenced by our subjective emotional and cognitive 
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 One way we could test this would be to conduct an experiment similar to that 
conducted by de Villiers (2014), which was discussed briefly in Chapter 3 (§3.4). de Villiers 
observed that experimental subjects struggled to recognise event similarity in images when 
their language faculty was tied up in another task. The suggestion I made in Chapter 3 was that 
the emergence of the language faculty altered the way we perceived the world, making it easier 
to parse information like who did what to whom. This claim is reinforced, I suggest, by 
observations made in §2 of this chapter. But language is also involved in generating imagined 
perceptions, I have suggested, in cases where we fantasise. A way to test this claim would be to 
ask participants to (attempt to) fantasise whilst the language faculty was tied up in another task. 
Difficulty doing so could be attributable to the role that the language faculty plays in being able 
to fantasise. 
 
§5 Positive Evidence? 
 
Besides hypothetical evidence in favour of this thesis, there are other extant studies 
that, I suggest, offer additional direct support for my central claims. In the first instance, a 
study by Trionfi and Reese (2009) suggests that there is a strong correlation between 
imagination and narrative (the ability to tell and comprehend stories). In their study, 5-year-
olds who had previously engaged with imaginary companions scored higher on narrative quality 
(i.e. they tell richer narratives) when retelling stories and personal narratives. Engaging with 
imaginary friends is an example of the kind of paracosm, or fantasy world, that children 
routinely create. This looks to me like further support for the claim that fantasising both drives 
linguistic development and that it drives creative behaviour.  
 
It has been suggested, as discussed in Chapter 5, that storytelling is a good way to 
disseminate information. However, the medium through which one tells a story makes a 
significant difference to the truth of this claim. A study by Singer and Singer (2005) which 
compared oral storytelling with other mediums, such as films and television, as a method of 
disseminating information, found that it performed comparatively poorly. This is perhaps 
unsurprising – television and films tell a story, but with the aid of images, and as I have noted, 
our imaginative engagement with images has more evolutionarily ancient roots. However, an 
implication of this study is interesting. Singer and Singer suggest that the fact that the 																																																																																																																																																														
states). For instance, people regularly report the size of an intruder as much larger than the actual perpetrator. 
This unconscious process might be part of what drove us away from the truth when we first began to fantasise. 
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information passed on through oral storytelling is less well remembered might implicate a more 
active role for the imagination in reconstructing stories when we come to recall them. The 
more incomplete the information is, the more we have to invent things to fill in the gaps in our 
memory. As such, storytelling could be expected to drive our imaginative capacities quite 
rapidly as we sought to remember and re-tell stories. This could explain the ‘explosive’ nature 
of the emergence of human creativity.  
 
We noted in Chapter 4 the Wyver and Spence study showing that there was a 
correlation between divergent problem-solving skills and pretend play. More recently, Kaugars 
and Russ (2009) reinvestigated this link and found that children who show better storytelling 
skills in episodes of pretend play were those who showed the better divergent problem-solving 
skills. This seems like direct evidence that storytelling can be connected to creativity, but it also 
fulfills the explanatory challenge from Lillard et al to posit an explanation of creativity that has 
pretend play as an epiphenomenon by suggesting that the common cause of both a tendency to 
engage in pretend play and enhanced divergent problem-solving skills is an enhanced capacity 
for storytelling. Moreover, Moore and Russ (2008) found that overall creativity could be 
enhanced by adults assisting children with play episodes by giving them stories to enact (or even 
just the beginning of a story). As such, it appears that any benefits from pretend play might, in 
fact, be benefits of engaging with a story through play. This, coupled with the considerations 
above, should give us reason to support the view that storytelling, via fantasy, drove the 
evolution of human creativity rather than pretend play. The common theme which emerges 
from the totality of this evidence is that the more we engage with fantastic narratives, the more 
likely it is that we will be creative adults. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 This chapter has reviewed a range of further empirical evidence that I take to either 
challenge or support the conclusions I’ve advocated for throughout this thesis. I have attempted 
to deal with challenges to the connection between language and the imagination raised by cases 
like Nadia, the autistic savant, and from Williams syndrome cases. Beyond this, I have 
presented evidence that ties language, fantasy and storytelling to the development of creativity. 
If this evidence is taken seriously then I believe that it gives us good reason to prefer my 
Storytelling Hypothesis over Picciuto and Carruthers’ Pretend Play Hypothesis, which attempts 
to solve the same puzzle – that posed by the Creative Explosion. 
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CLOSING REMARKS 
 
  
The nature of the puzzle of the Creative Explosion makes it near enough impossible to 
provide a definitive solution to it. Because certain kinds of practice don’t fossilise, we will 
never be able to fully demonstrate the truth of any claims about what appeared in the gap 
between the emergence of our species and the emergence of our species’ creative behaviours. 
As such, we’re left in the position of advocating a view which can, at best, have only indirect 
evidence. This has led some scientists and philosophers (e.g. Buller, 2005) to dismiss any 
attempt to address such puzzles as mere ‘just-so stories’, in reference to Rudyard Kipling’s 
fanciful explanations for children as to how animals acquired certain characteristics. No doubt 
my thesis is yet another such tale. But I think it is worth asking why these kinds of stories are so 
popular, even amongst academics who should perhaps know better. And I think I’ve answered 
that question in this thesis – we are naturally inclined toward telling stories with a peculiar 
nature, namely, ones which attempt to explain the way the world is, even if this requires us to 
posit unusual entities as agents, and even if these explanations actually move us further from 
reality and into the realm of fantasy. The result of constructing such stories is perhaps that they 
encourage us look for all sorts of (usually indirect) evidence that we might otherwise neglect or 
dismiss. The fact that such stories are common across all human populations, and across every 
domain of human life, is revealing about our nature I think. And it is in attempting to explain 
that nature that I have arrived at the position I have defended here. 
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